Fausto Marincioni

Dr. Fausto Marincioni

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

20Years (2007-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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11 December 2007 in Natural Hazards
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
PTPhong Tran
Phong Tran
FMFausto Marincioni
Fausto Marincioni
Rajib ShawRajib Shaw
Rajib Shaw
MSMassimo Sarti
Massimo Sarti
LALe Van An
Le Van An


1 November 2010 in Journal of Environmental Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PTPhong Tran
Phong Tran
FMFausto Marincioni
Fausto Marincioni
Rajib ShawRajib Shaw
Rajib Shaw

25 May 2013 in Regional Environmental Change
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Journal Article
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PDF file
FAF. Appiotti
F. Appiotti
MKM. Krželj
M. Krželj
Aniello RussoAniello Russo
Aniello Russo
MFM. Ferretti
M. Ferretti
MBM. Bastianini
M. Bastianini
FMFausto Marincioni
Fausto Marincioni

18 March 2009 in Environmental Management
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Journal Article
Closed access
PDF file
FMFausto Marincioni
Fausto Marincioni
FAFederica Appiotti
Federica Appiotti

1 February 2012 in Earthquake Spectra
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
FMFausto Marincioni
Fausto Marincioni
FAFederica Appiotti
Federica Appiotti
MFMaurizio Ferretti
Maurizio Ferretti
CACaterina Antinori
Caterina Antinori
PMPaola Melonaro
Paola Melonaro
RORoberto Oreficini‐Rosi
Roberto Oreficini‐Rosi
On Monday, 6 April 2009 at 3:32 a.m. (local time), a moment magnitude 6.3 earthquake with an epicenter located near the city of L'Aquila, in central Italy, killed 308 people, injured 1,500, left 22,000 homeless, and temporarily displaced another 65,000. This study examines a sample of the affected population and finds that despite the long list of historical earthquakes that struck the region and the swarm of foreshocks occurring up to four months before the main shock of 6 April, the residents of L'Aquila had a rather low earthquake risk perception and an unjustified confidence in the seismic safety of their houses. This low perception of earthquake risk and ignorance of the real structural resistance of buildings appear to have inhibited the individual and collective propensity to develop emergency plans. This situation was further exacerbated by the lack of clear and forthright communication from the emergency management authorities about the impossibility of precisely predicting earthquakes and about the risks posed by many of the city's old buildings.