In a very short time, discussions on Arctic governance have moved from being a topic of scholarly attention and NGO advocacy onto the agendas of states and of the European Union (EU). Increasingly, the various alternatives propounded by a diverse set of actors over what Arctic governance should look like appear as pre-negotiation tactics, a type of testing period before a regime change. The article examines whether the still predominant inter governmental forum, the Arctic Council, is facing a threat of being supplanted by other forms of governance. It will study how resistant the Arctic Council, and its predecessor the 1991 Arctic environmental protection strategy, are to change in order to understand whether the council could renew itself to meet future challenges. It will also examine the various proposals for Arctic governance set out by states, the EU and the region's indigenous peoples. All this will permit conclusions to be drawn on where the Arctic Council stands amid all these proposals and whether, and in what way, it should change to support more sustainable governance in the Arctic.

Indigenous peoples regularly regard international law as a very important tool for the advancement of their political goals. This is most likely because in many nation-states their opportunities for influencing political development are rather limited. Even though international law seems to be an important means for indigenous peoples to advance their goals, these peoples should be aware of its inherent limitations. One such shortcoming is that international law seriously restricts indigenous peoples' opportunities to participate in the international law-making processes; that is treaty and customary law. The contention in this article is that the recent norm-making method of soft law provides indigenous peoples with a better opportunity for influential participation than is afforded them by traditional methods. If these peoples are to benefit from this opportunity, however, we must appreciate the revolutionary potential of the concept: a potential that is suffocated if the concept is understood only from the perspective of international law. A good example of indigenous peoples gaining a better standing in inter-governmental co-operation is the Arctic Council, which based its work on the soft-law approach from the outset. There would seem to be good prospects for adopting the Arctic Council's approach in other regions of the world in order to improve indigenous peoples' international representational status.

The concept of social license to operate (SLO) is increasingly being used throughout the world to describe a specific aspect of company–community relations in resource-extractive projects, in particular how different actors interact to resolve, or not, the social and economic impacts on local communities and other stakeholders. This article will tease out the main elements of the SLO concept and examine the degree to which both actors (mining companies and communities), verbally and in action, respond toward one another. Based on previous empirical studies of scholars in the field, we have applied an analytical framework of SLO to empirically test whether or not it can provide greater insight into the motivations both behind a community's acceptance of or opposition to a company's project, as well as the extent to which a company is willing to appease the public in order to gain their acceptance. The framework combines a set of normative criteria the company must meet as a precondition to gaining SLO, with different levels of community acceptance indicating the degree to which a community bestows SLO on the company. Eight case studies from the European north (two mining projects in each of the countries Norway, Finland, Russia, and Sweden) have been selected to test the SLO analytical framework in order to ultimately determine whether a company's specific SLO practices (i.e. active public engagement, sponsoring community projects, etc.) generate different levels of community acceptance. Although there are other contributing factors that affect company–community relations in the context of mining projects, most notably the legal and regulatory frameworks for resource-extractive projects, the goal of this article is to focus on the social and ethical dimensions of the company–community relationship.

Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022 was the end of the Arctic cooperation between states and others as we knew it, despite the fact that Russia’s illegal actions are not occurring in the Arctic region. Russia’s attack on Ukraine caused pronounced security fears and responses, particularly from the European and North American countries, including the other Arctic states. This naturally affected Arctic cooperation because it is precisely in the Arctic region that Russia is such a vastly central actor. For example, the region’s pre-eminent inter-governmental forum, the Arctic Council, is struggling to continue its activities in full, as the seven western Arctic states paused participating in meetings held in and activities involving Russia. On the other hand, the first in-person meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) under the Central Arctic Ocean (CAO) fisheries agreement in late November 2022 successfully adopted its COP Rules of Procedure by consensus, including Russia. The purpose of this article is to investigate how adversely Arctic international cooperation in inter-governmental forums and treaties has suffered due to the Ukraine war, utilising a qualitative research methodology to collect internal and sensitive information from key informants. In particular, the article aims to find an answer to the following question: In which types of Arctic inter-governmental structures have the states been able to continue the cooperation and for what reasons? The hypothesis that will be tested in this article is whether treaty-based cooperation has fared better than cooperation founded on soft law. This article will flesh out the current state of Arctic cooperative frameworks and actual cooperative activities under them, analysing three soft law-based cooperative frameworks, including the Arctic Council and several treaty-based cooperative frameworks, such as the CAO fisheries agreement and Arctic Science Cooperation Agreement. This article is based on the facts as of 22 February 2023.

The European Union's (EU's) intention of becoming a permanent observer in the Arctic Council and the reluctance of Arctic actors to grant it that status have made the union's aspirations in the Arctic the subject of a continuing debate. The discussion appears to be dominated by geographical considerations and the EU's gradually emerging Arctic policy. This article puts forward a different view of the EU's presence in the region, one drawing on an analysis of relevant EU competences. As a complex international actor, the EU has acquired a broad array of decision-making powers from its member states, powers that partly extend to Iceland and Norway via the EEA Agreement. Moreover, the EU has in many cases become a relevant actor in international negotiations and treaty making processes the outcomes of which are of crucial importance for the governance of the Arctic. Our argument in the third and concluding section is that only by including the EU in Arctic governance can the international community provide better prospects for the union to sensitise its policies and discourses to the Arctic realities and for other Arctic actors to understand how the union functions. This argument is supported by an analysis of the EU's restrictions on the import of seal products and the ensuing litigation.

This article studies the role of observers under both the Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy (AEPS) and the Arctic Council (AC) before the Nuuk ministerial meeting that took place in May 2011. In this meeting, the AC actors were able to find consensus on criteria for admitting new observers, an issue that has received much media attention, given that China and the European Union, for example, are queuing to become observers in the AC. It is of importance to examine the content of these recently adopted Nuuk observer rules and their potential to impact decision-making on whether the external actors can be included as observers. Moreover, this article studies how, if at all, the Nuuk observer rules might affect the position of the AC in the broader setting of circumpolar cooperation.