GwangHyun Ahn

GwangHyun Ahn

Sejong University, Seoul, Republic of Korea
orcid

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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21 June 2024 in IEEE Access
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
GAGwangHyun Ahn
GwangHyun Ahn
JJJisoo Jang
Jisoo Jang
SCSeho Choi
Seho Choi
Dongkyoo ShinDongkyoo Shin
Dongkyoo Shin
With the advent of the digital information age, the dynamics of cyberspace are rapidly evolving, resulting in a significant increase in cyber threats. In this paper, we propose to integrate the Zero Trust (ZT) security model and the MITRE ATT&CK matrix to address the need for enhancing cyber resilience, which is an organization’s ability to recover quickly from a cyber-attack or security incident. This research focuses on a variety of cyber threats that pose significant risks to organizations, including phishing, ransomware, insider threats, and advanced persistent threats (APTs), which are prevalent in public sector organizations. These threats exploit vulnerabilities in an organization’s network and information systems. The ZT model’s principle of "never trust, always verify" ensures that all network traffic is inspected equally and emphasizes key elements such as micro-segmentation, continuous authentication, and the principle of least privilege. The findings of this study provide practical metrics for implementing and managing the effective integration of the ZT and ATT&CK models and demonstrate that this synergy can significantly improve an organization’s resilience to cyber threats. In addition to introducing a new paradigm in cybersecurity, the study highlights the importance of the Zero Trust model as an integral part of a modern security strategy and confirms that organizations can proactively analyze the evolving cyber threat landscape to ensure a more secure and resilient digital future. In particular, the integration between ZT and the MITRE ATT&CK matrix is essential, as current security approaches do not fully address the complexity and sophisticated nature of various cyber threats. These research gaps are identified, and practical solutions are proposed to integrate the two models, thereby strengthening an organization’s cyber defense mechanisms.

24 October 2022 in Applied Sciences
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GAGwangHyun Ahn
GwangHyun Ahn
Kookjin KimKookjin Kim
Kookjin Kim
Wonhyung ParkWonhyung Park
Wonhyung Park
Dongkyoo ShinDongkyoo Shin
Dongkyoo Shin
With advances in cyber threats and increased intelligence, incidents continue to occur related to new ways of using new technologies. In addition, as intelligent and advanced cyberattack technologies gradually increase, the limit of inefficient malicious code detection and analysis has been reached, and inaccurate detection rates for unknown malicious codes are increasing. Thus, this study used a machine learning algorithm to achieve a malicious file detection accuracy of more than 99%, along with a method for visualizing data for the detection of malicious files using the dynamic-analysis-based MITRE ATT&CK framework. The PE malware dataset was classified into Random Forest, Adaboost, and Gradient Boosting models. These models achieved accuracies of 99.3%, 98.4%, and 98.8%, respectively, and malicious file analysis results were derived through visualization by applying the MITRE ATT&CK matrix.

9 June 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GAGwangHyun Ahn
GwangHyun Ahn
Dongkyoo ShinDongkyoo Shin
Dongkyoo Shin
Existing Cyber Resilience Assessment Guidelines, including those of the Bank of Korea (BoK), focus on governance-oriented compliance and lack quantitative criteria for measuring the operational effectiveness of security technologies—a Policy–Technology Gap also common in general enterprise settings. To address this gap, this study proposes D3-CREF, a technology-centric cyber resilience evaluation framework that maps the MITRE D3FEND taxonomy to financial security domains and introduces a Normalized Resilience Index (NRI) aggregating four dimensions—Coverage, Maturity, Automation, and Timeliness—via a closed-form weighted geometric mean with AHP-elicited weights (consistency ratio CR = 0.04). All NRI indicators are anchored to MITRE ATT&CK techniques and exemplar CVE entries, enabling threat-informed measurement. The framework was validated through a three-round Delphi study with 50 experts (Kendall’s W = 0.78, p < 0.001; Cronbach’s α = 0.89; CVR 0.68–0.92) and a Cyber Range-based simulation. For three institutions with identical BoK scores (92/100), NRI yielded discriminative values of 0.83, 0.44, and 0.09 (CV = 0.68 vs. 0.00 for the baseline), confirming a shift from compliance-based to performance-driven assessment.

1 January 2021
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
WPWonhyung Park
Wonhyung Park
GAGwangHyun Ahn
GwangHyun Ahn
Recently, information leakage accidents have been continuously occurring due to cyberattacks, and internal information leakage has also been occurring additionally. In this situation, many hacking accidents and DDoS attacks related to IoT are reported, and cyber threat detection field is expanding. Therefore, in this study, the trend related to the commercialization and generalization of IoT technology and the degree of standardization of IoT have been analyzed. Based on the reality of IoT analyzed through this process, research and analysis on what points are required in IoT security control was conducted, and then IoT security control strategy was presented. In this strategy, the IoT environment was divided into IoT device, IoT network/communication, and IoT service/platform in line with the basic strategic framework of 'Pre-response-accident response-post-response', and the strategic direction of security control was established suitable for each of them.

23 September 2026 in Electronics
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
PDF file
GAGwangHyun Ahn
GwangHyun Ahn
Jae Pil YounJae Pil Youn
Jae Pil Youn
GSGeunSoo Son
GeunSoo Son
Dongkyoo ShinDongkyoo Shin
Dongkyoo Shin
Satellite ground segments run conventional, patchable software, but disruptive maintenance must be coordinated with recurring orbital visibility. We formulate vulnerability remediation as a constrained action-and-timing problem in which SGP4-propagated visibility intervals and a pre-contact guard band define protected intervals, and a deterministic gate admits or rejects each action over a recovery-aware execution envelope containing the action, its verification, and any rollback. The enforcement property is stated as a proved conditional invariant, and the experiments test conformance to it rather than operational safety. The evaluation is a public-feed-driven discrete-event simulation over 48 CISA KEV vulnerabilities, 12 propagated passes in a 24 h horizon, and MITRE D3FEND countermeasures. Across 30 paired runs, policies that did not enforce the protected intervals violated them in every run, whereas enforcing policies recorded none, with no violation in any of 270 gated runs (cluster-level 95% upper bound of 0.011 per run). Violations first appear at a schedule displacement of 120 s, about 900 km of along-track error, so schedule integrity rather than decision sophistication carries the property. Mission weighting added nothing beyond contact avoidance, which follows analytically from the hard exclusion and reverses under partial protection. Cumulative exposure is conditional on the retry budget of the reported runs, a dependence quantified analytically from the verification model rather than measured, and asset attribution rests on a simulation reference mapping rather than on adjudicated applicability.