Andrew M. Riggsby

Prof. Andrew M. Riggsby

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Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

36Years (1991-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 December 1998 in Arethusa
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Journal Article
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ARAndrew M. Riggsby
Andrew M. Riggsby

1 March 2003 in Arethusa
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Journal Article
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ARAndrew M. Riggsby
Andrew M. Riggsby

1 January 1995 in American Journal of Philology
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Journal Article
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ARAndrew M. Riggsby
Andrew M. Riggsby

2 November 2016
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Book Chapter
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ARAndrew M. Riggsby
Andrew M. Riggsby
The chapter surveys various typological divisions of Roman law that invoke terminology such as “criminal” and the like—based on explicit ancient categorisation; sets of procedural features; organization of juristic texts; and/or substantive features—and suggests that the implicit analogies to modern criminal law are not useful. The various Roman categories are less well defined than is usually imagined, and the various means of categorisation are often at cross-purposes. Even the most plausible composite Republican-era category is significantly narrower than the “criminal”, and at any rate the composition would be under-motivated. Imperial law develops a superficially more similar jurisdiction over time, but it is increasingly shaped by factors that have little to do with any particular conceptualization of the subject matter.

24 April 2015
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Book Chapter
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ARAndrew M. Riggsby
Andrew M. Riggsby

29 July 2004
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Book Chapter
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ARAndrew M. Riggsby
Andrew M. Riggsby
This chapter considers three problems in Roman (primarily Ciceronian) oratory and rhetoric surrounding the notion of character during a prosecution. The first is the question of how forensic oratory was constrained by external notions of character; this is inextricably tied to a debate of long standing whether antiquity understood a person's character to be ‘fixed’. The chapter argues that the evidence is best accounted for if oratorical practice is seen as being informed by such a view. The second section shows that awareness of this view of character can also aid our understanding of the overall function of the criminal courts in ancient Rome; the differing roles of personality in those courts and our own do not indicate fundamentally different roles for the two institutions. Finally, and more tentatively, the chapter suggests that oratorical practice, shaped by this view of character, in turn affected the reception of theory of ethos proposed by Aristotle.