Lilong Zhu

Prof. Dr. Lilong Zhu

School of Business, Shandong Normal University, Jinan, Shandong, China
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

17Years (2010-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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3 March 2020 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HHHui He
Hui He
LZLilong Zhu
Lilong Zhu
With the development of e-commerce, online shopping has become one of the most important consumer channels. However, the lack of government supervision, insufficient review of e-commerce platforms, illegal sales of online sellers and invalid consumer complaints have led to frequent green product quality problems during online shopping. Therefore, this paper considers that the online seller may be driven by interests, colluding with the e-commerce platform and selling low quality green product. At the same time, we introduce consumer feedback, and take the government supervision department, the online seller and the e-commerce platform as actors of the evolutionary game. In this paper, the evolutionary strategy choices of each actor were analyzed, and the influence of different factors on the evolutionary stability results was explored. Research indicates: firstly, consumer complaints play an indirect regulatory role for the online seller; secondly, the enhancement of the loss-sharing relationship between the online seller and the e-commerce platform can promote the legal operation of the two and prevent collusion; thirdly, the impact of consumer complaints on the choice of the e-commerce platform depends on the government supervision department’s penalty for the e-commerce platform; finally, the e-commerce platform establishes a reasonable reward system, which can make up for the defects of the online seller using advanced technology to avoid punishment. Our paper uses Matlab 2017 for simulation analysis and provides effective advices on how to urge the government supervision department to effectively supervise, promote the e-commerce platform to enhance review, urge the online seller to legal sale, and encourage consumers to legally defend their rights.

22 April 2020 in PLOS ONE
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
LZLilong Zhu
Lilong Zhu
Based on a three-stage stackelberg dynamic game analysis, this paper constructs a product quality control strategy model for three types of distribution channels (direct channel, retail channel and mixed channel) in a three-echelon supply chain, which is composed of one manufacturer, one retailer and the final customer. This paper studies how to design a distribution channel strategy and provides a product quality control strategy. Furthermore, this paper analyzes three types of distribution channels strategy in the context of how they influence a manufacturer’s product quality decision and quality prevention strategy, a retailer’s product pricing decision and quality inspection strategy, and the final customer’s product demand decision. We compare the manufacturer’s product quality level, quality prevention effort level, wholesale price, direct sale price and the retailer’s quality inspection effort level, retail price in three types of distribution channels and determine the manufacturer’s and retailer’s expected profits function and the final customer’s consumer surplus. In addition, we introduce the distribution channels demand elasticity ratio to analyze the influence of determining the product quality control strategy. Most importantly, we conduct a numerical sample analysis that will prove the model’s effectiveness and indicate a specific application in practice.

20 September 2021 in Frontiers in Environmental Science
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
HHHui He
Hui He
SZSiyi Zhang
Siyi Zhang
LZLilong Zhu
Lilong Zhu
Green consumption is an important foundation for achieving stable and long-term economic development goals. With the rapid development of e-commerce and people’s widespread attention to sustainability, more and more consumers purchase green products online. Therefore, we consider consumer feedback mechanisms including evaluation and complaint and construct an evolutionary game model of green product quality supervision with the participation of governmental supervision department, third-party e-commerce platform, online seller and consumer, which analyzes the four parties’ evolutionary stable strategies. To verify the theoretical results, we conduct a numerical simulation by Matlab 2020b. Moreover, we study the conditions that make evolutionary stable strategy combination exist based on Lyapunov’s First Method. And we find that when consumer chooses complaint, (0, 0, 1) is likely to become an only evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller chooses to provide high-quality green product, third-party e-commerce platform chooses not to strengthen inspection, and governmental supervision department chooses to strictly supervise. Conversely, when the consumer chooses no complaint, (1, 0, 0) and (0, 0, 1) may become an evolutionary stable strategy combination. At this time, the online seller cannot be stable in providing high-quality green product. What’s more, governmental supervision department increases the penalty, which can incentivize a third-party e-commerce platform to strengthen inspection. Third-party e-commerce platform increases the reward and can promote online seller to provide high-quality green product. On the one hand, this paper enriches the theoretical basis of online shopping green product quality supervision. On the other hand, compared with existing literature, it extends the main body of the evolutionary game to four paries and broadens the application scope of the game model. In addition, it has put forward feasible suggestions for the government supervision department to strengthen the quality supervision, and provided decision-making support for the third-party e-commerce platform to assume the responsibility of quality inspection.

17 August 2020 in Complexity
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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JRJunmei Rong
Junmei Rong
LZLilong Zhu
Lilong Zhu
The quality of pharmaceuticals has always been a hot issue in the world, and it involves public health, economic development of countries, social stability, and national security. Cleaner production is a prerequisite for ensuring the quality of medicines. However, the various types of counterfeit pharmaceuticals and fake vaccines exposed in the recent years have revealed many problems, such as lacking government regulation, loose quality management of companies, illegal profit of medical service agencies, and failure of patient complaints. This paper’s two innovations are as follows: first, it not only considers the collusion between pharmaceutical companies and medical service agencies, but also introduces patient feedback to study drug quality regulation strategies from a microperspective; second, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving cleaner production pharmaceutical companies, medical service agencies, and the governments to analyze the evolutionary stability using the Lyapunov first rule. The results of the research show that, first, improvement of patient complaint rates can effectively curb collusive behavior and promote the stable improvement of cleaner production drug quality; second, the governments must impose sufficient fines on pharmaceutical companies to avoid a stable strategic combination of collusion; third, enhancing patient feedback can speed up the evolution of the stable choice of legitimate strategies by pharmaceutical companies and the medical service agencies; finally, the government reducing the strict regulation costs can increase the strict regulation rate employed in the evolution process and slow down the pace of evolution to loose regulation. In addition, the simulation analysis was carried out using Matlab 2017b, which verified the validity of the model and proved the practical meaning of countermeasures and suggestions for improving government quality regulation.

1 January 2021 in Complexity
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
SZSiyi Zhang
Siyi Zhang
LZLilong Zhu
Lilong Zhu
Considering the government reward and punishment mechanism and the collusion behavior between third‐party testing agencies and drug enterprises, based on the coregulation information platform, this paper constructs an evolutionary game model of coregulation supervision, which involves the participation of local government, drug enterprises, and third‐party testing agencies. The stable equilibrium points of each participant’s strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov’s first method, and MATLAB 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players’ strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, the government‐increased awards and penalties will promote the integrity of drug enterprises and noncollusion of third‐party testing agencies, but it is not conducive to strict performance of regulatory responsibilities by the local government. Secondly, the provision of real drug test reports by third‐party testing agencies to the coregulation information platform can supervise drug enterprises and restrict local government to perform its duty. Thirdly, the central government’s punishment to the local government’s dereliction of duty is significant to enhancing the robustness of drug enterprises’ integrity operation. Furthermore, reasonably setting rewards and punishments and perfecting the coregulation information platform will help form a coregulation pattern of government supervision, self‐discipline of drug enterprises, and social supervision. Finally, drug quality is highly related to whether drug enterprises operate with integrity. Standardizing coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation is the key to ensuring the safety of the source of drug quality. Therefore, this paper enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the coregulation supervision of drug enterprises’ integrity operation and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.

29 April 2022 in Frontiers in Public Health
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
SZSiyi Zhang
Siyi Zhang
LZLilong Zhu
Lilong Zhu
The efficiency and level of drug quality supervision are highly related to the distorted or true reporting of new media, and the collusion or non-collusion of third-party testing agencies. Therefore, based on the co-regulation information platform, considering the strategic choices of local government, drug enterprises, third-party testing agencies and new media, this article constructs a four-party evolutionary game model of co-regulation supervision. The stable equilibrium points of each participant's strategic choices are solved. The stability of the strategic combination is analyzed by Lyapunov's first method, and Matlab 2020b is used for simulation analysis to verify the influence of each decision variable on different players' strategic choices. The results show that, firstly, new media's true reporting can make up for the lack of supervision of drug enterprises by local government, and the greater the impact of new media reporting, the more active drug enterprises will be to produce high-quality drugs. Secondly, non-collusion of third-party testing agencies can improve the self-discipline ability of drug enterprises, encourage new media to report truthfully, and play the role of co-regulation supervision. Furthermore, the greater the probability of new media's true reporting, the more local government tend to be stricter, and the probability of strict supervision is positively related to the central government's accountability. Finally, increasing penalty for producing low-quality drugs and collusion will help standardize the behavior of drug enterprises and third-party testing agencies. This article enriches and expands the theoretical basis of the drug quality co-regulation supervision and proposes corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.