This study examines the influence of board interlocks and former politicians on decisions regarding acquisitions in Spain. Our research suggests that board interlocks to other firms can positively influence operations in terms of acquisition scale. Our findings also show that this relationship is positively moderated by the presence of former politicians. That is, the effects of interlocks on acquisitions are amplified further when there are former politicians on boards, which confirms their role as community influentials. In the case of Spain, and under-regulated industries, this complementary effect is maintained. However, the role played by interlocks seems to be more important than former politicians, which means that board interlocks can replace other formal methods of acquiring information (through former politicians) while attempting acquisitions.

The aim of this paper is compare corporate governance and firm strategy before and after privatization. The design of control and performance evaluation systems in the pre and post-privatization periods is compared so that it can be understood in relation to the changes observed at a high corporate level (corporate governance and firm strategy). We carry out various case studies on five privatized Spanish companies. The results support several conclusions. First, the variables that are traditionally related to greater board independence in monitoring do not undergo variation after privatization. Second, the interests of the firms’ new ownership have an impact on firm strategy after privatization. Finally, control and performance evaluation system designs clearly align with firm strategy after privatization.