The article deals with the revival of fasting in Russia after a long period of its nearly full neglect. On the basis of electronic sources, such as web forums, question-and-answer services, streaming video channels, and other publications the author shows how the clergy and the laity together discuss, collectively test and evaluate diverse fasting practices. The discourse on fasting practices in Russia is polyphonic and highly personalized; even the clergy has no single authoritative position. It remains unclear, who should be responsible for fasting mitigation in case of illness, pregnancy, or other circumstances; people are exposed to many different opinions, what results in confusion and anxiety. The article shows that contemporary believers—including the clergy—are not ready to follow tradition blindly. The discussants are roughly divided into two groups: those supporting traditional rules (fasting from animal products), and those inventing their own practices (fasting from sweets, or switching to cheaper foods). Both groups are interested in rational, mundane arguments in support of their choice: the traditionalists emphasize that fasting from meat is “healthy”, or that Lenten food is “tastier”; their opponents point out that fish and seafood are more expensive than dairy products and poultry; therefore, no money can be saved for the destitute.

Fundamentalists in the Russian Orthodox Church see contemporary state institutions as sources of threat because of their fragility and unreliability. Thus, in response, they engage in ritual and political actions aimed at restoring the spiritual unity of the Russian people ( sobornost ) that would allow the monarchy to be restored and resume the God-given mission of the Russian Orthodox Church to delaying the apocalypse. In this article, the author reveals the ways the concept of an averted or delayed apocalypse shapes fundamentalists’ approaches to institution and network building as alternatives to existing public institutions, which they consider incapable in the face of the approaching End Time. The author distinguishes between anti-systemic fundamentalists (those unwilling to have anything in common with the existing sociopolitical system) and symbiotic fundamentalists (those involved in provisional cooperation with state agencies). Anti-systemic fundamentalists insist on Russians’ verbal repentance for the sin of abandoning their mission of averting the Apocalypse; sometimes they live in walled communities. Symbiotic fundamentalists are building networks or communities that do not necessarily imply living together. Using these communities as a tool, symbiotic fundamentalists hope to rebuild the spiritual unity of the Russians. They envision their activities as repentance by works that in the future would allow the Orthodox monarchy to be restored and to resume the God-given mission of the church.

This contribution examines why Orthodox radicals in Moldova demonstrate their ability to use direct action – violent or non-violent – to change state policy, examining cases of confrontation over machine-readable identity cards, the non-denominational use of public spaces, non-discrimination against religious minorities and LGBT. The author suggests that the dynamics of religious radicalism in Moldova are explained by the fact that after the regime change in 2009, official discourse is not supportive of the so-called ‘traditional values’ shared by many. In the absence of other discursive opportunities, domestic political confrontations in Moldova are currently symbolically focused on concepts of ‘the European path’ and ‘the Orthodox land’. Since the mainstream Orthodox Church cannot afford open antistate activity, defending the faith and values is increasingly associated with radicals whose direct activism has apocalyptic undertones. The radical Orthodox have become a persistent political factor, able to influence government policies and legislation. They do not envision themselves as perpetrators of violence, considering their actions to be self-defence. The existence of radicals inside the Church also prevents its general drift in the direction of a more liberal position.

Introduction. The article analyzes the results of the sociological research undertaken by the authors in 2018 within the framework of the research project “Social Projects of the Russian Orthodox Church” in terms of comparing motivation, social technologies and social consequences of implementing Orthodox social projects in the capital and other regions of Russia in order to identify factors contributing to and hindering their successful implementation at the regional level. The purpose of the empirical research was to identify the social functions fulfilled in the process of developing and implementing social projects by organizations within the structure of the Russian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), as well as by lay organizations created and headed by parishioners of the Russian Orthodox Church. Materials and Methods. The study used qualitative methods of collecting and analyzing sociological data such as observation, in-depth interviews with people participating in social activities of the Orthodox projects and with the members of their target groups. The qualitative study used theoretical sampling and the method of selecting typical cases, which made it possible to describe and analyze social technologies and the consequences of the Orthodox social activities in different areas of impact on the society, including helping the poor and the socially deprived strata of the population, rehabilitation of the disabled, ‘pro-life’ movements, as well as educational activities. Results. In the process of research, based on the analysis of the survey data, the goals of the Orthodox social projects and their hierarchy have been identified, as well as the peculiarities of motivation of the activities of the participants of the Orthodox social projects studied and the specifics of the forms of organizing social assistance in Moscow, the Republic of Mordovia, and the Ivanovo Region. The social technologies of direct and indirect influence of the Orthodox social projects in terms of educational activities have been studied. The authors sought to assess the transformational consequences of implementation of the Orthodox social projects studied at the levels of the individual, social institutions, and groups. Discussion and Conclusion. The study has revealed that the Orthodox social initiatives help their participants master such skills as fundraising, interaction with the society, government bodies and commercial entities, thus becoming an important segment of civil society. The main difficulties the Orthodox social projects encounter have been revealed: poor systemic work and dependence on the personality of the leader, dependence on grants. The scientific results of the study can be used when developing strategies and implementing social policies with the participation of Orthodox non-profit organizations through a comprehensive analysis of methods and social technologies.

The authors propose a typology of sites of memory of political repressions that took place in different periods of Russian history, which emerged under the influence of a set of historical, social and cultural factors. The purpose of the study is to trace the logic of the formation of specific types of monuments, including those existing in the form of the so-called counter-monuments, in the process of implementing the politics of memory and formulating ideas about the traumatic past. The authors used the chronotopic method of examining sites of memory in a number of regions of Russia, such as the memorial complex Perm-36, multiple sites of commemoration at the Bolshoy Solovetsky Island, places of memory at the Rybinsk water reservoir, the Butovo polygon, memorial objects in the Saratov region, and the Republic of Mordovia, architectural constructions in the Russian Far East, etc. Theoretically, the research is rooted in the concept of “memory sites” proposed by Pierre Nora and understood as a combination of material and spiritual elements of culture that carry a symbolic load associated with understanding the social past. The authors demonstrate the presence of several types of memorial sites. It turned out that in the Russian domain of memory about the political repressions there are no sites that meet the criteria of a traditional monument. Conditionally traditional monuments can be territorially localized (solitary or complex) or dispersed (standard or heterogeneous). The second type of monuments is defined as hybrid, including vernacular, alternative and palimpsest varieties. Vernacular monuments are determined by their agents of construction, while the alternative ones are associated with specific interpretations of the past and can be supplemented with new constructive elements in the course of existence, palimpsests imply the explicit or hidden presence of many symbolically loaded layers. Counter-monuments constitute a special type represented by walking, landscape, ecological, and disappearing monuments. They are characterized as performative and participatory. The presence of different types of monuments proves not so much the absence of a unified strategy of commemoration in Russian society, but rather the fact that multiple social groups participate in the process of commemoration, producing heterogeneous and polyphonic monuments.

The authors’ objective was to find out how and why the approach of the Russian Orthodox Church to sociocultural adaptation of predominantly Muslim international labor migrants has evolved from its initial stage to now. Research methodology is based on a critical analysis of various sources, on observations, and archival materials. The adaptation program of the Church was advertised as a secular project pursuing the goal of peacekeeping because of a tacit agreement on mutual non-proselytisation between the basic faith-based communities in Russia. The initiative, launched in December 2012, had to merge adaptation courses of all dioceses into a nationwide network that then was expected to become part of an all-Russian system of preparation for language and culture tests. The Church also planned to open its own network of testing centrescenters for migrants. The authors emphasize that, although some of the diocesan courses were successful, the initiative deteriorated due to many external and internal factors. One of them was that diocesan courses have proven to be unattractive for labor migrants; their curriculum was too thick and overloaded with information about Russian culture and Orthodox Christianity, while Muslim labor migrants preferred to adapt to their new environment with a mediation of their own networks. It is suggested by the authors that the main cause of the project’s non-fulfillment was an intra-church cleavage between the enthusiasts of adaptation who convinced that diocesan courses must aim at spreading the Orthodox faith to foreign workers, including Muslims, and the church officials who promoted secular curriculum and forbade preaching Christianity to labor migrants.