The aim of this study was to qualitatively assess the disturbances of lived time in individuals with multiple drug dependencies. The research was conducted at Monar-Markot Center for Humanitarian Aid in Roznowice (Poland) in 2014 through direct, non-disguised observational study in a therapeutic community setting. Overall, 10 clients with multiple drug dependencies forming a newcomers group participated in. They previously abstained from usage for negligible periods of time. The measurements included participant observation of collective time regimes at the center; group discussions; written accounts by clients; Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory; semi-structured interviews. It was found that the clients experienced difficulties in following a strict therapeutic temporal regime, and they also showed a concomitant need to accelerate time as it passed. They also suffered an unpleasant domination by traumatic past within lived time. Their time horizons appeared significantly shortened and their planning capacity impaired, while a distant (dissociated) future was fantasized about in a realistic manner. Altogether, their disturbances of lived time consisted of the propensity to overemphasize their past dimensions at the expense of their future, while a gap between a close and a distant future appeared.

Background: The increasing deployment of conversational artificial intelligence (AI) in mental health interventions necessitates an evaluation of their efficacy in rectifying cognitive biases and recognizing affect in human-AI interactions. These biases are particularly relevant in mental health contexts as they can exacerbate conditions such as depression and anxiety by reinforcing maladaptive thought patterns or unrealistic expectations in human-AI interactions. Objective: This study aimed to assess the effectiveness of therapeutic chatbots (Wysa and Youper) versus general-purpose language models (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini Pro) in identifying and rectifying cognitive biases and recognizing affect in user interactions. Methods: This study used constructed case scenarios simulating typical user-bot interactions to examine how effectively chatbots address selected cognitive biases. The cognitive biases assessed included theory-of-mind biases (anthropomorphism, overtrust, and attribution) and autonomy biases (illusion of control, fundamental attribution error, and just-world hypothesis). Each chatbot response was evaluated based on accuracy, therapeutic quality, and adherence to cognitive behavioral therapy principles using an ordinal scale to ensure consistency in scoring. To enhance reliability, responses underwent a double review process by 2 cognitive scientists, followed by a secondary review by a clinical psychologist specializing in cognitive behavioral therapy, ensuring a robust assessment across interdisciplinary perspectives. Results: This study revealed that general-purpose chatbots outperformed therapeutic chatbots in rectifying cognitive biases, particularly in overtrust bias, fundamental attribution error, and just-world hypothesis. GPT-4 achieved the highest scores across all biases, whereas the therapeutic bot Wysa scored the lowest. Notably, general-purpose bots showed more consistent accuracy and adaptability in recognizing and addressing bias-related cues across different contexts, suggesting a broader flexibility in handling complex cognitive patterns. In addition, in affect recognition tasks, general-purpose chatbots not only excelled but also demonstrated quicker adaptation to subtle emotional nuances, outperforming therapeutic bots in 67% (4/6) of the tested biases. Conclusions: This study shows that, while therapeutic chatbots hold promise for mental health support and cognitive bias intervention, their current capabilities are limited. Addressing cognitive biases in AI-human interactions requires systems that can both rectify and analyze biases as integral to human cognition, promoting precision and simulating empathy. The findings reveal the need for improved simulated emotional intelligence in chatbot design to provide adaptive, personalized responses that reduce overreliance and encourage independent coping skills. Future research should focus on enhancing affective response mechanisms and addressing ethical concerns such as bias mitigation and data privacy to ensure safe, effective AI-based mental health support.

The article gives an account of various disturbed experiences of time from a phenomenological perspective. The author distinguishes three levels for addressing variations of temporal experience—the temporal structure of consciousness itself, the actual experience of time, and the sociopolitical temporality. He excludes the psychological type of argument, exemplified by Philip Zimbardo’s Time Perspective Inventory and concentrates on disorders in which the temporal structure of consciousness is itself altered. The clinical examples of disturbed temporalities being investigated come from studies of two influential, 20th-century German phenomenological psychiatrists: Ludwig Binswanger (1881–1966) and Viktor Emil von Gebsattel (1883–1974) and include mania, phobia, schizophrenia, depression, and addiction. Philosophical examples come from Hannah Arendt’s “The Life of the Mind.” It is argued that not all disturbed experiences of time related to mental disorders are pathological, but that we can distinguish such experiences from their less severe varieties by appealing to the value-free norm of primordial temporality. A psychotic experience of internal time of the self coming to a standstill exemplifies such a pathological situation, in which temporal experience is not only altered, but ruined.

The paper examines both the phenomenology of the manic self as well as critical aspects of manic neurobiology, focusing, with respect to both domains, on manic temporality. We argue that the distortions of lived time in mania exceed mere acceleration and are fundamental for manic affectivity. Mania involves radical acceleration and radical asynchronicity, which result in an instantaneous existence. People with mania rebel against the facticity of reality and suffer from an existential leap towards the future, in which the self abandons normal temporal boundaries. Excerpts from the interviews with persons with mania who experienced psychosis illustrate this phenomenon. Commenting upon disrupted circadian rhythms in mania and the role of lithium in its treatment the paper posits manic temporality as the link through which manic phenomenology and manic neurobiology intertwine.

The goal of this paper is to introduce Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences’ thematic issue on disordered temporalities. The authors begin by discussing the main reason for the neglect of temporal experience in present-day psychiatric nosologies, mainly, its reduction to clock time. Methodological challenges facing research on temporal experience include addressing the felt sense of time, its structure, and its pre-reflective aspects in the life-world setting. In the second part, the paper covers the contributions to the thematic issue concerning temporal experience in anxiety, depression, mania, addiction, post-traumatic stress disorder, autism, and in recovery from psychosis. The authors argue in favor of integrative and cross-disciplinary approaches. In conclusion, they present time as a significant aspect of human suffering.