We examine the significance of fourty-one potential covariates of bitcoin returns for the period 2010–2018 (2872 daily observations). The recently introduced principal component-guided sparse regression is employed. We reveal that economic policy uncertainty and stock market volatility are among the most important variables for bitcoin. We also trace strong evidence of bubbly bitcoin behavior in the 2017–2018 period.

We examine the significance of fourty-one potential covariates of bitcoin returns for the period 2010–2018 (2,872 daily observations). The principal component-guided sparse regression is employed, introduced by Tay et al. (2018). We reveal that economic policy uncertainty and stock market volatility are among the most important variables for bitcoin. We also trace strong evidence of bubbly bitcoin behavior in the 2017-2018 period.

This paper proposes a model of corporate control and oligopolistic competition under common ownership. Each firm’s conduct results from Nash bargaining (NB) among shareholders and firms play a Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains. NB encompasses a rich class of models of corporate control under common ownership, including the current canonical model due to O’Brien and Salop (2000, OS), which has however important deficiencies. A specification of NB overcomes these deficiencies and yields theoretical results and policy implications that contradict those derived under OS. I use Nash-in-Nash to study the competitive effects of changes in corporate control providing a rationale for a policy proposal requiring institutional investors to be passive.

We argue that in the ultimatum game the effects of altruistic behavior and reciprocity vary more in the spectrum of positively compared to negatively-valenced relationships. Thus, we suggest that social distance effects are asymmetric. Our experimental results support this hypothesis; in the region of positively-valenced relationships, the proposers increase the percentage they offer as relationship quality increases more drastically compared to when the relationship is negatively-valenced, in which case they appear more invariant to relationship effects. Also, by eliciting a minimum share which the responder is willing to accept out of the total sum, we provide clearer results on the social distance and stakes effects on the latter’s behavior. We find a negative effect of relationship quality on the minimum acceptable share. This contradicts a strand of the literature which suggests that closer-”in-group” individuals may be punished more severely, so that cooperation in a group is maintained.