Daniel Wiesen

Dr. Daniel Wiesen

Department of Business Administration and Healthcare Management, University of Cologne, Albertus-Magnus-Platz, 50923 Cologne, Germany

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

13Years (2014-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 December 2015 in Health Economics
Verified
Journal Article
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JBJeannette Brosig-Koch
Jeannette Brosig-Koch
HHHeike Hennig-Schmidt
Heike Hennig-Schmidt
NKNadja Kairies-Schwarz
Nadja Kairies-Schwarz
Daniel WiesenDaniel Wiesen
Daniel Wiesen

1 May 2014 in Social Science & Medicine
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HHHeike Hennig-Schmidt
Heike Hennig-Schmidt
Daniel WiesenDaniel Wiesen
Daniel Wiesen

20 December 2022 in Journal of Health Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
AAArthur E. Attema
Arthur E. Attema
MGMatteo M Galizzi
Matteo M Galizzi
MGMona Groß
Mona Groß
HHHeike Hennig-Schmidt
Heike Hennig-Schmidt
YKYassin Karay
Yassin Karay
Daniel WiesenDaniel Wiesen
Daniel Wiesen
We study how patient-regarding altruism is formed by medical education. We elicit and structurally estimate altruistic preferences using experimental data from a large sample of medical students (N = 733) in Germany at different progress stages in their studies. The estimates reveal substantial heterogeneity in altruistic preferences of medical students. Patient-regarding altruism is highest for freshmen, significantly declines for students in the course of medical studies, and tends to increase again for last year students, who assist in clinical practice. Also, patient-regarding altruism is higher for females and positively associated to general altruism. Altruistic medical students have gained prior practical experience in healthcare, have lower income expectations, and are more likely to choose surgery and pediatrics as their preferred specialty.

15 February 2024 in Journal of Health Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
JBJeannette Brosig-Koch
Jeannette Brosig-Koch
HHHeike Hennig-Schmidt
Heike Hennig-Schmidt
NKNadja Kairies-Schwarz
Nadja Kairies-Schwarz
JKJohanna Kokot
Johanna Kokot
Daniel WiesenDaniel Wiesen
Daniel Wiesen
There is considerable controversy about what causes (in)effectiveness of physician performance pay in improving the quality of care. Using a behavioral experiment with German primary-care physicians, we study the incentive effect of performance pay on service provision and quality of care. To explore whether variations in quality are based on the incentive scheme and the interplay with physicians' real-world profit orientation and patient-regarding motivations, we link administrative data on practice characteristics and survey data on physicians' attitudes with experimental data. We find that, under performance pay, quality increases by about 7pp compared to baseline capitation. While the effect increases with the severity of illness, the bonus level does not significantly affect the quality of care. Data linkage indicates that primary-care physicians in high-profit practices provide a lower quality of care. Physicians' other-regarding motivations and attitudes are significant drivers of high treatment quality.

29 December 2017 in Health Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
MGMatteo M Galizzi
Matteo M Galizzi
Daniel WiesenDaniel Wiesen
Daniel Wiesen

17 August 2019 in Medical Decision Making
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
KEKerstin Eilermann
Kerstin Eilermann
KHKatrin Halstenberg
Katrin Halstenberg
LKLudwig Kuntz
Ludwig Kuntz
Kyriakos MartakisKyriakos Martakis
Kyriakos Martakis
BRBernhard Roth
Bernhard Roth
Daniel WiesenDaniel Wiesen
Daniel Wiesen
Background. Inappropriate prescribing of antibiotics, which is common in pediatric care, is a key driver of antimicrobial resistance. To mitigate the development of resistance, antibiotic stewardship programs often suggest the inclusion of feedback targeted at individual providers. Empirically, however, it is not well understood how feedback affects individual physicians’ antibiotic prescribing decisions. Also, the question of how physicians’ characteristics, such as clinical experience, relate to antibiotic prescribing decisions and to responses to feedback is largely unexplored. Objective. To analyze the causal effect of descriptive expert feedback (and individual characteristics) on physicians’ antibiotic prescribing decisions in pediatrics. Design. We employed a randomized, controlled framed field experiment, in which German pediatricians ( n=73) decided on the length of first-line antibiotic treatment for routine pediatric cases. In the intervention group ( n=39), pediatricians received descriptive feedback in form of an expert benchmark, which allowed them to compare their own prescribing decisions with expert recommendations. The recommendations were elicited in a survey of pediatric department directors ( n=20), who stated the length of antibiotic therapies they would choose for the routine cases. Pediatricians’ characteristics were elicited in a comprehensive questionnaire. Results. Providing pediatricians with expert feedback significantly reduced the length of antibiotic therapies by 10% on average. Also, the deviation of pediatricians’ decisions from experts’ recommendations significantly decreased. Antibiotic therapy decisions were significantly related to pediatricians’ clinical experience, risk attitudes, and personality traits. The effect of feedback was significantly associated with physicians’ experience. Conclusion. Our results indicate that descriptive expert feedback can be an effective means to guide pediatricians, especially those who are inexperienced, toward more appropriate antibiotic prescribing. Therefore, it seems to be suitable for inclusion in antibiotic stewardship programs.