The geographic spread of 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) infections from the epicenter of Wuhan, China, has provided an opportunity to study the natural history of the recently emerged virus. Using publicly available event-date data from the ongoing epidemic, the present study investigated the incubation period and other time intervals that govern the epidemiological dynamics of COVID-19 infections. Our results show that the incubation period falls within the range of 2–14 days with 95% confidence and has a mean of around 5 days when approximated using the best-fit lognormal distribution. The mean time from illness onset to hospital admission (for treatment and/or isolation) was estimated at 3–4 days without truncation and at 5–9 days when right truncated. Based on the 95th percentile estimate of the incubation period, we recommend that the length of quarantine should be at least 14 days. The median time delay of 13 days from illness onset to death (17 days with right truncation) should be considered when estimating the COVID-19 case fatality risk.

To estimate the serial interval of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) from information on 28 infector-infectee pairs. We collected dates of illness onset for primary cases (infectors) and secondary cases (infectees) from published research articles and case investigation reports. We subjectively ranked the credibility of the data and performed analyses on both the full dataset (n = 28) and a subset of pairs with highest certainty in reporting (n = 18). In addition, we adjust for right truncation of the data as the epidemic is still in its growth phase. Accounting for right truncation and analyzing all pairs, we estimated the median serial interval at 4.0 days (95% credible interval [CrI]: 3.1, 4.9). Limiting our data to only the most certain pairs, the median serial interval was estimated at 4.6 days (95% CrI: 3.5, 5.9). The serial interval of COVID-19 is close to or shorter than its median incubation period. This suggests that a substantial proportion of secondary transmission may occur prior to illness onset. The COVID-19 serial interval is also shorter than the serial interval of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), indicating that calculations made using the SARS serial interval may introduce bias.

A cluster of pneumonia cases linked to a novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) was reported by China in late December 2019. Reported case incidence has now reached the hundreds, but this is likely an underestimate. As of 24 January 2020, with reports of thirteen exportation events, we estimate the cumulative incidence in China at 5502 cases (95% confidence interval: 3027, 9057). The most plausible number of infections is in the order of thousands, rather than hundreds, and there is a strong indication that untraced exposures other than the one in the epidemiologically linked seafood market in Wuhan have occurred.

The exported cases of 2019 novel coronavirus (COVID-19) infection that were confirmed outside China provide an opportunity to estimate the cumulative incidence and confirmed case fatality risk (cCFR) in mainland China. Knowledge of the cCFR is critical to characterize the severity and understand the pandemic potential of COVID-19 in the early stage of the epidemic. Using the exponential growth rate of the incidence, the present study statistically estimated the cCFR and the basic reproduction number—the average number of secondary cases generated by a single primary case in a naïve population. We modeled epidemic growth either from a single index case with illness onset on 8 December 2019 (Scenario 1), or using the growth rate fitted along with the other parameters (Scenario 2) based on data from 20 exported cases reported by 24 January 2020. The cumulative incidence in China by 24 January was estimated at 6924 cases (95% confidence interval [CI]: 4885, 9211) and 19,289 cases (95% CI: 10,901, 30,158), respectively. The latest estimated values of the cCFR were 5.3% (95% CI: 3.5%, 7.5%) for Scenario 1 and 8.4% (95% CI: 5.3%, 12.3%) for Scenario 2. The basic reproduction number was estimated to be 2.1 (95% CI: 2.0, 2.2) and 3.2 (95% CI: 2.7, 3.7) for Scenarios 1 and 2, respectively. Based on these results, we argued that the current COVID-19 epidemic has a substantial potential for causing a pandemic. The proposed approach provides insights in early risk assessment using publicly available data.

From 29 to 31 January 2020, a total of 565 Japanese citizens were evacuated from Wuhan, China on three chartered flights. All passengers were screened upon arrival in Japan for symptoms consistent with novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV) infection and tested for presence of the virus. Assuming that the mean detection window of the virus can be informed by the mean serial interval (estimated at 7.5 days), the ascertainment rate of infection was estimated at 9.2% (95% confidence interval: 5.0, 20.0). This indicates that the incidence of infection in Wuhan can be estimated at 20,767 infected individuals, including those with asymptomatic and mildly symptomatic infections. The infection fatality risk (IFR)—the actual risk of death among all infected individuals—is therefore 0.3% to 0.6%, which may be comparable to Asian influenza pandemic of 1957–1958.

The impact of the drastic reduction in travel volume within mainland China in January and February 2020 was quantified with respect to reports of novel coronavirus (COVID-19) infections outside China. Data on confirmed cases diagnosed outside China were analyzed using statistical models to estimate the impact of travel reduction on three epidemiological outcome measures: (i) the number of exported cases, (ii) the probability of a major epidemic, and (iii) the time delay to a major epidemic. From 28 January to 7 February 2020, we estimated that 226 exported cases (95% confidence interval: 86,449) were prevented, corresponding to a 70.4% reduction in incidence compared to the counterfactual scenario. The reduced probability of a major epidemic ranged from 7% to 20% in Japan, which resulted in a median time delay to a major epidemic of two days. Depending on the scenario, the estimated delay may be less than one day. As the delay is small, the decision to control travel volume through restrictions on freedom of movement should be balanced between the resulting estimated epidemiological impact and predicted economic fallout.