At the inception of human brain mapping, two principles of functional anatomy underwrote most conceptions—and analyses—of distributed brain responses: namely, functional segregation and integration. There are currently two main approaches to characterizing functional integration. The first is a mechanistic modeling of connectomics in terms of directed effective connectivity that mediates neuronal message passing and dynamics on neuronal circuits. The second phenomenological approach usually characterizes undirected functional connectivity (i.e., measurable correlations), in terms of intrinsic brain networks, self-organized criticality, dynamical instability, and so on. This paper describes a treatment of effective connectivity that speaks to the emergence of intrinsic brain networks and critical dynamics. It is predicated on the notion of Markov blankets that play a fundamental role in the self-organization of far from equilibrium systems. Using the apparatus of the renormalization group, we show that much of the phenomenology found in network neuroscience is an emergent property of a particular partition of neuronal states, over progressively coarser scales. As such, it offers a way of linking dynamics on directed graphs to the phenomenology of intrinsic brain networks.
1 June 2021 in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
Recent characterisations of self-organising systems depend upon the presence of a 'Markov blanket': a statistical boundary that mediates the interactions between the inside and outside of a system. We leverage this idea to provide an analysis of partitions in neuronal systems. This is applicable to brain architectures at multiple scales, enabling partitions into single neurons, brain regions, and brain-wide networks. This treatment is based upon the canonical micro-circuitry used in empirical studies of effective connectivity, so as to speak directly to practical applications. The notion of effective connectivity depends upon the dynamic coupling between functional units, whose form recapitulates that of a Markov blanket at each level of analysis. The nuance afforded by partitioning neural systems in this way highlights certain limitations of 'modular' perspectives of brain function that only consider a single level of description.
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance—in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations—is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account—an organism-centered fictionalism or instrumentalism. We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the ‘aboutness’ or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
Recent research has demonstrated the potential of psychedelic therapy for mental health care. However, the psychological experience underlying its therapeutic effects remains poorly understood. This paper proposes a framework that suggests psychedelics act as destabilizers, both psychologically and neurophysiologically. Drawing on the ‘entropic brain’ hypothesis and the ‘RElaxed Beliefs Under pSychedelics’ model, this paper focuses on the richness of psychological experience. Through a complex systems theory perspective, we suggest that psychedelics destabilize fixed points or attractors, breaking reinforced patterns of thinking and behaving. Our approach explains how psychedelic-induced increases in brain entropy destabilize neurophysiological set points and lead to new conceptualizations of psychedelic psychotherapy. These insights have important implications for risk mitigation and treatment optimization in psychedelic medicine, both during the peak psychedelic experience and during the subacute period of potential recovery.
21 January 2022 in Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience
In this theoretical review, we begin by discussing brains and minds from a dynamical systems perspective, and then go on to describe methods for characterizing the flexibility of dynamic networks. We discuss how varying degrees and kinds of flexibility may be adaptive (or maladaptive) in different contexts, specifically focusing on measures related to either more disjoint or cohesive dynamics. While disjointed flexibility may be useful for assessing neural entropy, cohesive flexibility may potentially serve as a proxy for self-organized criticality as a fundamental property enabling adaptive behavior in complex systems. Particular attention is given to recent studies in which flexibility methods have been used to investigate neurological and cognitive maturation, as well as the breakdown of conscious processing under varying levels of anesthesia. We further discuss how these findings and methods might be contextualized within the Free Energy Principle with respect to the fundamentals of brain organization and biological functioning more generally, and describe potential methodological advances from this paradigm. Finally, with relevance to computational psychiatry, we propose a research program for obtaining a better understanding of ways that dynamic networks may relate to different forms of psychological flexibility, which may be the single most important factor for ensuring human flourishing.
Introduction: This paper presents Enactive Artificial Intelligence (eAI) as a gender-inclusive approach to AI, emphasizing the need to address social marginalization resulting from unrepresentative AI design.Methods: The study employs a multidisciplinary framework to explore the intersectionality of gender and technoscience, focusing on the subversion of gender norms within Robot-Human Interaction in AI.Results: The results reveal the development of four ethical vectors, namely explainability, fairness, transparency, and auditability, as essential components for adopting an inclusive stance and promoting gender-inclusive AI.Discussion: By considering these vectors, we can ensure that AI aligns with societal values, promotes equity and justice, and facilitates the creation of a more just and equitable society.