This paper describes the nitration of 2,4-dinitrotoluene (DNT) and its conversion to 2,4,6-trinitrotoluene (TNT) at a gram scale with the use of a fully automated flow chemistry system. The conversion of DNT to TNT traditionally requires the use of highly hazardous reagents like fuming sulfuric acid (oleum), fuming nitric acid (90–100%), and elevated temperatures. Flow chemistry offers advantages compared to conventional syntheses including a high degree of safety and simpler multistep automation. The configuration and development of this automated process based on a commercially available flow chemistry system is described. A high conversion rate (>99%) was achieved. Unlike established synthetic methods, ordinary nitrating mixture (65% HNO3/98% H2SO4) and shorter reaction times (10–30 min) were applied. The viability of flow nitration as a means of safe and continuous synthesis of TNT was investigated. The method was optimized using an experimental design approach, and the resulting process is safer, faster, and more efficient than previously reported TNT synthesis procedures. We compared the flow chemistry and batch approaches, including a provisional cost calculation for laboratory-scale production (a thorough economic analysis is, however, beyond the scope of this article). The method is considered fit for purpose for the safe production of high-purity explosives standards at a gram scale, which are used to verify that the performance of explosive trace detection equipment complies with EU regulatory requirements.
22 November 2021 in Journal of Transportation Security
Screening for prohibited items at airports is an example of a multi-layered screening process. Multiple layers of screening – often comprising different technologies with complementary strengths and weaknesses – are combined to create a single screening process. The detection performance of the overall system depends on multiple factors, including the performance of individual layers, the complementarity of different layers, and the decision rule(s) for determining how outputs from individual layers are combined. The aim of this work is to understand and optimise the overall system performance of a multi-layered screening process. Novel aspects include the use of realistic profiles of alarm distributions based on experimental observations and a focus on the influence of correlation/orthogonality amongst the layers of screening. The results show that a cumulative screening architecture can outperform a cascading one, yielding a significant increase in system-level true positive rate for only a modest increase in false positive rate. A cumulative screening process is also more resilient to weaknesses in the individual layers. The performance of a multi-layered screening process using a cascading approach is maximised when the false positives are orthogonal across the different layers and the true positives are correlated. The system-level performance of a cumulative screening process, on the other hand, is maximised when both false positives and true positives are as orthogonal as possible. The cost of ignoring orthogonality between screening layers is explored with some numerical examples. The underlying software model is provided in a Jupyter Notebook as supplementary material.
Explosives detection systems (EDS) based on X-ray are used at airports to screen baggage for the presence of explosives. In Europe and the United States, EDS equipment is tested extensively by specialist test centres prior to approval for operational use in airports. Once EDS are installed in airports, however, it can be challenging to test the EDS equipment and verify that it continues to perform at the highest level, because of the impracticality of introducing bulk explosives into civil aviation airports. We have developed inert, non-toxic polymer-bonded simulants and validated them against real explosives using EDS equipment. The accuracy of our simulants is within 1% of the target bulk density, and within 2% of the target effective atomic number, and the materials have a stability of at least 4 years, with an uncertainty of 0.5%. The simulants generate alarms in almost 100% of cases on a wide range of commercial EDS models, and we consider the simulants fit for purpose for use during testing of EDS equipment at airports.
At the checkpoint, the detection of illicit inorganic powders in passenger luggage using conventional X-ray can be challenging. An algorithm is presented for the automated detection of inorganic powder-like substances from complex X-ray images of highly cluttered passenger bags using computer vision. The proposed method utilizes support vector machine (SVM) classifiers built from local binary patterns (LBP) texture features. When tested on a dataset created in-house, the algorithm achieves a detection precision of 97% and a false positive rate of 3%. This is the first study performed on a realistic dataset, including different amounts and shapes of powders and electronic clutter, and where the success of the automated method is compared with inter-observer variability.
30 October 2017 in Journal of Transportation Security
Restrictions on the carriage of liquids, aerosol, and gels (LAGs) by airline passengers have been in place since November 2006, following the discovery of a terrorist plot involving homemade liquid explosives to be used on transatlantic flights (Wikipedia, 2006 ). Restrictions on the carriage of LAGs remain today, and the operational impact of introducing further screening of liquids is subject to ongoing debate. This paper addresses one of the concerns, namely that the false alarm rates of liquid explosive detection systems (LEDS) are adversely affected by the filling level of LAGs containers. Our study contributes to a better understanding of the operational impact of screening partially full containers, based on a large number of screening repetitions under laboratory conditions and robust statistical analysis. False alarm rates were observed for 39 LAGs screened with 5 different LEDS. For each combination, four different container filling levels (100%, 75%, 50% and 25%) were studied. These observations were used to model the impact of partially filling for sequential combinations of equipment. Three possible scenarios were considered, namely passengers being allowed to carry (1) only water, (2) water & soft drinks, and (3) all LAGs. The results show that, for a sequential combination of two equipment types, the impact of partially filled containers on the overall false alarm rate is negligible. Nevertheless, partially filled containers do result in an approximate two-fold increase in the number of items requiring level-two screening, which may be significant for airports when managing their screening processes.
Explosives detection systems (EDS) based on X-ray are used at airports to screen baggage for the presence of explosives. Once EDS are installed in airports, however, it can be challenging to test the EDS equipment and verify that it continues to perform at the highest level, because of the impracticality of introducing bulk explosives into civil aviation airports. The problem is particularly acute for sensitive homemade explosives, such as triacetone triperoxide (TATP). This paper describes our work to develop a safe, accurate and stable simulant for TATP for EDS based on X-ray transmission. Bulk quantities of TATP were synthesised and characterised especially for this project, and we describe the unique challenges and safety considerations of collecting this data. Our calculations show that the expanded measurement uncertainty with a coverage factor of k = 2 is 5.7% for bulk density and 1.0% for Zeff at 24 months.