The processing difficulty of each word we encounter in a sentence is affected by both our prior linguistic experience and our general knowledge about the world. Computational models of incremental language processing have, however, been limited in accounting for the influence of world knowledge. We develop an incremental model of language comprehension that constructs—on a word-by-word basis—rich, probabilistic situation model representations. To quantify linguistic processing effort, we adopt Surprisal Theory, which asserts that the processing difficulty incurred by a word is inversely proportional to its expectancy (Hale, 2001; Levy, 2008). In contrast with typical language model implementations of surprisal, the proposed model instantiates a novel comprehension-centric metric of surprisal that reflects the likelihood of the unfolding utterance meaning as established after processing each word. Simulations are presented that demonstrate that linguistic experience and world knowledge are integrated in the model at the level of interpretation and combine in determining online expectations.
Language is processed on a more or less word-by-word basis, and the processing difficulty induced by each word is affected by our prior linguistic experience as well as our general knowledge about the world. Surprisal and entropy reduction have been independently proposed as linking theories between word processing difficulty and probabilistic language models. Extant models, however, are typically limited to capturing linguistic experience and hence cannot account for the influence of world knowledge. A recent comprehension model by Venhuizen, Crocker, and Brouwer (2019, Discourse Processes) improves upon this situation by instantiating a comprehension-centric metric of surprisal that integrates linguistic experience and world knowledge at the level of interpretation and combines them in determining online expectations. Here, we extend this work by deriving a comprehension-centric metric of entropy reduction from this model. In contrast to previous work, which has found that surprisal and entropy reduction are not easily dissociated, we do find a clear dissociation in our model. While both surprisal and entropy reduction derive from the same cognitive process—the word-by-word updating of the unfolding interpretation—they reflect different aspects of this process: state-by-state expectation (surprisal) versus end-state confirmation (entropy reduction).
The results of a highly influential study that tested the predictions of the Rational Speech Act (RSA) model suggest that (a) listeners use pragmatic reasoning in one-shot web-based referential communication games despite the artificial, highly constrained, and minimally interactive nature of the task, and (b) that RSA accurately captures this behavior. In this work, we reevaluate the contribution of the pragmatic reasoning formalized by RSA in explaining listener behavior by comparing RSA to a baseline literal listener model that is only driven by literal word meaning and the prior probability of referring to an object. Across three experiments we observe only modest evidence of pragmatic behavior in one-shot web-based language games, and only under very limited circumstances. We find that although RSA provides a strong fit to listener responses, it does not perform better than the baseline literal listener model. Our results suggest that while participants playing the role of the Speaker are informative in these one-shot web-based reference games, participants playing the role of the Listener only rarely take this Speaker behavior into account to reason about the intended referent. In addition, we show that RSA’s fit is primarily due to a combination of non-pragmatic factors, perhaps the most surprising of which is that in the majority of conditions that are amenable to pragmatic reasoning, RSA (accurately) predicts that listeners will behave non-pragmatically. This leads us to conclude that RSA’s strong overall correlation with human behavior in one-shot web-based language games does not reflect listener’s pragmatic reasoning about informative speakers.
Referential processing is part and parcel of language comprehension, but in neurocognitive theories and models of comprehension it typically does not take center stage. Models informed by event-related potentials focus on semantic and syntactic processing in terms of the two most salient event-related potentials components, the N400 and P600, while experimental findings have implicated the Nref component-a frontal, sustained negativity-in referential processing. Extant accounts of the Nref assume it reflects processes involved in establishing reference or association at a distance, but an important open question remains how these mechanisms can be reconciled with existing neurocognitive models. We here offer a mechanistic account of referential processing grounded in retrieval-integration (RI) theory, an integrated theory of language comprehension with broad empirical coverage. On RI theory, the conceptual knowledge associated with an incoming word in context is retrieved from long-term memory (N400), and accordingly integrated into the unfolding utterance representation (P600). We here argue that word meaning is not only defined by the conceptual knowledge associated with a word, but also by its referential knowledge (its presuppositions). Whenever this referential knowledge is inconsistent with what is anticipated given the context, increased referential retrieval effort ensues (Nref). In contrast to extant accounts, we do thus not implicate the Nref in the establishment of reference itself, but instead attribute referential resolution to the integrative processes underlying the P600. The resultant referential RI theory integrates the N400, Nref, and P600 in a single model, and its predictions are consistent with extant empirical evidence on referential processing. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2025 APA, all rights reserved).