Md Jubayer al Mahmod

Mr. Md Jubayer al Mahmod


Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 July 2017 in Photonics and Nanostructures - Fundamentals and Applications
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMd Jubayer al Mahmod
Md Jubayer al Mahmod
RHRakib Hyder
Rakib Hyder
ZIZahurul Islam
Zahurul Islam

1 January 2019 in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
BCBenjamin Cyr
Benjamin Cyr
MMMd Jubayer al Mahmod
Md Jubayer al Mahmod
Ujjwal GuinUjjwal Guin
Ujjwal Guin
The continuous growth of the cloning of electronic devices poses a severe threat to our critical infrastructure that uses the Internet, as cloned devices can transmit secret information and cause security concerns. Cloned devices can also be unreliable as they may be manufactured with inferior quality materials, and they may have many defects as they may not be tested properly. It is thus extremely important to protect these electronic devices from cloning. An efficient way to prevent a device being cloned is to prevent the firmware from being copied because, without the proper firmware, the device will not function like the original. In this paper, we present a novel firmware obfuscation method without encrypting the entire memory. The firmware is obfuscated by swapping a subset of instructions. The instructions to be swapped are specifically chosen so that an attacker cannot discover their location. During operation, the hardware reconstructs the original program using a PUF-generated identifier (ID) and a small memory that stores the swapped instructions. An adversary cannot make a program work completely without knowing which instructions have been swapped, as the program will execute in the wrong sequence and produce the incorrect result. Our proposed solution requires only a small overhead to reconstruct the firmware, making it practical for devices with strict resource constraints. This solution also allows remote updates of new obfuscated firmware without any modification and is practical for the rising trend of ubiquitous computing.

22 June 2018 in IEEE Sensors Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
MMMd Jubayer al Mahmod
Md Jubayer al Mahmod
RHRakib Hyder
Rakib Hyder
MIMd Zahurul Islam
Md Zahurul Islam
We propose and theoretically analyze an integrated biosensor scheme based on a Metal-Insulator-Metal waveguide-coupled ring resonator structure that can be used for bio-molecular sensing applications. We incorporate silicon as substrate aiming that the whole structure can be fabricated monolithically in the same CMOS-compatible device. The full-field FDTD analysis is carried out to find the spectral response and performance characteristics of the proposed nanosensor in the NIR region of the spectrum. As the coupling of surface plasmon polaritons between two metal-dielectric interfaces of the ring increases the strength of the confined field, the sensitivity of the structure increases and reaches as high as 1383 nm/RIU. The analyses also indicate that the resonant modes can be tuned according to the design requirement keeping sensitivity almost constant. The proposed nanostructure is also investigated for some biomolecular sensing applications and expected results are obtained.

8 March 2020 in Cryptography
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
MMMd Jubayer al Mahmod
Md Jubayer al Mahmod
Ujjwal GuinUjjwal Guin
Ujjwal Guin
The edge devices connected to the Internet of Things (IoT) infrastructures are increasingly susceptible to piracy. These pirated edge devices pose a serious threat to security, as an adversary can get access to the private network through these non-authentic devices. It is necessary to authenticate an edge device over an unsecured channel to safeguard the network from being infiltrated through these fake devices. The implementation of security features demands extensive computational power and a large hardware/software overhead, both of which are difficult to satisfy because of inherent resource limitation in the IoT edge devices. This paper presents a low-cost authentication protocol for IoT edge devices that exploits power-up states of built-in SRAM for device fingerprint generations. Unclonable ID generated from the on-chip SRAM could be unreliable, and to circumvent this issue, we propose a novel ID matching scheme that alleviates the need for enhancing the reliability of the IDs generated from on-chip SRAMs. Security and different attack analysis show that the probability of impersonating an edge device by an adversary is insignificant. The protocol is implemented using a commercial microcontroller, which requires a small code overhead. However, no modification of device hardware is necessary.

25 July 2025 in Communications of the ACM
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
MMMd Jubayer al Mahmod
Md Jubayer al Mahmod
MHMatthew Hicks
Matthew Hicks
The widespread use of embedded systems has increased the risk of physical memory disclosure attacks. A notable example is the cold boot attack, where attackers exploit DRAM’s temperature-dependent data retention property. At low temperatures, DRAM cells temporarily retain their state after power loss, allowing sensitive data to be recovered. Cold boot attacks can expose system secrets, bypassing defenses like disk encryption. To counter this threat, developers store sensitive data in on-chip SRAM. Unlike DRAM, on-chip SRAM is isolated from external access and, due to its low capacitance, loses data almost immediately when powered off, making it robust against such attacks. While SRAM protects against traditional cold boot attacks, we show that there is another way to retain information in on-chip SRAM across power cycles. This paper presents Volt Boot , an attack that demonstrates a vulnerability of on-chip SRAM due to the physical separation common in modern system-on-chip power distribution networks. Volt Boot leverages asymmetrical power states (for example, on vs. off) to force SRAM state retention across power cycles, eliminating the need for traditional cold boot attack enablers, such as low-temperature or intrinsic data retention time. Using three modern ARM Cortex-A SOCs, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the attack in caches, registers, and iRAMs. Unlike other forms of SRAM data retention attacks, Volt Boot retrieves data with 100% accuracy—without any complex post-processing.

1 July 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
MMMd Jubayer al Mahmod
Md Jubayer al Mahmod
MHMatthew Hicks
Matthew Hicks
The foundation of trusted computation depends on the ability to verify the authenticity of the underlying hardware. This need is further compounded by the presence of counterfeit components in the market, highlighting the necessity for pre-deployment and run-time chip identification techniques. Current solutions involve burning authentication information in physical fuses or creating a unique mask for each integrated circuit, which are either costly or susceptible to forgery. While many solutions have been proposed to prevent chip counterfeiting at design time, no accurate, reference-free, and cost-effective solutions exist for chip buyers to authenticate their purchases in the pre-deployment phase and enable software-level verification at runtime. The lack of industry-standard authentication methods forces chip buyers to either adopt expensive solutions, such as X-Ray imaging, or simply rely on blind faith. This paper presents SKU-RAM, a technique for chip identification that allows manufacturers to embed their signature into integrated circuits, provides per-device identification, and facilitates hardware-enforced time-limited licensing functionality. Our approach takes advantage of the aging-induced power-on state changes in SRAM to encode authentication data into an already fabricated device, without modifying the mask of the chips. This hardware-overhead-free augmentation to the chips eliminates numerous instances of chip counterfeiting and enables software-level authentication. We demonstrate the effectiveness of SKU-RAM as a comprehensive and scalable anti-counterfeiting solution for existing and future computing devices using commercial off-the-shelf microcontrollers and microprocessors and multi-year real-time experiments.