Social distancing measures due to the COVID-19 pandemic have accelerated the adoption and implementation of digital mental health tools. Psychiatry and therapy sessions are being conducted via videoconferencing platforms, and the use of digital mental health tools for monitoring and treatment has grown. This rapid shift to telehealth during the pandemic has given added urgency to the ethical challenges presented by digital mental health tools. Regulatory standards have been relaxed to allow this shift to socially distanced mental health care. It is imperative to ensure that the implementation of digital mental health tools, especially in the context of this crisis, is guided by ethical principles and abides by professional codes of conduct. This paper examines key areas for an ethical path forward in this digital mental health revolution: privacy and data protection, safety and accountability, and access and fairness.

Medical interventions are usually categorized as “invasive” when they involve piercing the skin or inserting an object into the body. Beyond this standard definition, however, there is little discussion of the concept of invasiveness in the medical literature, despite evidence that the term is used in ways that do not reflect the standard definition of medical invasiveness. We interviewed psychiatrists, patients with depression, and members of the public without depression to better understand their views on the invasiveness of several psychiatric electroceutical interventions (treatments that involve electrical or magnetic stimulation of the brain) for the treatment of depression. Our study shows that people recognize several kinds of invasiveness: physical, emotional, and lifestyle. In addition, several characteristics of therapies influence how invasive they are perceived to be; these include the perceived capacity of an intervention to result in harm; how localized the effects of the intervention are; the amount of control retained by the person receiving the intervention; how permanent its effects are perceived as being; and how familiar it seemed to participants. Our findings contribute to a small literature on the concept of invasiveness, which emphasizes that categorizing an intervention as invasive, or as noninvasive, evokes a variety of other normative considerations, including the potential harm it poses and how it compares to other potential therapies. It may also draw attention away from other salient features of the intervention.

The potential to collect brain data more directly, with higher resolution, and in greater amounts has heightened worries about mental and brain privacy. In order to manage the risks to individuals posed by these privacy challenges, some have suggested codifying new privacy rights, including a right to “mental privacy.” In this paper, we consider these arguments and conclude that while neurotechnologies do raise significant privacy concerns, such concerns are—at least for now—no different from those raised by other well-understood data collection technologies, such as gene sequencing tools and online surveillance. To better understand the privacy stakes of brain data, we suggest the use of a conceptual framework from information ethics, Helen Nissenbaum’s “contextual integrity” theory. To illustrate the importance of context, we examine neurotechnologies and the information flows they produce in three familiar contexts—healthcare and medical research, criminal justice, and consumer marketing. We argue that by emphasizing what is distinct about brain privacy issues, rather than what they share with other data privacy concerns, risks weakening broader efforts to enact more robust privacy law and policy.

Stakeholders' perceptions of barriers to and other ethical concerns about using psychiatric electroceutical interventions (PEIs), interventions that use electrical or magnetic stimuli to treat psychiatric conditions like treatment-resistant depression (TRD), may influence the uptake of these interventions. This study examined such perceptions among psychiatrists, patients with depression, and members of the public. We conducted semi-structured qualitative interviews with 16 members of each group to examine their views on practical barriers and ethical concerns. We used qualitative content analysis to identify relevant themes, and compared findings across stakeholder groups. Access limitations to the interventions, including cost and availability of the interventions, cut across all PEIs-including those that are still experimental, and were raised by all groups. Most participants across all groups raised concerns about informed consent, in terms of receiving adequate, appropriate, and understandable information. Our results suggest that these three stakeholder groups perceive similar structural and attitudinal barriers to, and have similar ethical concerns about, using PEIs for TRD. These results identify key issues that must be addressed for the full potential of PEIs to be realized. Future research with larger samples will help to better understand how to address these barriers to treatment for individuals with TRD.