Process overlap theory (POT) is a new theoretical framework designed to account for the general factor of intelligence (g). According to POT, g does not reflect a general cognitive ability. Instead, g is the result of multiple domain-general executive attention processes and multiple domain-specific processes that are sampled in an overlapping manner across a battery of intelligence tests. POT explains several benchmark findings on human intelligence. However, the precise nature of the executive attention processes underlying g remains unclear. In the current paper, we discuss challenges associated with building a theory of individual differences in attention and intelligence. We argue that the conflation of psychological theories and statistical models, as well as problematic inferences based on latent variables, impedes research progress and prevents theory building. Two studies designed to illustrate the unique features of POT relative to previous approaches are presented. In Study 1, a simulation is presented to illustrate precisely how POT accounts for the relationship between executive attention processes and g. In Study 2, three datasets from previous studies are reanalyzed (N = 243, N = 234, N = 945) and reveal a discrepancy between the POT simulated model and the unity/diversity model of executive function. We suggest that this discrepancy is largely due to methodological problems in previous studies but also reflects different goals of research on individual differences in attention. The unity/diversity model is designed to facilitate research on executive function and dysfunction associated with cognitive and neural development and disease. POT is uniquely suited to guide and facilitate research on individual differences in cognitive ability and the investigation of executive attention processes underlying g.
The positive manifold—the finding that cognitive ability measures demonstrate positive correlations with one another—has led to models of intelligence that include a general cognitive ability or general intelligence (g). This view has been reinforced using factor analysis and reflective, higher-order latent variable models. However, a new theory of intelligence, Process Overlap Theory (POT), posits that g is not a psychological attribute but an index of cognitive abilities that results from an interconnected network of cognitive processes. These competing theories of intelligence are compared using two different statistical modeling techniques: (a) latent variable modeling and (b) psychometric network analysis. Network models display partial correlations between pairs of observed variables that demonstrate direct relationships among observations. Secondary data analysis was conducted using the Hungarian Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale Fourth Edition (H-WAIS-IV). The underlying structure of the H-WAIS-IV was first assessed using confirmatory factor analysis assuming a reflective, higher-order model and then reanalyzed using psychometric network analysis. The compatibility (or lack thereof) of these theoretical accounts of intelligence with the data are discussed.
10 August 2022 in Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology
Cognitive control serves a crucial role in human higher mental functions. The Dual Mechanisms of Control theoretical framework provides a unifying account that decomposes cognitive control into two qualitatively distinct mechanisms—proactive control and reactive control. Here, we describe the Dual Mechanisms of Cognitive Control (DMCC) task battery, which was developed to probe cognitive control modes in a theoretically targeted manner, along with detailed descriptions of the experimental manipulations used to encourage shifts to proactive or reactive mode in each of four prototypical domains of cognition: selective attention, context processing, multitasking, and working memory. We present results from this task battery, conducted from a large ( N > 100), online sample that rigorously evaluates the group effects of these manipulations in primary indices of proactive and reactive control, establishing the validity of the battery in providing dissociable yet convergent measures of the two cognitive control modes. The DMCC battery may be a useful tool for the research community to examine cognitive control in a theoretically targeted manner across different individuals and groups.
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability understand that other people’s mental states may be different from one’s own. Psychometric models have shown that individual differences in ToM can largely be attributed to general intelligence (g) (Coyle et al. 2018). Most psychometric models specify g as a reflective latent variable, which is interpreted as a general ability that plays a causal role in a broad range of cognitive tasks, including ToM tasks. However, an alternative approach is to specify g as a formative latent variable, that is, an overall index of cognitive ability that does not represent a psychological attribute (Kovacs and Conway 2016). Here we consider a formative g approach to the relationship between ToM and intelligence. First, we conducted an SEM with reflective g to test the hypothesis that ToM is largely accounted for by a general ability. Next, we conducted a model with formative g to determine whether the relationship between ToM and intelligence is influenced by domain-specific tasks. Finally, we conducted a redundancy analysis to examine the contribution of each g variable. Results suggest that the relationship between ToM and intelligence in this study was influenced by language-based tasks, rather than solely a general ability.
Using baseline data (n = 9875) from the Adolescent Brain Cognitive Development (ABCD) Study examining children aged 9 to 10 years, the current analyses included: (1) exploratory factor analysis (EFA) and confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) of neurocognitive measures administered during baseline collection, and (2) linear regression analyses on the Child Behavior Checklist (CBCL), controlling for demographic and socioeconomic factors. The neurocognitive tasks measured episodic memory, executive function (EF; attention), language skills, processing speed, working memory, visuospatial ability, and reasoning. The CBCL included composite scores of parent-reported internalizing, externalizing, and stress-related behavior problems. The study reported here serves as an extension of prior research using a principal components analysis (PCA) of the ABCD baseline data. We propose an alternative solution using factor analysis. Analyses revealed a three-factor structure: verbal ability (VA), executive function/processing speed (EF/PS), and working memory/episodic memory (WM/EM). These factors were significantly correlated with the CBCL scores, albeit with small effect sizes. These findings provide a novel three-factor solution to the structure of cognitive abilities measured in the ABCD Study, offering new insights into the association between cognitive function and problem behaviors in early adolescence.
In a recent publication in the Journal of Intelligence, Dennis McFarland mischaracterized previous research using latent variable and psychometric network modeling to investigate the structure of intelligence. Misconceptions presented by McFarland are identified and discussed. We reiterate and clarify the goal of our previous research on network models, which is to improve compatibility between psychological theories and statistical models of intelligence. WAIS-IV data provided by McFarland were reanalyzed using latent variable and psychometric network modeling. The results are consistent with our previous study and show that a latent variable model and a network model both provide an adequate fit to the WAIS-IV. We therefore argue that model preference should be determined by theory compatibility. Theories of intelligence that posit a general mental ability (general intelligence) are compatible with latent variable models. More recent approaches, such as mutualism and process overlap theory, reject the notion of general mental ability and are therefore more compatible with network models, which depict the structure of intelligence as an interconnected network of cognitive processes sampled by a battery of tests. We emphasize the importance of compatibility between theories and models in scientific research on intelligence.