Richard F. Potthoff

Dr. Richard F. Potthoff

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Academic Career Length

25Years (2002-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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2 May 2021 in American Politics Research
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RPRichard F. Potthoff
Richard F. Potthoff
MMMichael C. Munger
Michael C. Munger
Using thermometer score data from the ANES, we show that while there may have been no clear-cut Condorcet winner among the 2016 US presidential candidates, there appears to have been a Condorcet loser: Donald Trump. Thus the surprise is that the electorate preferred not only Hillary Clinton, but also the two “minor” candidates, Gary Johnson and Jill Stein, to Trump. Another surprise is that Johnson may have been the Condorcet winner. A minimal normative standard for evaluating voting systems is advanced, privileging those systems that select Condorcet winners if one exists, and critiquing systems that allow the selection of Condorcet losers. A variety of voting mechanisms are evaluated using the 2016 thermometer scores: Condorcet voting, plurality, Borda, (single winner) Hare, Coombs, range voting, and approval voting. We conclude that the essential problem with the existing voting procedure—Electoral College runoff of primary winners of two major parties—is that it (demonstrably) allows the selection of a Condorcet loser.

12 January 2018 in Social Sciences
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RPRichard F. Potthoff
Richard F. Potthoff
For two or more dimensions, the two main approaches to estimating legislators’ ideal points from roll-call data entail arbitrary, yet consequential, identification and modeling assumptions that bring about both indeterminateness and undue constraints for the ideal points. This paper presents a simple and fast approach to estimating ideal points in multiple dimensions that is not marred by those issues. The leading approach at present is that of Poole and Rosenthal. Also prominent currently is one that uses Bayesian techniques. However, in more than one dimension, they both have several problems, of which nonidentifiability of ideal points is the most precarious. The approach that we offer uses a particular mode of principal components analysis to estimate ideal points. It applies logistic regression to estimate roll-call parameters. It has a special feature that provides some guidance for deciding how many dimensions to use. Although its relative simplicity makes it useful even in just one dimension, its main advantages are for more than one.

25 April 2010 in Public Choice
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RPRichard F. Potthoff
Richard F. Potthoff

1 March 2023 in Election Law Journal: Rules, Politics, and Policy
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RPRichard F. Potthoff
Richard F. Potthoff
The Hare voting system for single-winner elections—better known currently as ranked-choice voting (RCV) and earlier as instant-runoff voting (IRV)—has recently experienced sharply increased adoptions and impact in the U.S. Therefore, a detailed examination of its favorable and unfavorable features is necessary. Further, we compare Hare against a different type of ranked-choice voting—Condorcet systems. Advocates of Hare rightly point out that it avoids some serious defects of plurality voting (though so do Condorcet systems). Not afflicting Condorcet systems are many flaws of Hare, including possible failure to elect Condorcet winners; lack of summability; inability to rank candidates at the bottom, below unused ranks; obscuring the strength of a dropped candidate; and dubious recount provisions. We note some unnatural restrictions imposed by actual or proposed rules governing Hare: maximums on how many candidates may be ranked, prevention of recount requests from potential winners, and disregard of skipped intermediate rankings—limitations that may arise from efforts to overcome inherent Hare complexity.