The TrustZone technology is incorporated in a majority of recent ARM Cortex A and Cortex M processors widely deployed in the IoT world. Security critical code execution inside a so-called secure world is isolated from the rest of the application execution within a normal world. It provides hardware-isolated area called a trusted execution environment (TEE) in the processor for sensitive data and code. This paper demonstrates a vulnerability in the secure world in the form of a cross-world, secure world to normal world, covert channel. Performance counters or Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) events are used to convey the information from the secure world to the normal world. An encoding program generates appropriate PMU event footprint given a secret S. A corresponding decoding program reads the PMU footprint and infers S using machine learning (ML). The machine learning model can be trained entirely from the data collected from the PMU in user space. Lack of synchronization between PMU start and PMU read adds noise to the encoding/decoding ML models. In order to account for this noise, this study proposes three different synchronization capabilities between the client and trusted applications in the covert channel. These are synchronous, semi-synchronous, and asynchronous. Previously proposed PMU based covert channels deploy L1 and LLC cache PMU events. The latency of these events tends to be 100–1000 cycles limiting the bandwidth of these covert channels. We propose to use microarchitecture level events with latency of 10–100 cycles captured through PMU for covert channel encoding leading to a potential 100× higher bandwidth. This study conducts a series of experiments to evaluate the proposed covert channels under various synchronization models on a TrustZone supported Cortex-A processor using OP-TEE framework. As stated earlier, switch from signaling based on PMU cache events to PMU microarchitectural events leads to approximately 15× higher covert channel bandwidth. This proposed finer-grained microarchitecture event encoding covert channel can achieve throughput of the order of 11 Kbits/s as opposed to previous work’s throughput of the order of 760 bits/s.
Over the last ten years, there has been a significant interest in employing nonnegative matrix factorization (NMF) to reduce dimensionality to enable a more efficient clustering analysis in machine learning. This technique has been applied in various image processing applications within the fields of computer vision and sensor-based systems. Many algorithms exist to solve the NMF problem. Among these algorithms, the alternating direction method of multipliers (ADMM) and its variants are one of the most popular methods used in practice. In this paper, we propose a block-active ADMM method to minimize the NMF problem with general Bregman divergences. The subproblems in the ADMM are solved iteratively by a block-coordinate-descent-type (BCD-type) method. In particular, each block is chosen directly based on the stationary condition. As a result, we are able to use much fewer auxiliary variables and the proposed algorithm converges faster than the previously proposed algorithms. From the theoretical point of view, the proposed algorithm is proved to converge to a stationary point sublinearly. We also conduct a series of numerical experiments to demonstrate the superiority of the proposed algorithm.
Modern x86 processors incorporate performance-enhancing features such as prefetching mechanisms, cache coherence protocols, and support for large memory pages (e.g., 2 MB huge pages). While these architectural innovations aim to reduce memory access latency, boost throughput, and maintain cache consistency across cores, they can also expose subtle microarchitectural side channels that adversaries may exploit. This study investigates how the combination of prefetching techniques and huge pages can significantly enhance the throughput and accuracy of covert channels in controlled computing environments. Building on prior work that examined the impact of the MESI cache coherence protocol using single-cache-line access without huge pages, our approach expands the attack surface by simultaneously accessing multiple cache lines across all 512 L1 lines under a 2 MB huge page configuration. As a result, our 9-bit covert channel achieves a peak throughput of 4940 KB/s—substantially exceeding previously reported benchmarks. We further validate our channel on AMD SEV-SNP virtual machines, achieving up to an 88% decoding accuracy using write-access encoding with 2 MB huge pages, demonstrating feasibility even under TEE-enforced virtualization environments. These findings highlight the need for careful consideration and evaluation of the security implications of common performance optimizations with respect to their side-channel potential.
Side-channel attacks leveraging microarchitectural components such as caches and translation lookaside buffers (TLBs) pose increasing risks to cryptographic and machine-learning workloads. This paper presents a comparative study of performance and side-channel leakage under two page-size configurations—standard 4 KB pages and 2 MB huge pages—using paired attacker–victim experiments instrumented with both Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) counters and precise per-access timing using rdtscp(). The victim executes repeated, key-dependent memory accesses across eight cryptographic modes (AES, ChaCha20, RSA, and ECC variants) while the attacker records eight PMU features per access (cpu-cycles, instructions, cache-references, cache-misses, etc.) and precise rdtscp() timing. The resulting traces are analyzed using a multilayer perceptron classifier to quantify key-dependent leakage. Results show that the 2 MB huge-page configuration achieves a comparable key-classification accuracy (mean 0.79 vs. 0.77 for 4 KB) while reducing average CPU cycles by approximately 11%. Page-index identification remains near random chance (3.6–3.7% for PMU side-channels and 1.5% for timing side-channel), indicating no increase in measurable leakage at the page level. These findings suggest that huge-page mappings can improve runtime efficiency without amplifying observable side-channel vulnerabilities, offering a practical configuration for balancing performance and security in user-space cryptographic workloads.
Side-channel attacks leveraging microarchitectural components such as caches and translation lookaside buffers (TLBs) pose increasing risks to cryptographic and machine-learning workloads. This paper presents a comparative study of performance and side-channel leakage under two page-size configurations—standard 4KB pages and 2MB huge pages—using paired attacker–victim experiments instrumented with both Performance Monitoring Unit (PMU) counters and precise per-access timing using rdtscp(). The victim executes repeated, key-dependent memory accesses across eight cryptographic modes (AES, ChaCha20, RSA, and ECC variants) while the attacker records eight PMU features per access (cpu-cycles, instructions, cache-references, cache-misses, etc.) and precise rdtscp() timing. The resulting traces are analyzed using a multilayer perceptron classifier to quantify key-dependent leakage. Results show that the 2MB huge-page configuration achieves a comparable key-classification accuracy (mean 0.79 vs. 0.77 for 4KB) while reducing average CPU cycles by approximately 11%. Page-index identification remains near random chance (3.6--3.7% for PMU side-channels and 1.5% for timing side-channel), indicating no increase in measurable leakage at the page level. These findings suggest that huge-page mappings can improve runtime efficiency without amplifying observable side-channel vulnerabilities, offering a practical configuration for balancing performance and security in user-space cryptographic workloads.