This paper aims to formulate a new PPP project public-participation mechanism that uses “public satisfaction” as a direct influencing factor in conjunction with the public-private benefit model to achieve a substantial response from project stakeholders regarding public satisfaction and ensure the transparency of PPP project operation. The proposed model, combined public satisfaction assessment with the principal-agent model, investigates the influence of public satisfaction on investors’ efforts and the benefit or risk distribution between the government and private investors. The results show that the public’s satisfaction level with the project directly affects the proportion of public and private income distribution, which provides a way for the public to directly play a substantive and positive role in PPP projects to guarantee public benefits and the smooth implementation. The increase in the public satisfaction evaluation of either the government or the investors, helps improve the overall effectiveness of PPP projects.

Purpose: In order to make the construction industry develop in the direction of greening, this paper analyzes whether the application of intelligent technology in prefabricated buildings can achieve carbon emission reduction, starting from the problems of weak technology and insufficient encouragement policies in the prefabricated building industry. It also designs dynamic and adjustable incentives for the smart transformation of prefabricated buildings and makes recommendations to facilitate the transformation of assembly manufacturers into “smart factories”. Design/methodology/approach: This paper takes the intelligent technology for carbon reduction, energy efficiency and policy design in the prefabricated buildings industry as the starting point. Based on in-depth expert interviews and questionnaire survey data, a linear multiple regression model is used to establish an association network of intelligent technology in the production and transportation, construction, operation and maintenance, demolition and scrapping stages. On this basis, an evolutionary game theory is used to construct a smart transformation and carbon reduction utility game model between the government and manufacturers, and relevant suggestions for smart empowerment of green construction development technology combinations and policy settings are proposed. Findings: An assembly manufacturing plant with smart empowerment is an important way to achieve green and sustainable development in the construction industry. Among them, BIM and IoT have made a greater impact on carbon emission reduction of prefabricated buildings in all stages of the whole life cycle. The government’s proposed energy efficiency incentives and environmental tax amount will effectively increase companies' motivation for smart transformation of prefabricated buildings. However, when the environmental tax amount is low, the government should strengthen the regulation of the industry in order to increase the speed of smart transformation of assembly manufacturers. Therefore, a reasonable setting of the environmental tax rate and energy-saving incentives and flexible adjustment of the regulatory efforts can maximize the functional utility of the government in the process of smart transformation. Research limitations/implications: This paper focuses on the impact of intelligent technologies on the overall carbon emissions of the industry and provides an evolutionary analysis of the strategic game between the government and assembly manufacturers, the main players in the smart transformation process of prefabricated buildings. However, smart technologies for different categories of assembly manufacturing plants and strategic options for a wider range of stakeholders have not been examined in depth. Originality/value: Different from existing research, this study focuses on exploring the strategic game between the government and assembly manufacturers in the smart transformation of prefabricated buildings. It provides an innovative explanation of the connection between intelligent technology and carbon emissions. The study develops an evolutionary game model for both parties, addressing the research gap on the combined effects of policy incentives and intelligent technology on carbon reduction and efficiency improvement in the prefabricated buildings industry. This research not only offers practical reference for the government in designing incentive mechanisms and establishing regulatory systems but also provides feasible practical guidance for the smart transformation and carbon reduction efforts of assembly manufacturing plants.

Due to the numerous cross-operations and poor information communication, it is easy to cause production safety accidents in traditional assembled steel plants. The transformation and upgrading of smart production in the assembly steel plants is helpful to improve the efficiency of safety management. In order to effectively reduce the safety risks in the production of assembled steel components, this paper integrates policy incentives and safety supervision, constructs an evolutionary game model between the government and assembled steel producers, and analyzes the strategic evolution rules and stability conditions of stakeholders through the replication dynamics equation. Moreover, based on the empirical simulation of the Fuzhou X Steel Structure Plant project, the effectiveness of the evolutionary model incentive strategy setting is verified. The results show that whether an assembled steel plants adopt a smart management strategy or not is influenced by the government's incentive subsidy mechanism, penalty mechanism, the benefits and costs generated by traditional/ smart management, the probability and loss of safety accidents and other factors. The conclusion is important for upgrading the safety management mode, improving the safety production efficiency and constructing the safety supervision system of the assembled steel smart plant.

Purpose: This study explores how Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) information disclosure affects carbon reduction efficiency in the construction industry. It identifies key ESG factors and analyzes the interaction mechanisms between governments and enterprises, aiming to develop a structured framework that promotes transparency, informs policy design, and enhances collaborative governance for sustainable construction. Design/methodology/approach: A two-stage research design is employed. First, the DEMATEL-AISM approach is used to examine the causal relationships and hierarchical structure among 14 ESG-related factors, clarifying their influence pathways. Second, an evolutionary game model simulates strategic interactions between governments and construction firms under different parameter settings, including effort levels, environmental benefit coefficients, and reciprocity preferences. Sensitivity analysis is conducted to assess how these variables affect long-term strategic convergence. Findings: The DEMATEL-AISM analysis identifies three core ESG drivers with the highest centrality and causal impact in the construction sector: S1 (subsidy and incentive mechanisms), S2 (information-sharing level), and G1 (technological innovation). Evolutionary game simulations reveal that cooperative strategies between governments and enterprises are more likely when the ESG quality standard (S0) exceeds 0.7 or when fixed incentives (SF) remain modest (SF = 0.2). Among all variables, the government's variable compensation coefficient (λ) plays the most decisive role in influencing enterprise disclosure behavior, highlighting the critical role of dynamic incentives in steering collaborative action. Originality/value: Unlike prior studies that focus predominantly on empirical assessments or static models, this research integrates causal analysis with dynamic simulation to examine ESG disclosure mechanisms tailored to the construction industry. By modeling the interplay between information-sharing and strategic incentives, it offers a novel perspective on how targeted policy parameters can enhance ESG performance and carbon reduction. The findings provide actionable insights for designing effective incentive frameworks and improving stakeholder collaboration in sustainable construction governance.