“Re-visits and drug renewal” is difficult for chronic disease patients during COVID-19 and will continue in the post-pandemic era. To overcome this dilemma, the scenario of chronic disease diagnosis and treatment systems was set, and an evolutionary game model participated by four stakeholder groups including physical medical institutions, medical service platforms, intelligent medical device providers, and chronic disease patients, was established. Ten possible evolutionary stabilization strategies (ESSs) with their mandatory conditions were found based on Lyapunov's first method. Taking cardiovascular and cerebrovascular diseases, the top 1 prevalent chronic disease, as a specific case context, and resorting to the MATLAB simulation, it is confirmed that several dual ESSs and four unique ESS circumstances exist, respectively, and the evolution direction is determined by initial conditions, while the evolution speed is determined by the values of the conditions based on the quantitative relations of benefits, costs, etc. Accordingly, four governance mechanisms were proposed. By their adjustment, the conditions along with their values can be interfered, and then the chronic disease diagnosis and treatment systems can be guided toward the desired direction, that is, toward the direction of countermeasure against the pandemic, government guidance, global trends of medical industry development, social welfare, and lifestyle innovation. The dilemma of “Re-visits and drug renewal” actually reflects the uneven distribution problem of qualified medical resources and the poor impact resistance capability of social medical service systems under mass public emergency. Human lifestyle even the way of working all over the world will get a spiral upgrade after experiencing COVID-19, such as consumption, and meeting, while medical habits react not so rapidly, especially for mid or aged chronic disease patients. We believe that telemedicine empowered by intelligent medical devices can benefit them and will be a global trend, governments and the four key stakeholders should act according to the governance mechanisms suggested here simultaneously toward novel social medical ecosystems for the post-pandemic era.

Post-pandemic, the use of medical supplies, such as masks, for epidemic prevention remains high. The explosive growth of medical waste during the COVID-19 pandemic has caused significant environmental problems. To alleviate this, environment-friendly epidemic prevention measures should be developed, used, and promoted. However, contradictions exist between governments, production enterprises, and medical institutions regarding the green transformation of anti-epidemic supplies. Consequently, this study aimed to investigate how to effectively guide the green transformation. Concerning masks, a tripartite evolutionary game model, consisting of governments, mask enterprises, and medical institutions, was established for the supervision of mask production and use, boundary conditions of evolutionary stabilization strategies and government regulations were analyzed, and a dynamic system model was used for the simulation analysis. This analysis revealed that the only tripartite evolutionary stability strategy is for governments to deregulate mask production, enterprises to increase eco-friendly mask production, and medical institutions to use these masks. From the comprehensive analysis, a few important findings are obtained. First, government regulation can promote the green transformation process of anti-epidemic supplies. Government should realize the green transformation of anti-epidemic supplies immediately in order to avoid severe reputation damage. Second, external parameter changes can significantly impact the strategy selection process of all players. Interestingly, it is further found that the cost benefit for using environmentally friendly masks has a great influence on whether green transformation can be achieved. Consequently, the government should establish a favorable marketplace for, and promote the development of, inexpensive, high-quality, and effective environmentally friendly masks in order to achieve the ultimate goal of green transformation of anti-epidemic supplies in the post-pandemic era.

This study explores the channel preference of a platform and a green manufacturer in an online market. The platform offers both the agency channel and the reselling channel, while the manufacturer designs a green product to improve the green effort and sells it through the platform. We find that the manufacturer’s channel preference is determined by the interaction of the green investment, the commission rate, and the competition intensity. In contrast, the online platform prefers the hybrid channel when both the commission rate and green investment inefficiency are moderate but prefers the agency channel otherwise. Interestingly, the manufacturer can change its sales center between the reselling channel and the agency channel, thus resulting in a win–win outcome for the manufacturer and the platform by selecting the hybrid channel. This study reveals the benefits of green product selling in an online market and provides useful guidelines for green product manufacturers and platform managers in improving their strategic selling channel.