Over the coming years, it is expected that the number of machine-to-machine (M2M) devices that communicate through LTE-A networks will rise significantly for providing ubiquitous information and services. However, LTE-A was devised to handle human-to-human traffic, and its current design is not capable of handling massive M2M communications. Access Class Barring (ACB) is a congestion control scheme included in the LTE-A standard that aims to spread the accesses of user equipments (UEs) through time so that the signaling capabilities of the eNB are not exceeded. Notwithstanding its relevance, the potential benefits of the implementation of ACB are rarely analyzed accurately. In this paper, we conduct a thorough performance analysis of the LTE-A random access channel (RACH) and ACB as defined in 3GPP specifications. Specifically, we seek to enhance the performance of LTE-A in massive M2M scenarios by modifying certain configuration parameters and by the implementation of ACB.We observed that ACB is appropriate for handling sporadic periods of congestion. Concretely, our results reflect that the access success probability of M2M UEs in the most extreme test scenario suggested by the 3GPP improves from approximately 30%, without any congestion control scheme, to 100% by implementing ACB and setting its configuration parameters properly.
The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT) is expected to bring major benefits to a wide range of areas. However, the successful deployment of the IoT calls for the existence of sustainable and well-understood business models. In this paper, we propose and analyze a business model for a likely scenario in the IoT, which is made up of WSNs, service providers and users. The service providers compete against each other in the intermediation between the virtualized WSNs and the users that benefit from enhanced services built on the sensed data. The service providers pay to the WSNs for the data and charge the users for the service. The model is analyzed by applying oligopoly theory and game theory, the conditions for the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium are established, and the equilibrium and the social optimum are obtained. Our results show that the business model is sustainable, provided that the users' sensitivity to the value-to-price ratio is not negligible and, in this situation, the number of active service providers is upper bounded by a value that depends on the sensitivity and the market size. Furthermore, the operation of such a market is shown to efficiently use the information provided by the WSNs, and, when compared to the social optimum, to produce an increase in users' and service providers' surpluses, but a reduction in WSNs' surplus.
6 December 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
The deployment of machine-type communications (MTC) together with cellular networks have great potential to create the ubiquitous Internet of Things environment. Nevertheless, the simultaneous activation of a large number of MTC devices (UEs) is a situation difficult to manage at the evolved Node B (eNB). The knowledge of the joint probability distribution function (PDF) of the number of successful and collided access requests within a random access opportunity (RAO) is a crucial piece of information for contriving congestion control schemes. A closed-form expression and an efficient recursion to obtain this joint PDF are derived in this paper. Furthermore, we exploit this PDF to design estimators of the number of contending UEs in a RAO. Our numerical results validate the effectiveness of our formulation and show that its computational cost is considerably lower than that of other related approaches. In addition, our estimators can be used by the eNBs to implement highly efficient congestion control methods.
5 October 2015 in IEEE Wireless Communications Letters
A business model for Internet-of-Things-based services is proposed whereby a platform serves as an intermediary between human users and wireless sensor networks (WSNs). The platform, acting as a monopolist, posts both the price paid by each user and the price paid to each WSN so as to maximize its profits. In this setting, we propose, analyze, and compare two alternative payment schemes for the WSN side. We demonstrate that the two payment schemes are equivalent from every stakeholder's point of view. And then we show that there is a user cost ceiling, which depends both on the number of WSNs and the strength of the cross externality that the WSNs creates on the users, below which the take-up is maximum.