We develop a general framework in which public goods are conflicting (complementary) if an increase in the provision of one public good raises (lowers) the marginal cost of providing another public good. The framework is used to analyse the policy implications of maintaining safe minimum standards (SMSs) for two public goods. The comparative-static results are illustrated using a sector model for Norwegian agriculture in which the SMSs for food security, agrobiodiversity and greenhouse gas emissions are modelled as constraints. The simulations show that even if public goods are conflicting, better-targeted policies can achieve SMSs at lower social costs.
Norway maintains a complex system of activity or type specific coupled payments which account for a large share of farm income. Most of the payment rates are negatively related to farm size and are higher in remote areas compared to central regions. We present and use a newly developed recursive‐dynamic multi‐commodity model (Agrispace) withCESproduction functions depicting regional farm clusters derived from the full farm population. Using this model, we simulate impacts of current and alternative subsidy policies on production, prices, input use, income and farm structural change. Mapping cluster results to each farm along with behavioural rules allows estimation of individual profits and farm exits. Our results indicate that, in the short run, the current policy regime seems to support the policy objective of maintaining a variety of farms in all parts of Norway. In the long run, farm structural change is less affected by a policy reform that leaves total support levels unchanged.
17 June 2019 in Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics
We present a game-theoretical model arguing that greater public transparency does not necessarily lead to higher social welfare. Political agents can benefit from providing citizens with misleading information aimed at aligning citizens’ choices with the political agents’ preferences. Citizens can lose from being fooled by political agents, though they can mitigate their losses by conducting costly inspections to detect false information. Producing and detecting false information is costly and can reduce social welfare.
This paper studies the hypothesis that farm structure and the regional distribution of agricultural activity themselves have a significant impact on greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from agriculture. Applying a dynamic model for the Norwegian agricultural sector covering the entire farm population, the model results support the hypothesis. Even without mitigation options, GHG emissions decline by 1.4 per cent if agriculture becomes regionally concentrated and increase by 1.5 per cent if a policy that favors a small-scale farm structure is put in place. Adding a carbon tax to a policy that leads to regional concentration, may help to reconcile competing policy objectives. A switch from animal production to crop production, and an extensification of animal production keeps a large resource base across the country while cutting GHG emissions.