Renewable energy plays an important role in the transition to a low emission society, yet in many regions energy projects have resulted in increasing societal polarization. Based on a comprehensive literature review and a survey among stakeholders from specific regions in Germany, Italy, Latvia, Norway, Poland and Spain with little prior experience with wind energy, we highlight six categories of factors that shape community acceptance of onshore wind energy development: technical characteristics of wind energy projects, environmental impacts, economic impacts, societal impacts, contextual factors and individual characteristics. We identify key similarities in acceptance-related patterns of wind energy development across the selected regions, but also important differences, highlighting the very context-specific nature of community acceptance. The findings contribute to improving the understanding of the forces, factors and relationships at play between policy frameworks and perceptions of wind energy under different conditions. We conclude by proposing policy recommendations regarding measures to increase the positive impacts and reduce the negative impacts of wind energy projects, and to strengthen existing drivers and reduce barriers to community acceptance of wind energy development.

Political feasibility (or infeasibility) is often associated with target-group support (or opposition) of specific policy alternatives. We argue that target-groups’ capacity to influence the spectrum of politically feasible policy options tends to be higher when (1) target groups control resources needed by decision-makers, that (2) are agenda-setters and/or veto players in the decision-making process. In the 2008 revision of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) exemptions from the basic principle of full auctioning of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions allowances can all be traced to target-group interest representation by single veto players or blocking minorities in the European Council and the Council of Ministers. Our analysis indicates that target groups succeeded in constraining the spectrum of politically feasible policy options to the extent that their positions were unified and threats to shut down or relocate activity were perceived to be relevant, severe and credible. Our findings confirm both the significance and the limits of portfolio assignment in the Commission. Even with Directorate General (DG) Environment in an agenda-setting role, target groups acquired exemptions through their relations with veto players in the Council.

Much can be learned about adaptation by applying structures and methodologies already used in other research fields. This study employs a public economic policy approach to investigate how – or if at all – adaptation should be supported by the public sector. Three different fields of adaptation activity are identified which are especially relevant for government intervention and the study proposes ways in which government intervention could be conducted. The analysis takes into account that developing regions are particularly vulnerable and they have insufficient funds to adequately adapt to climate change.

Increasing losses from weather related extreme events coupled with limited coping capacity suggest a need for strong adaptation commitments, of which public sector responses to adjustments to actual and expected climate stimuli are key. The European Commission has started to address this need in the emerging European Union (EU) climate adaptation strategy; yet, a specific rationale for adaptation interventions has not clearly been identified, and the economic case for adaptation to extremes remains vague. Basing the diagnosis on economic welfare theory and an empirical analysis of the current EU and member states’ roles in managing disaster risk, we discuss how and where the public sector may intervene for managing climate variability and change. We restrict our analysis to financial disaster management, a domain of adaptation intervention, which is of key concern for the EU adaptation strategy. We analyse three areas of public sector interventions, supporting national insurance systems, providing compensation to the affected post event as well as intergovernmental loss sharing through the EU solidarity fund, according to the three government functions of allocation, distribution, and stabilization suggested by welfare theory, and suggest room for improvement.

More than two decades of climate change negotiations have produced a series of global climate agreements, such as the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accords, but have nevertheless made very limited progress in curbing global emissions of greenhouse gases. This paper considers whether negotiations can succeed in reaching an agreement that effectively addresses the climate change problem. To be effective, a climate agreement must cause substantial emissions reductions either directly (in the agreement's own lifetime) or indirectly (by paving the way for a future agreement that causes substantial emissions reductions directly). To reduce global emissions substantially, an agreement must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, participation must be both comprehensive and stable. Secondly, participating countries must accept deep commitments. Finally, the agreement must obtain high compliance rates. We argue that three types of enforcement will be crucial to fulfilling these three conditions: (1) incentives for countries to ratify with deep commitments, (2) incentives for countries that have ratified with deep commitments to abstain from withdrawal, and (3) incentives for countries having ratified with deep commitments to comply with them. Based on assessing the constraints that characterize the climate change negotiations, we contend that adopting such three-fold potent enforcement will likely be politically infeasible, not only within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, but also in the framework of a more gradual approach. Therefore, one should not expect climate change negotiations to succeed in producing an effective future agreement—either directly or indirectly.