This study explores the relationship between corporate performance and corporate social responsibility (CSR) initiatives in the Ecuadorian banking environment. The first model employs both return on assets and return on equity as proxy for the financial performance while the second model includes the non-financial corporate performance constructs collected by a self-designed online questionnaire. We found a statistically positive relationship among CSR initiates and the financial and non-financial indicators in corporate performance. Our findings revealed that economic, legal, ethical, and philanthropic responsibility initiatives positively affect the non-financial corporate performance of the Ecuadorian banking environment. Similarly, the non-financial corporate performance is significantly positively influenced by the customer’s brand trust, customer’s brand loyalty, customer’s perception of quality, and customer satisfaction. Study results are mostly consistent with the banking environment of other countries, especially in Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Lebanon. Customers of the Ecuadorian banking environment perceived banks as socially responsible entities and Ecuadorian banks invest resources in CSR activities as a corporate governance policy to increase their financial and non-financial performance. Future research should include a corporate governance index with a CSR component as an independent variable to increase statistical models’ power.

This study investigates the relationship between dividend policy, firm performance, and value within the Korean market, taking into account the unique context of Chaebol ownership structures. Utilizing a robust dataset of 5478 observations from the Korean Composite Stock Price Index, our empirical analysis employs advanced regression models, revealing distinctive effects of various dividend policy measures through the lenses of interest alignment and managerial entrenchment hypotheses. Surprisingly, while cash dividend payments exhibit a robust positive impact on Tobin’s Q and market-to-book ratios, suggesting an overall positive link with market valuations, a closer inspection reveals divergent impacts for Chaebol and non-Chaebol firms. In Chaebol entities, dividend policy proxies consistently demonstrate positive effects on performance metrics, aligning with the interest alignment hypothesis and highlighting strategic signaling efforts. Conversely, non-Chaebol firms exhibit intriguingly negative impacts, supporting the managerial entrenchment hypothesis and implying potential challenges to market value. Firms should prioritize transparent communication on dividend policies for improved investor decision making and enhanced corporate governance in the dynamic Korean market.

In this study, we investigate whether effective corporate governance (CG) intervenes in the relationship between real earnings management (REM) and firm value (FV) by introducing Korean market data. We find that management’s opportunistic REM behavior is no longer effective for firms characterized by strong CG. More importantly, our interaction and robustness analyses show evidence indicating that CG plays an effective monitoring role in preventing management from engaging in opportunistic REM activities, and FV ceases to experience the decrease associated with REM activities as a consequence.

This study examines how leverage affects real earnings management (REM) in non-financial firms listed on the Korea Composite Stock Price Index from 2010 to 2018 by employing total, short-term, and long-term debt ratios (i.e., leverage) as independent variables and four REM metrics as dependent variables. We find a significant positive relationship between leverage and REM in suspicious firms, whereas the effect of leverage is insignificant in non-suspicious firms. We also find that the positive relationship between both variables is stronger in the second half of the fiscal year, which shows the prevalence of the seasonality of REM, as managers collect high-frequency financial information during this period. These findings are consistent with those in the literature that managers increase firm leverage and REM activities to reduce their probability of being discovered, since financial statements in the interim quarters are not often audited. Our study complements the literature by introducing quarterly data to identify clearly REM activities and detect the strongest effect on the relationship between REM and leverage. Moreover, our results from the two-stage least square (2SLS) regression analysis are consistent with our previous findings.

This study examines the moderating function of corporate governance (CG) to the relationship between leverage and firm value (FV) using Korean market data. The study employs ordinary least-squares panel data regressions and two methods to manage endogeneity problems. The findings show a meaningful negative relationship between leverage and FV. This relationship, however, disappears, when the interaction variable of leverage × CG is included in the econometric model. These results indicate that an effective CG mechanism may lessen the probability of either the entrenched management-decision-making behavior or the agency costs of debt and, therefore, the negative effect of debt to FV diminishes. Moreover, our data show that the relationship between leverage and FV becomes positive, even though insignificant, for firms with a high level of CG, whereas it stays significantly negative for firms with a low level of CG. We also find that leverage for firms with a high level of CG is lower than those firms with a low level of CG. These additional findings support our conclusion of the moderating role of CG, which also influences the firms’ risk, leverage, and FV. The authors recommend the implementation of a robust CG plan to decrease the information asymmetry and the agency leverage problem.

This study examines the relationship between corporate governance (CG) and agency costs using Korean market data, particularly for chaebol firms. The final sample includes 660 firm-year observations between 2016 and 2020 for Korean non-financial firms listed on the Korean Composite Stock Price Index (KOSPI). This study employs an ordinary least-squares panel data regression model using two proxies for agency costs, namely, asset utilization ratio and operating expense ratio, and six CG individual metrics as independent variables (CG score, protection of shareholder rights, board structure, disclosure, audit organization, and managerial discretion and error management). We find that firms with high CG experience lower agency costs than those with low CG. Moreover, our evidence suggests that firms can decrease agency costs by improving the quality of CG. The results of our regression model also support the idea that CG is effective in reducing agency costs for chaebol firms but not for non-chaebol firms. Finally, our findings suggest that the implementation of effective CG mechanisms in firms might improve managerial behavior through better decision-making to maximize the value of firms.