In the platform economy, the pricing mechanisms are typically determined unilaterally by the platform, leading to increasingly prominent issues such as unreasonable commission rules and insufficient protection of drivers’ rights and interests. The commission rate is a key regulatory parameter for balancing revenue distribution between network freight platforms and carriers, directly shaping their strategic behaviors and influencing the industry’s sustainable development. This study aims to adopt the commission rate as the core indicator of platform revenue distribution. Through equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation, it develops a revenue-maximization model grounded in both individual rationality and collective rationality. Based on this framework, it identifies the commission ranges that achieve Pareto improvements at different stages of platform development, thereby optimizing the platform’s revenue distribution strategy. The findings show that, under collective rationality, the effort levels of both platforms and carriers exceed those under individual rationality. When the commission rate falls within a specific range, the collective-revenue-maximization strategy enhances the benefits of both parties and achieves Pareto improvement. The optimal commission rate increases progressively as the platform develops and is strongly associated with the marginal effects of effort levels on order volume and the logistics service cost coefficient. The results offer theoretical guidance and practical insights for the scientific design of commission mechanisms in network freight platforms.