Benjamin Fordham

Prof. Benjamin Fordham

Binghamton University
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Academic Career Length

29Years (1998-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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5 April 2012 in International Organization
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Benjamin FordhamBenjamin Fordham
Benjamin Fordham
KKKatja B. Kleinberg
Katja B. Kleinberg
Recent research on the sources of individual attitudes toward trade policy comes to very different conclusions about the role of economic self-interest. The skeptical view suggests that long-standing symbolic predispositions and sociotropic perceptions shape trade policy opinions more than one's own material well-being. We believe this conclusion is premature for two reasons. First, the practice of using one attitude to predict another raises questions about direction of causation that cannot be answered with the data at hand. This problem is most obvious when questions about the expected impact of trade are used to predict opinions about trade policy. Second, the understanding of self-interest employed in most studies of trade policy attitudes is unrealistically narrow. In reality, the close relationship between individual economic interests and the interests of the groups in which individuals are embedded creates indirect pathways through which one's position in the economy can shape individual trade policy preferences. We use the data employed by Mansfield and Mutz to support our argument that a more complete account of trade attitude formation is needed and that in such an account economic interests may yet play an important role.1

1 September 2011 in Journal of Peace Research
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Benjamin FordhamBenjamin Fordham
Benjamin Fordham
Some states define their interests more broadly than others, looking beyond their immediate security and mobilizing their national wealth in pursuit of more ambitious goals. The most successful of these states come to be seen by others as major powers. Though major powers and states aspiring to attain this status are very important in world politics, relatively little explicit attention has been paid to the question of why some states expand their foreign policy ambitions, adopting what can be termed a major-power foreign policy. This article evaluates three explanations for this policy choice. Some international relations theory claims that potential power is itself a sufficient motivation for the adoption of major-power foreign policy. Other theorists suggest that some triggering condition is required, such as increasing international threat or expanding international economic interests. Evidence concerning the construction of military capabilities and diplomatic activism indicates that potential power alone does not offer a sufficient explanation for the adoption of major-power foreign policy. Both international threats and economic interests act as triggers for this choice, though they appear to push states toward different types of mobilization.

1 January 1998
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Benjamin FordhamBenjamin Fordham
Benjamin Fordham
In 1950, the U.S. military budget more than tripled while plans for a national health care system and other new social welfare programs disappeared from the agenda. At the same time, the official campaign against the influence of radicals in American life reached new heights. Benjamin Fordham...

9 January 2008 in International Organization
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Benjamin FordhamBenjamin Fordham
Benjamin Fordham
This research note evaluates the effect of economic interests on public support for American global activism. Those who were relatively well-positioned to benefit economically from the American-backed postwar international order, mainly those with better access to human and financial capital, or who hailed from relatively export-oriented parts of the country, should be more likely to support it. An analysis of American National Election Study data on support for isolationism between 1956 and 2000 supports this line of argument. Individual self-interest is probably the most important pathway through which the international economy has influenced public opinion. However, the aggregate effects of exports and imports on respondents' home states have also made a difference. The effects of these economic interests are substantively large and fairly consistent over time.

4 July 2011 in Foreign Policy Analysis
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Benjamin FordhamBenjamin Fordham
Benjamin Fordham
KKKatja B. Kleinberg
Katja B. Kleinberg

1 January 2007 in International Organization
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Benjamin FordhamBenjamin Fordham
Benjamin Fordham
Why did the United States intervene in World War I, breaking with its long tradition of noninvolvement in European political and military conflicts? During the 1920s and 1930s, many “revisionist” historians argued that American efforts to protect its trade with the Allies ultimately led to intervention. The logic of the revisionist position closely parallels the contemporary liberal case that interdependence promotes peace but arrives at different conclusions about the relationship between trade and conflict. Historians have largely abandoned this economic interpretation of American intervention, but data on the impact of the wartime export boom on the United States suggest that it should be reconsidered. The export boom was so large that it would have been difficult to ignore, and its progress corresponds to the timing of important decisions leading to American belligerency. An analysis of congressional voting on war-related measures also suggests that export income helped shape politicians' views of the war.I would like to thank Katherine Barbieri, John Coogan, David Clark, Jeffry Frieden, Jack Levy, Brian Lai, Timothy McKeown, David Painter, Strom Thacker, and participants in the world politics workshop at Binghamton University, the political economy workshop at Harvard University, and the Department of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, for their many comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this article. Lisa Martin and several anonymous reviewers at International Organization also made many valuable suggestions. I am especially grateful to Thomas Walker, whose good-natured skepticism prompted me to write this paper. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2005 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. Any remaining errors and misinterpretations are my responsibility.