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Dr. Lili Xu
Dalian Maritime University

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0 Development Economics
0 Industrial Organization
0 Privatization
0 Pubic Economics
0 Environmental Economics and Policy

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Article
Published: 22 May 2021 in The Japanese Economic Review
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This study considers strategic relations between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and privatization policy in a mixed duopoly. We investigate the impact of the order of sequential games and compare with simultaneous game to highlight the significant role of the foreign shareholding ratio of the CSR-firm. We show that the privatization-then-CSR case yields a lower (higher) degree of privatization while a higher (lower) level of CSR than the CSR-then-privatization case when foreign penetration is low (high). We also show that privatization-then-CSR case can be a unique equilibrium in an endogenous timing game, while it is socially desirable when foreign penetration is neither sufficiently low nor high.

ACS Style

Lili Xu; Fanrui Su; Sang-Ho Lee. Strategic corporate social responsibility and partial privatization policy with foreign penetration. The Japanese Economic Review 2021, 1 -28.

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Fanrui Su, Sang-Ho Lee. Strategic corporate social responsibility and partial privatization policy with foreign penetration. The Japanese Economic Review. 2021; ():1-28.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Fanrui Su; Sang-Ho Lee. 2021. "Strategic corporate social responsibility and partial privatization policy with foreign penetration." The Japanese Economic Review , no. : 1-28.

Journal article
Published: 14 August 2020 in Sustainability
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This study considers two asymmetric ports under international competition in which each country has a hub port and a private manufacturer and investigates strategic interactions between port privatization and emission tax policies. We emphasize the key role of the relative market size between the two countries and show that in a privatization choice game, port privatization is a dominant strategy in a larger country, but it will be chosen by a smaller country only if its relative market size is not so small. We also show that the coordination of global emission taxes before privatization choices can induce the equilibrium of the game to be globally optimal when the emission tax is relatively high. This finding provides an important policy implication on the climate change that coordinated global environmental policy is imperatively required in the port privatization policy.

ACS Style

Feng Pian; Lili Xu; Yuyan Chen; Sang-Ho Lee. Global Emission Taxes and Port Privatization Policies under International Competition. Sustainability 2020, 12, 6595 .

AMA Style

Feng Pian, Lili Xu, Yuyan Chen, Sang-Ho Lee. Global Emission Taxes and Port Privatization Policies under International Competition. Sustainability. 2020; 12 (16):6595.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Feng Pian; Lili Xu; Yuyan Chen; Sang-Ho Lee. 2020. "Global Emission Taxes and Port Privatization Policies under International Competition." Sustainability 12, no. 16: 6595.

Journal article
Published: 29 May 2020 in China Economic Review
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This paper investigates the strategic corporate social responsibility (CSR) of a high-speed rail (HSR) firm when competing with an airline firm in a differentiated transportation market and the interactions with government environmental policies in the context of a Cournot–Bertrand comparison. We find that a standard CSR chosen by the government is lower under Cournot than that under Bertrand when both the marginal cost of HSR and product substitutability are low enough, while a voluntary CSR chosen by the HSR operator is always higher under Cournot than that under Bertrand. We also find that the voluntary CSR could be higher or lower than the standard CSR, depending on marginal costs, product substitutability, and competition modes. We then show that when the government imposes an environmental tax together with CSR activities, both the strategic CSR and environmental tax are always lower under Cournot than those under Bertrand. Finally, we show that equilibrium traffic volumes, ticket fares, consumer welfare, and social welfare are independent of competition modes with environmental tax.

ACS Style

Lili Xu; Xinying Fan; Weixin Luan. Strategic corporate social responsibility of high-speed rail in China. China Economic Review 2020, 62, 101499 .

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Xinying Fan, Weixin Luan. Strategic corporate social responsibility of high-speed rail in China. China Economic Review. 2020; 62 ():101499.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Xinying Fan; Weixin Luan. 2020. "Strategic corporate social responsibility of high-speed rail in China." China Economic Review 62, no. : 101499.

Journal article
Published: 05 December 2018 in Economic Modelling
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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become a global business strategy and thus it provides significant welfare implications for designing optimal policies. This paper investigates the impact of CSR on policy interaction between tariffs and privatization in an international bilateral trade model. We find that CSR is closely related to the government's policy decisions on tariffs. In particular, we find that the strategic tariff for increasing domestic welfare is always higher (lower) than the efficient tariff for improving global welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). We also show that a privatization policy raises tariff and worsens (improves) domestic welfare when the degree of CSR is low (high). Finally, we demonstrate that both countries choose a nationalization policy even though the privatization policy is globally optimal when the degree of CSR is high.

ACS Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee. Tariffs and privatization policy in a bilateral trade with corporate social responsibility. Economic Modelling 2018, 80, 339 -351.

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Sang-Ho Lee. Tariffs and privatization policy in a bilateral trade with corporate social responsibility. Economic Modelling. 2018; 80 ():339-351.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee. 2018. "Tariffs and privatization policy in a bilateral trade with corporate social responsibility." Economic Modelling 80, no. : 339-351.

Journal article
Published: 01 November 2018 in International Review of Economics & Finance
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This study investigates environmental policies in free-entry mixed markets taking account of excess burden of taxation. We consider and compare the two ex-ante and ex-post tax policies in which the government chooses the optimal environmental tax before or after private firms invest fixed costs and enter the market, respectively. When the excess burden of taxation is small (large), we find that ex-post taxation imposes a lower (higher) tax level than ex-ante taxation, which induces a larger (smaller) number of firms and a higher (lower) environmental damage. We also show that the excess burden of taxation can increase the welfare, but ex-ante taxation always yields higher welfare than ex-post taxation. Finally, we show that privatization policy in a free-entry market decreases environmental damage but increases welfare only when the entry cost is low.

ACS Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee. Environmental policies with excess burden of taxation in free-entry mixed markets. International Review of Economics & Finance 2018, 58, 1 -13.

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Sang-Ho Lee. Environmental policies with excess burden of taxation in free-entry mixed markets. International Review of Economics & Finance. 2018; 58 ():1-13.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee. 2018. "Environmental policies with excess burden of taxation in free-entry mixed markets." International Review of Economics & Finance 58, no. : 1-13.

Preprint
Published: 01 January 2018
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This study considers Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) in Cournot markets with endogenous entry and investigates the effects of CSR on environmental taxation and welfare consequences. We show that the optimal tax under free entry is higher than that under blockaded entry and also higher than marginal environmental damage. We then show that a higher taxation is socially excessive from the viewpoint of socially optimal CSR, which requires an appropriate regulatory framework for CSR promotion. Finally, we show that the environment is less damaged but social welfare deteriorates accompanied with CSR when the fixed cost is low, while pollution abatement activities will reduce the optimal tax and improves both environmental quality and social welfare.

ACS Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Taxation with Endogenous Entry. 2018, 1 .

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Sang-Ho Lee. Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Taxation with Endogenous Entry. . 2018; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee. 2018. "Corporate Social Responsibility and Environmental Taxation with Endogenous Entry." , no. : 1.

Article
Published: 06 September 2017 in Journal of Economics
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This paper examines an endogenous timing game in product differentiated duopolies under price competition when emission tax is imposed on environmental externality. We show that a simultaneous-move (sequential-move) outcome can be an equilibrium outcome in a private duopoly under significant (insignificant) environmental externality, but this result can be reversed in a mixed duopoly. We also show that when environmental externalities are significant, public leadership yields greater welfare than private leadership, and that public leadership is more robust than private leadership as an equilibrium outcome. Finally, we find that privatization can result in a public leader becoming a private leader, but this worsens welfare.

ACS Style

Sang-Ho Lee; Lili Xu. Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes. Journal of Economics 2017, 124, 175 -201.

AMA Style

Sang-Ho Lee, Lili Xu. Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes. Journal of Economics. 2017; 124 (2):175-201.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sang-Ho Lee; Lili Xu. 2017. "Endogenous timing in private and mixed duopolies with emission taxes." Journal of Economics 124, no. 2: 175-201.

Journal article
Published: 01 July 2017 in International Review of Economics & Finance
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ACS Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee; Toshihiro Matsumura. Ex-ante versus ex-post privatization policies with foreign penetration in free-entry mixed markets. International Review of Economics & Finance 2017, 50, 1 -7.

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Sang-Ho Lee, Toshihiro Matsumura. Ex-ante versus ex-post privatization policies with foreign penetration in free-entry mixed markets. International Review of Economics & Finance. 2017; 50 ():1-7.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee; Toshihiro Matsumura. 2017. "Ex-ante versus ex-post privatization policies with foreign penetration in free-entry mixed markets." International Review of Economics & Finance 50, no. : 1-7.

Journal article
Published: 01 June 2016 in Economic Modelling
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We compare a Cournot with a Bertrand duopoly in a differentiated mixed market when both emission tax and privatization policies are used together. We find that the optimal emission tax is always lower than the marginal environmental damage, and it is always lower under Cournot than under Bertrand. We also find that the optimal privatization is always a partial privatization, and it is always higher under Cournot than under Bertrand. The socially optimal combinations of emission tax and privatization will damage the environment most, but Cournot yields lower environmental damage and social welfare than those under Bertrand. Finally, we show that the environmental damage is non-monotone in the level of privatization under both Cournot and Bertrand competitions.

ACS Style

Lili Xu; Sumi Cho; Sang-Ho Lee. Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand comparison. Economic Modelling 2016, 55, 73 -82.

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Sumi Cho, Sang-Ho Lee. Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand comparison. Economic Modelling. 2016; 55 ():73-82.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Sumi Cho; Sang-Ho Lee. 2016. "Emission tax and optimal privatization in Cournot–Bertrand comparison." Economic Modelling 55, no. : 73-82.

Journal article
Published: 01 March 2016 in Japan and the World Economy
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We introduce the excess burden of taxation into a bilateral trade, two-country and two-mixed market model, in which a state-owned enterprise in each country competes with both domestic and foreign private enterprises. We show that the welfare effect of privatization and free trade agreements (FTAs) depends on the shadow cost of the excess burden of taxation. We also show that privatization without an FTA can reduce social welfare and that privatization with an FTA improves (reduces) social welfare when the shadow cost is low (high). We then examine an FTA-coordination game and show that nationalization is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium; without an FTA it reduces welfare when the shadow cost is low, and with an FTA it improves welfare when the shadow cost is high. Finally, we show that privatization policy can play the role of commitment device to encourage parties to agree to an FTA and thus, it can improve both domestic and global welfare when the shadow cost is low.

ACS Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee; Leonard F.S. Wang. Free trade agreements and privatization policy with an excess burden of taxation. Japan and the World Economy 2016, 37-38, 55 -64.

AMA Style

Lili Xu, Sang-Ho Lee, Leonard F.S. Wang. Free trade agreements and privatization policy with an excess burden of taxation. Japan and the World Economy. 2016; 37-38 ():55-64.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu; Sang-Ho Lee; Leonard F.S. Wang. 2016. "Free trade agreements and privatization policy with an excess burden of taxation." Japan and the World Economy 37-38, no. : 55-64.

Journal article
Published: 19 June 2012 in The Manchester School
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ACS Style

Sang-Ho Lee; Lili Xu; Zhao Chen. COMPETITIVE PRIVATIZATION AND TARIFF POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED DUOPOLY*. The Manchester School 2012, 81, 763 -779.

AMA Style

Sang-Ho Lee, Lili Xu, Zhao Chen. COMPETITIVE PRIVATIZATION AND TARIFF POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED DUOPOLY*. The Manchester School. 2012; 81 (5):763-779.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Sang-Ho Lee; Lili Xu; Zhao Chen. 2012. "COMPETITIVE PRIVATIZATION AND TARIFF POLICIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL MIXED DUOPOLY*." The Manchester School 81, no. 5: 763-779.

Journal article
Published: 01 September 2021
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Span>We examine a strategic interaction between two governments in an international mixed duopoly market, in which the state-owned enterprise competes with private enterprises under different regimes of privatization policies with import tariffs and environmental taxes. We find that bilateral privatization leads to higher tariff than no privatization, but unilateral privatization yields the highest tariff to the privatized country and the lowest tariff to the non-privatized country. However, higher environmental tax is called for when privatization policy is practiced. We then investigate a privatization choice game between two governments and show that unilateral privatization is Nash equilibrium of the game. Finally, we compare the local optimum with global optimum and show that global optimum is independent of the regimes of privatization policies, but trade and environmental policy coordination between two governments for the global welfare maximization is required.

ACS Style

Lili Xu. Strategic privatization with tariffs and environmental taxes in an international mixed duopoly. 2021, 1 .

AMA Style

Lili Xu. Strategic privatization with tariffs and environmental taxes in an international mixed duopoly. . 2021; ():1.

Chicago/Turabian Style

Lili Xu. 2021. "Strategic privatization with tariffs and environmental taxes in an international mixed duopoly." , no. : 1.