The paper addresses the theme of sponsorship as the main form of public–private partnership through which to finance restoration/recovery interventions for the historical–architectural heritage. The goal is the maximization of sponsorship profitability for companies. Specifically, an existing dynamic model through which it was possible to estimate the optimal annual amount to be invested in sponsorship to maximize the current value of expected profits has been analyzed, reworked and for the first time applied to an Italian company. It was therefore assumed that the company is intent on supporting a multi-year program of sponsorship investment. It is also assumed that the corporation is a single-product company, operating in monopolistic competition and characterized by a Cobb–Douglas production function with decreasing returns to scale. The work is in continuity with a previous publication focused on the application and validation of a static model. The final goal is to provide tools for applied analysis of the financial sustainability of the sponsorship that forms incentive for companies to implement its use, facilitating the recovery of the historical–architectural heritage. Public bodies can thus benefit from the greater contribution of resources from private financiers for a zero-cost and sustainable valorization of cultural heritage.
The topic of the paper is sponsorship for the requalification/conservation of historical-architectural heritage. In the literature, there are many models for evaluating the financial efficiency of sponsorship from the point of view of the sponsor (mostly in the sports field), but none of these jointly support both the sponsor and the sponsee in the selection of financially sustainable cultural sponsorships. Trying to reduce this gap, an innovative model is proposed for estimating the profitability of cultural sponsorship. The model consists of three phases. In the first, which consists of the financial analysis of the investment for the sponsee, the minimum amount that the sponsee can request from the sponsor is established. The second phase analyzes the financial performance of potential sponsors, estimating the optimal sponsorship budget that maximizes profits. In the final phase, where the results of the two analyses are compared, the sponsee eventually reformulates his offer and decides which company to sign the contract with. The model is tested through a case study: the sponsorship of the restoration of the Don Tullio Fountain in Salerno (Italy). It is assumed that two companies are interested in sponsorship. The results show that the investment is financially sustainable for both companies.
This paper explores the topic of the energy transition in housing. The work aims to offer a knowledge base for energy policy on the current scenario of the energy redevelopment of Italian multi-family buildings. The financial feasibility of energy retrofit projects in the case of multi-apartment buildings is then analyzed. From a set of projects located in the Campania region (Italy), the typical building on which to carry out ordinary energy efficiency works was identified. Two design variants are considered on which to implement the Cost-Revenue Analysis (CRA): (i) energy retrofit intervention not including photovoltaic system; (ii) energy retrofit intervention including photovoltaic system. For the second design variant, further analyses were conducted (sensitivity analysis, scenario analysis, risk analysis) to identify the main sensitive variables and to estimate the probability of financial failure of the intervention. The study shows that interventions without photovoltaics are unlikely to be financially sustainable. However, although the presence of photovoltaics significantly increases the savings in the bill, the Payback Period (PP) remains quite high. An ordinary energy retrofit project including photovoltaic technology can be made financially sustainable only by resorting to government building bonuses, in the absence of which the probability of failure is 46%.
The United Nations SDG6 goal of ensuring universal access to safe drinking water and sanitation by 2030 will require increased investment in the rehabilitation and maintenance of water infrastructure. In Italy, the water sector has not yet reached the performance of other European countries. The hierarchization of investments is essential for identifying priorities and efficiently allocating resources. This issue is part of the debate on the reconciliation of public and private needs in the management of water services. The present research proposes a model based on the analytic hierarchy process (AHP). Taking into account the design alternatives considered optimal that contribute to the resolution of territorial criticalities, the model organizes them in a ranking that indicates the chronological priorities to be respected in the investments to be made. The evaluation criteria are set in compliance with the norms defined by the National Authority (ARERA). The model is tested on a water manager in the Campania region. Among the main results, it is found that the two extremes of the ranking are shared between the two actors involved in the investment strategy (the private operator and public regulator). The model represents an effective tool for identifying shared planning strategies between public and private operators.
The sustainable management of water resources can be pursued through effective tariff policies capable of discouraging water wastefulness. Increasing Block Tariffs (IBT) represent a method of pricing the water service which consists of providing various tariff ranges, with a unit cost that increases as consumption increases. The definition of the consumption ranges and the relative tariffs must guarantee the right balance between the needs of the users and the need to protect the resource according to 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This study proposes an optimization model useful for ensuring the tariff structure complies with the guidelines dictated by the Integrated Text for Water Services Tariffs (TICSI), an Italian standard that aims to rationalize and level out the fee structure at the national level. The purpose of the model is to guarantee the sustainability of the tariffs for users, protect less well-off households, and, at the same time, to ensure that the fees grow with consumption in an optimal way for the operator, in compliance with the economic constraints imposed by the national authority (ARERA). The model, which consists of a non-linear function capable of minimizing the difference between the tariffs before and after TICSI’ rules implementation, was tested through a case study. Specifically, the optimal water tariffs for each consumption range were defined for an operator in Southern Italy. The proposed model makes it possible to integrate EU guidelines relating to “polluter pays” and the protection of water resources more effectively into the national regulatory framework.
This paper deals with private sponsorship as a tool for the redevelopment of Italy’s vast wealth of historical-architectural public heritage sites. Italian law provides for the stipulation of sponsorship agreements by and between public sector agencies or entities (which need financial resources to restore or re-qualify property) and private sector investors (which guarantee the capital sought by the public sector in exchange for significant returns on their investments) raising various economic issues, particularly in connection with the profitability thresholds for private sector investors in return for the public sector’s use of their financial resources. In this paper, the authors focus on how private sector investors determine how much of their businesses turnover constitutes the optimal percentage level of overall income that may be invested in sponsorships to maximize business profitability. For this purpose, a model based on past works on the subject (Bucci et al., 2003) has been chosen by the authors. Such model gives a solution for verifying a sponsorship’s profitability. This model is static and is applicable to single-product companies that invest in sponsorships, under the theories of monopolistic competition and of Cobb-Douglas production function. Our objectives are to present this model, explaining in detail the mathematical steps, simplifying the model where possible in order to reduce the levels of complexity in its application, and finally to apply it to real case scenarios of cultural sponsorships.