The primary user emulation (PUE) attack is one of the strongest attacks in mobile cognitive radio networks (MCRN) because the primary users (PU) and secondary users (SU) are unable to communicate if a malicious user (MU) is present. In the literature, some techniques are used to detect the attack. However, those techniques do not explore the cooperative detection of PUE attacks using deep neural networks (DNN) in one MCRN network and with experimental results on software-defined radio (SDR). In this paper, we design and implement a PUE attack in an MCRN, including a countermeasure based on the entropy of the signals, DNN, and cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) to detect the attacks. A blacklist is included in the fusion center (FC) to record the data of the MU. The scenarios are simulated and implemented on the SDR testbed. Results show that this solution increases the probability of detection (PD) by 20% for lower signal noise ratio (SNR) values, allowing the detection of the PUE attack and recording the data for future reference by the attacker, sharing the data for all the SU.
Software-Implemented Hardware Fault Tolerance (SIHFT) techniques can be applied in processor-based systems, avoiding the modification of hardware components when designing dependable systems. These techniques allow the use of Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) processors, but result in high overheads in terms of programs' code and performance. This paper presents a novel approach for designing reduced-overheads software-based fault-tolerant systems by using approximate computing at the software level. The approximate computing paradigm consists of improving energy and performance efficiency at the expense of accuracy in the results. Although the use of approximate computing has been previously proposed to reduce overheads of fault-tolerant systems, most of these works are focused on the hardware level, so the physical modification of the system is still mandatory, and thus, unfeasible in COTS components. Our proposal is validated by means of a case study using the Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller and several test programs, which are approximated and hardened using well-known techniques at the software level: loop perforation and SWIFT-R, respectively. Results show that it is possible to design dependable processor-based systems, with a significant reduction in overheads, in exchange for minor errors of accuracy.
8 April 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Emerging Topics in Computing
The technological scaling has made electronic devices more susceptible to radiation-induced faults. To mitigate these faults, researchers have proposed different techniques at the software, hardware, and hybrid levels. Although some of these techniques are very effective, most of them are based on redundancy, which causes non-negligible computational overheads in terms of area, performance, and power consumption. In this paper, we propose FTxAC, which consists in using approximate computing techniques in conjunction with radiation-induced mitigation strategies for the design of fault-tolerant systems with minimal overheads. Given the nature of the approximate computing paradigm, FTxAC is suitable for error resilient applications. To show the applicability of the proposal, we carry out several case studies with the TI MSP430 microcontroller, in which a set of software-based fault tolerance techniques are used jointly with approximate computing methods to reduce overheads. The experimental results are analyzed in terms of fault coverage, accuracy of the results, and overheads of the several levels of redundancy. Results show that, depending on the level of approximation, the evaluated application, and the fault tolerance strategy employed, the performance of the system can be improved, even counteracting completely the implicit overheads of the redundancy.
Fault injection campaigns are a widely used method to validate the effectiveness of fault tolerance strategies, as well as to validate the reliability of systems such as microprocessors. To carry out these campaigns, developers have created fault injection tools, which facilitate and automate this process. In this paper, we present MiFIT, a modular, open source fault injection tool for microprocessors. To demonstrate its functionality, a series of fault injection experiments are performed on the Texas Instruments MSP430 microcontroller.
Fault mitigation techniques based on pure software, known as software-implemented hardware fault tolerance (SIHFT), are very attractive for use in COTS (commercial off-the-shelf) microprocessors because they do not require physical modification of the system. However, these techniques cause software overheads that may affect the efficiency and costs of the overall system. This paper presents a design method of radiation-induced fault-tolerant microprocessor-based systems with lower execution time overheads. For this purpose, approximate computing and selective fault mitigation software-based techniques are used; thus it can be used in COTS devices. The proposal is validated through a case study for the TI MSP430 microcontroller. Results show that the designer can choose among a wide spectrum of design configurations, exploring different trade-offs between reliability, performance, and accuracy of results.
The Mobile Cognitive Radio Network (MCRN) are an alternative to spectrum scarcity. However, like any network, it comes with security issues to analyze. One of the attacks to analyze is the Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack, which leads the system to give the attacker the service as a legitimate user and use the Primary Users’ (PUs) spectrum resources. This problem has been addressed from perspectives like arrival time, position detection, cooperative scenarios, and artificial intelligence techniques (AI). Nevertheless, it has been studied with one PUE attack at once. This paper implements a countermeasure that can be applied when several attacks simultaneously exist in a cooperative network. A deep neural network (DNN) is used with other techniques to determine the PUE’s existence and communicate it with other devices in the cooperative MCRN. An algorithm to detect and share detection information is applied, and the results show that the system can detect multiple PUE attacks with coordination between the secondary users (SUs). Scenarios are implemented on software-defined radio (SDR) with a cognitive protocol to protect the PU. The probability of detection (PD) is measured for some signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) values in the presence of one PUE or more in the network, which shows high detection values above 90% for an SNR of -7dB. A database is also created with the attackers’ data and shared with all the SUs.