Intimate partner violence is widespread and represents an obstacle to human freedom and a significant public health concern. Poverty alleviation programs and efforts to economically "empower" women have become popular policy options, but theory and empirical evidence are mixed on the relationship between women's empowerment and the experience of violence. We study the effects of a successful poverty alleviation program on women's empowerment and intimate partner relations and violence from 2009 to 2011. In the first experiment, a cluster-randomized superiority trial, 15 marginalized people (86% women) were identified in each of 120 villages (n = 1800) in Gulu and Kitgum districts in Uganda. Half of villages were randomly assigned via public lottery to immediate treatment: five days of business training, $150, and supervision and advising. We examine intent-to-treat estimates of program impact and heterogeneity in treatment effects by initial quality of partner relations. 16 months after the initial grants, the program doubled business ownership and incomes (p < 0.01); we show that the effect on monthly income, however, is moderated by initial quality of intimate partner relations. We also find small increases in marital control (p < 0.05), self-reported autonomy (p < 0.10), and quality of partner relations (p < 0.01), but essentially no change in intimate partner violence. In a second experiment, we study the impact of a low-cost attempt to include household partners (often husbands) in the process. Participants from the 60 waitlist villages (n = 904) were randomly assigned to participate in the program as individuals or with a household partner. We observe small, non-significant decreases in abuse and marital control and large increases in the quality of relationships (p < 0.05), but no effects on women's attitudes toward gender norms and a non-significant reduction in autonomy. Involving men and changing framing to promote more inclusive programming can improve relationships, but may not change gender attitudes or increase business success. Increasing women's earnings has no effect on intimate partner violence.
Recent work in several fields has established that humans can adopt binding “behavioral” preferences and convincingly signal those preferences to other humans, either via their behavior or via their body language / tone of voice. In this paper, we model the strategic implications of this ability. Our thesis is that through a person's lifetime they (perhaps subconsciously) learn what such signaled, binding behavioral preferences result in the highest value of their actual preferences, given the resultant behavior of other players. We argue that this “persona” model may explain why many interpersonal preferences have the particular form they do. As an illustration, we use the persona model to explain cooperation in non-repeated versions of the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD). We also provide quantitative predictions to distinguish this explanation of cooperation from simply assuming people have actual preferences biased towards cooperation. In particular, we show that the persona model predicts a “crowding out” phenomenon in the PD, in which introducing incentives to cooperate causes players to stop cooperating instead. We also use the persona model to predict a tradeoff between the robustness of cooperation in the PD and the benefit of that cooperation.
Players in economic situations often have preferences not only over their own outcome but also over what happens to fellow players, entirely apart from any strategic considerations. While this can be modeled directly by simply writing down final preferences, these are commonly unknown a priori. In many cases it is therefore both helpful and instructive to explicitly model these interactions. This paper presents a simple structure in the context of game theory, building on a model due to Bergstrom, that incorporates these ‘synergisms’ between players. It is powerful enough to cover a wide range of such interactions and model many disparate experimental and empirical results, yet straightforward enough to be used in many applied situations where altruism, or a baser motive, is implied.
We study the dynamic structure of equilibria in game theory. Allowing players in a game the opportunity to renegotiate, or switch to a feasible and Pareto superior equilibrium, can lead to welfare gains. However, in an extensive-form game this can also make it more difficult to enforce punishment strategies, leading to the question of which equilibria are feasible after all. This paper attempts to resolve that question by presenting the first definition of renegotiation-proofness in general games. This new concept, the renegotiation perfect set, satisfies five axioms. The first three axiomsnamely Rationality, Consistency, and Internal Stabilitycharacterize weakly renegotiation-proof sets. There is a natural generalized tournament defined on the class of all WRP sets, and the final two axiomsExternal Stability and Optimalitypick a unique winner from this tournament. The tournament solution concept employed, termed the catalog, is based on Duttas minimal covering set and can be applied to many settings other than renegotiation. It is shown that the renegotiation perfection concept is an extension of the standard renegotiation-proof definition for finite games, introduced by (Benoit and Krishna 1993), and that it captures the notion of a strongly renegotiation-proof equilibrium as defined by (Farrell and Maskin 1989).