Maria Montero

Dr. Maria Montero

School of Economics, University of Nottingham, University Park, Nottingham, UK

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

27Years (2000-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 May 2006 in SSRN Electronic Journal
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MMMaria Montero
Maria Montero
Inequity aversion models have been used to explain equitable payoff divisions in bargaining games. I show that inequity aversion can actually increase the asymmetry of payoff division if unanimity is not required. This is due to the analogy between inequity aversion and risk aversion. Inequity aversion may also affect comparative statics: the advantage of being proposer can decrease as players become more impatient.

1 February 2006 in Games and Economic Behavior
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MMMaria Montero
Maria Montero

1 March 2012 in Mathematical Social Sciences
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MBMichel Le Breton
Michel Le Breton
MMMaria Montero
Maria Montero
VZVera Zaporozhets
Vera Zaporozhets

15 March 2007 in Social Choice and Welfare
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MMMaria Montero
Maria Montero
MSMartin Sefton
Martin Sefton
PZPing Zhang
Ping Zhang

1 March 2007 in The Economic Journal
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MMMaria Montero
Maria Montero

31 August 2018 in Journal of the European Economic Association
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FGFabio Galeotti
Fabio Galeotti
MMMaria Montero
Maria Montero
APAnders Poulsen
Anders Poulsen
We consider how the outcome of bargaining varies with changes in the trade-off between equality, efficiency, and total-earnings maximization. We observe that subjects avoid an equal-earning outcome if it is Pareto inefficient; a large proportion of bargaining pairs avoids an equal and Pareto efficient outcome in favor of one giving unequal and total-earnings maximizing payoffs, and this proportion increases when unequal outcomes imply larger earnings to one of the players, even though this also implies higher inequality; finally, we document a compromise effect that violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives condition.