hongjie gao

Dr. hongjie gao


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

8Years (2019-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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22 November 2019 in Sensors
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
Haitao XuHaitao Xu
Haitao Xu
HGhongjie gao
hongjie gao
CZChengcheng Zhou
Chengcheng Zhou
RDRuifeng Duan
Ruifeng Duan
XZXianwei Zhou
Xianwei Zhou
The progress of science and technology and the expansion of the Internet of Things make the information transmission between communication infrastructure and wireless sensors become more and more convenient. For the power-limited wireless sensors, the life time can be extended through the energy-harvesting technique. Additionally, wireless sensors can use the unauthored spectrum resource to complete certain information transmission tasks based on cognitive radio. Harvesting enough energy from the environments, the wireless sensors, works as the second users (SUs) can lease spectrum resource from the primary user (PU) to finish their task and bring additional transmission cost to themselves. To minimize the overall cost of SUs and to maximize the spectrum profit of the PU during the information transmission period, we formulated a differential game model to solve the resource allocation problem in the cognitive radio wireless sensor networks with energy harvesting, considering the SUs as the game players. By solving the proposed resource allocation game model, we found the open loop Nash equilibrium solutions and feedback Nash equilibrium solutions for all SUs as the optimal control strategies. Ultimately, series numerical simulation experiments have been made to demonstrate the rationality and effectiveness of the game model.

24 March 2022 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HGhongjie gao
hongjie gao
Haitao XuHaitao Xu
Haitao Xu
LLLixin Li
Lixin Li
CZChengcheng Zhou
Chengcheng Zhou
HZHenggao Zhai
Henggao Zhai
ZHZhu Han
Zhu Han
Mobile crowdsensing (MCS) is an effective perception paradigm for large-scale tasks, driven by the proliferation of mobile devices with more powerful sensing and computing capabilities. An effective incentive mechanism is critical to the operation of an MCS system in promoting public engagement. However, the great majority of works discuss fixed task pricing, while the inherent inequality of the supply–demand relationship of the tasks exists. Therefore, it is essential to study the dynamic task pricing problem in the peer-to-peer data sharing MCS system. In this article, we formulate the interactions between the requester and the sensors as a two-stage Stackelberg differential game model, while considering the average behavior of sensors to solve the dynamic task pricing problem. Specifically, in the game model, the requester is the leader who first announces the issued task rate and provides decisive state-changing task pricing dynamics to the sensors. Then, the sensors are the followers who decide the rate of tasks completed noncooperatively based on requesters’ observed strategy, using the level of effort as the state dynamics. The requester and the sensors interact through a mean-field term included in the dynamic state functions, which catches the average behavior of all users. By solving the model, the optimal strategies for the users and the optimal tasks pricing trends in the dynamic environment are obtained. Furthermore, the effectiveness and feasibility of the scheme are verified by a series of numerical simulation experiments.

5 September 2022 in IEEE Communications Letters
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
HGhongjie gao
hongjie gao
JAJianwei An
Jianwei An
CZChengcheng Zhou
Chengcheng Zhou
LLLi Li
Li Li
The mobile crowd sensing perception paradigm relies on the participation of generous users, and an appropriate incentive mechanism can promote the participation of more users. Moreover, social relationships among users can promote users’ willingness to complete the sensing tasks, which in turn boosts the collection of high-quality data for the platform. In this letter, we study the problem of designing a suitable incentive mechanism combined with data quality under social influence. Specifically, we divide the design of the incentive mechanism into two stages: participant selection considering social influence; reward payment considering quality measurement. We use the KKT system to get an optimal time of users in stage I. Furthermore, the reward payment stage can be equivalently transformed into a mixed-integer nonlinear problem, and we devise a heuristic algorithm HEAL to solve the problem. Finally, we conduct certain numerical comparative simulation experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and correctness of HEAL.