The economic effects of the Covid-19 pandemic have placed a renewed strain on the economic governance of the European Union (EU). The European Central Bank (ECB) was a key player in the EU's response to the crisis induced by the pandemic. This paper adopts a theoretical approach focused on policy learning to explain how and why the ECB responded to the crisis in 2020–2021. By drawing on speeches, newspaper articles and interviews with policy-makers, the paper finds that the ECB was able to rely on earlier crisis experiences in the euro area in forming its response to the pandemic crisis. Although the sovereign debt crisis and the pandemic crisis had both similarities and differences from one another, the ECB was able to engage in inter-crisis and intra-crisis learning. Its learning concerned objectives, instruments as well as an awareness that timely and forceful response was crucial, so that the member states and other EU institutions had time to act.
The Basel III Accord on a ‘Global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems’ was issued in late 2010 as the cornerstone of the international regulatory response to the global financial crisis. Its adoption into European Union (EU) legislation has, however, been met with considerable member state reticence and intra-EU negotiations are ongoing. This paper investigates the political economy of new capital requirements in the EU, arguing that the institutional features of national banking sectors convincingly account for the divergence in EU member state preferences on capital rules.
The global financial crisis that reached its peak in late 2008 has brought the importance of financial services regulation and supervision into the spotlight. This book examines the governance of financial services in the EU, asking who governs financial services in the EU, how and why, and explaining where the power lies in the policy-making process. It covers the main financial services: banking, securities, payments systems, clearing and settlement. Addressing the politics and public policy aspects of financial market integration, regulation and supervision in the European Union, this book conducts a theoretically-informed and empirically-grounded analysis of financial services governance from the establishment of Economic and Monetary Union (1999) and the launch of the Financial Services Action Plan (1999), to date. It also assesses the EU responses to the global financial crisis. Providing a reliable and unique insight into the politics of financial services regulation in the EU based on an extensive programme of interviews with policy makers and stakeholders across Europe, the book will be of great topical interest to students and scholars of European Union studies, political science and political economy.
24 January 2023 in Journal of European Public Policy
The COVID-19 pandemic posed unprecedented challenges to the European Union (EU) and its member states. In the EU, health policy competence has been and remains largely with member states. However, faced with a major external crisis, which more or less affected all member states at the same time, the EU developed a framework within which the member states (and their subnational units) could respond together to the crisis. This introductory article to the Special Issue ‘The COVID-19 Pandemic and the European Union,’ briefly examines how EU institutions, policies and politics were affected by the crisis. Contrary to earlier crises, the EU responded speedily and effectively this time around. The EU has become increasingly important in crisis management, in part due to the nature of transboundary crises. The EU proved itself to be a good crisis manager on some dimensions, but certainly not on all. The crisis created momentum for collective action and for fast decision-making, even though the legitimacy of some these actions has been subject to limited public scrutiny.
In this article, we apply the ‘failing forward’ approach to analyse the negotiations on and design of reforms to Eurozone economic governance to tackle the Covid-19-related crisis of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). This crisis highlights both spill-overs from major asymmetries in EMU and weaknesses in the incomplete economic governance of the Eurozone. We focus on the financial support mechanisms agreed upon after intergovernmental negotiations in major crisis situations. These reforms represent compromise solutions that reflect well-entrenched disagreements among member states. We explain why more far-reaching reforms to Eurozone economic governance – notably, the adoption of mutualized Euro-denominated debt and the generalized use of grants over loans – have not been adopted, despite the severity of the Covid-19-related crisis. These reforms – notably the Next Generation European Union (NGEU) financial package adopted in July 2020 – fail to address and, rather, contribute to existing asymmetries, thus sowing the seeds of future crises.