Neuroimaging technologies such as brain–computer interfaces and neurofeedback have evolved rapidly as new tools for cognitive neuroscience and as potential clinical interventions. However, along with these developments, concern has grown based on the fear of the potential misuse of neurotechnology. In October 2021, Chile became the first country to include neurorights in its Constitution. The present article is divided into two parts. In the first section, we describe the path followed by neurorights that led to its inclusion in the Chilean Constitution, and the neurotechnologies usually involved in neurorights discussions. In the second part, we discuss two potential problems of neurorights. We begin by pointing out some epistemological concerns regarding neurorights, mainly referring to the ambiguity of the concepts used in neurolegislations, the difficult relationship between neuroscience and politics and the weak reasons for urgency in legislating. We then describe the dangers of overprotective laws in medical research, based on the detrimental effect of recent legislation in Chile and the potential risk posed by neurorights to the benefits of neuroscience development. This article aims to engage with the scientific community interested in neurotechnology and neurorights in an interdisciplinary reflection of the potential consequences of neurorights. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Neurofeedback: new territories and neurocognitive mechanisms of endogenous neuromodulation’.

Introduction The idea of video recording (VR) in the operating room (OR) with panoramic cameras and microphones is a new concept that is changing the approach to medical activities in the OR. However, VR in the OR has brought up many concerns regarding patient privacy and has highlighted legal and ethical issues that were never previously exposed. Aim To review the literature concerning these aspects and provide a better ethical and legal understanding of the new challenges concerning VR in the OR. Conclusions There is a disparity between the two main legal models concerning VR in the OR, namely the European legal system (General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)) and the American legal framework (Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)). This difference mainly deals with two distinct bioethical paradigms: GDPR places a strong emphasis on protecting patients’ privacy to improve the public health system, whereas HIPAA indicates the need to generate protocols to safeguard the risks connected to medical activity and patient privacy. Following from this point, we may argue that, at the ethical and bioethical level, GDPR and HIPAA depend mainly on two different ethical models: a perspective based on moral acquaintances and weak proceduralism, respectively. It is worth noting the importance of developing additional guidelines concerning different world regions to avoid the ethical problems that may emerge when simply applying a foreign paradigm to a very different culture.

El desarrollo actual de la ecología ha abierto nuevos desafíos para la reflexión filosófica contemporánea. En este sentido, ya no es posible interpretar la naturaleza humana a partir de una reflexión sobre el hombre como un ser aislado de su ambiente. El paradigma de ecología humana que se presenta aquí quiere heredar la reflexión sobre la filosofía de la naturaleza (y también sobre la filosofía de la naturaleza humana), proponiendo la cuestión ecológica actual como un tema eminentemente antropológico: el lugar del hombre en el cosmos indica asimismo su esencia. Esta tarea nos obliga a replantear la especificidad del ser humano en relación con el mundo a través del tema del habitar, que nos invita a reflexionar sobre las actividades del custodiar y del construir la casa. Se hace así posible replantear el tema ecológico actual como una crisis predominantemente antropológica: para sanar la herida del ecosistema, primero hay que curar la fractura dentro del hombre.

Many authors in the field of Environmental Philosophy have claimed to be inspired by Spinoza's monism, which has traditionally been considered a form of pantheism because nature and God coincide. This idea has deep normative implications, as some environmental ethicists claim that wounding nature is the same as wounding God, which implies a resacralization of nature. In particular, we will focus on Arne Næss's Ecosophy (or Deep Ecology) to offer a current relevant example of the pantheist (or panentheist) worldview. However, a new demarcation distinguishes pantheism from panentheism; in the latter, nature and God belong together but do not fully coincide, as in pantheism. Nevertheless, whether Spinoza is a panentheist, pantheist, or neither has yet to be fully determined, as well as whether his doctrine serves as a proper foundation for an ecology that attempts the aforementioned resacralization of nature. This article attempts to clarify these issues.