Zhaohui Dong

Mr. Zhaohui Dong

orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

7Years (2020-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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28 May 2022 in International Transactions in Operational Research
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
LZLei Zhao
Lei Zhao
XBXinhua Bi
Xinhua Bi
ZDZhaohui Dong
Zhaohui Dong
NXNi Xiao
Ni Xiao
AZAnni Zhao
Anni Zhao

12 March 2020 in Sustainability
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Journal Article
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HCHaitao Chen
Haitao Chen
ZDZhaohui Dong
Zhaohui Dong
GLGendao Li
Gendao Li
HZHetian Zhao
Hetian Zhao
With environmental problems becoming severe, many firms, including HP, Huawei, and Apple are simultaneously implementing trade-in programs and advertising to stimulate market demand. Offering trade-in service by the manufacturer is a method of price discrimination by providing replacement consumers with a rebate when they purchase new products. With the recycled, used products, the manufacturer can benefit through a strict series—via a remanufacturing process. Although numerous literatures have investigated the pricing strategy and advertising decisions in the closed-loop supply chain (CLSC), to the best of our knowledge, there is little research that analyzes and compares the economic and social performance of these two marketing strategies. To fill this gap, we establish two supply chain models with two periods, namely, an advertisement model and a joint model, while the equilibrium purchasing behavior of the replacement consumers can be characterized under three conditions: (1) all of the replacement consumers purchasing new products (ATA); (2) partial replacement consumers purchasing (PTA); (3) no replacement consumers purchasing (NTA). These three conditions are decided by the numerous relationships of the parameters. Solving the optimal decisions of the manufacturer in both models, the critical value in the joint model is higher in the advertisement model, which indicates that developing the trade-in program can enhance the robustness of the business model. Furthermore, through numerical example, we find that the market demand in the joint model is higher than in the advertisement model, and the cost of marketing strategy in the joint model is lower in the advertisement model, which means that the efficiency of the marketing strategy is higher than the single marketing strategy. As a result, comparing the economic and social performance between the two models, we conclude that the advertisement elasticity of the market demand is the key factor of the manufacturer’s profits and total social welfare.

17 October 2020 in Sustainability
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
HCHaitao Chen
Haitao Chen
ZDZhaohui Dong
Zhaohui Dong
GLGendao Li
Gendao Li
This study establishs a dual channel closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) model under a government–penalty mechanism (RPM) consisting a dual-channel manufacturer, a retailer, and the government. We consider a Stackelberg game between the manufacturer and the retailer, and the government rewards or punishes manufacturers on the basis of the collection rate of used products. This paper analyzes the influence of government RPM on the optimal decisions, the relationship between the two sales channels, and the total social welfare of the supply chain system. We find that the government RPM can improve the stability of the dual-channel supply chain and the collection rate of the used products. Moreover, we are the first to provide a method of deriving the optimal government RPM through a numerical example.