IoT technologies are becoming pervasive in public and private sectors and represent presently an integral part of our daily life. The advantages offered by these technologies are frequently coupled with serious security issues that are often not properly overseen or even ignored. The IoT threat landscape is extremely wide and complex and involves a wide variety of hardware and software technologies. In this framework, the security of application layer protocols is of paramount importance since these protocols are at the basis of the communications among applications and services running on different IoT devices and on cloud/edge infrastructures. This paper offers a comprehensive survey of application layer protocol security by presenting the main challenges and findings. More specifically, the paper focuses on the most popular protocols devised in IoT environments for messaging/data sharing and for service discovery. The main threats of these protocols as well as the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) for their products and services are analyzed and discussed in detail. Good practices and measures that can be adopted to mitigate threats and attacks are also investigated. Our findings indicate that ensuring security at the application layer is very challenging. IoT devices are exposed to numerous security risks due to lack of appropriate security services in the protocols as well as to vulnerabilities or incorrect configuration of the products and services being deployed. Moreover, the constrained capabilities of these devices affect the types of security services that can be implemented.
Cloud technologies are being used nowadays to cope with the increased computing and storage requirements of services and applications. Nevertheless, decisions about resources to be provisioned and the corresponding scheduling plans are far from being easily made especially because of the variability and uncertainty affecting workload demands as well as technological infrastructure performance. In this paper we address these issues by formulating a multi-objective constrained optimization problem aimed at identifying the optimal scheduling plans for scientific workflows to be deployed in uncertain cloud environments. In particular, we focus on minimizing the expected workflow execution time and monetary cost under probabilistic constraints on deadline and budget. According to the proposed approach, this problem is solved offline, that is, prior to workflow execution, with the intention of allowing cloud users to choose the plan of the Pareto optimal set satisfying their requirements and preferences. The analysis of the combined effects of cloud uncertainty and probabilistic constraints has shown that the solutions of the optimization problem are strongly affected by uncertainty. Hence, to properly provision cloud resources, it is compelling to precisely quantify uncertainty and take explicitly into account its effects in the decision process.
The pervasiveness of complex technological infrastructures and services coupled with the continuously evolving threat landscape poses new sophisticated security risks. These risks are mostly associated with many diverse vulnerabilities related to software or hardware security flaws, misconfigurations and operational weaknesses. In this scenario, a timely assessment and mitigation of the security risks affecting technological environments are of paramount importance. To cope with these compelling issues, we propose an AI-assisted methodological framework aimed at evaluating whether the target environment is vulnerable or safe. The framework is based on the combined application of graph-based and machine learning techniques. More precisely, the components of the target together with their vulnerabilities are represented by graphs whose analysis identifies the attack paths associated with potential security threats. Machine learning techniques classify these paths and provide the security assessment of the target. The experimental evaluation of the proposed framework was performed on 220 artificially generated Active Directory environments, half of which injected with vulnerabilities. The results of the classification process were generally good. For example, the F1-score obtained by the Random Forest classifier for the assessment of vulnerable networks was equal to 0.91. These results suggest that our approach could be applied for automating the security assessment procedures of complex networked environments.
Two types of dynamics are important when modeling cyberattacks: how adversaries chain together techniques across systems and how they change the target systems. Attack graphs are prominent within research communities for automatically mapping and chaining together actions. Modeling adversary-driven system changes is comparatively unexplored, however. One reason could be that modeling adversarial change dynamics poses a blend of problems where the typical attack graph approaches could produce state-space explosions and infinite graphs. Therefore, this work presents the core modeling aspects of the Dynamic Meta Attack Language (DynaMAL), a project to lazily generate attack graphs by combining attack graph construction and simulation methods. DynaMAL lets users declare domain-specific modeling and attack graph generation languages. Then, the attack graphs are generated one step at a time based on the actions of an adversary agent. By only generating what is explicitly requested, DynaMAL can demonstrably change the system model as the attack graph grows while sidestepping typical state-space explosions and graph re-calculation problems. Shifting to a lazy generation process poses new challenges, however. Nevertheless, there is likely a point where lazy approaches will prevail when analyzing large and complex systems.