Zilong Wang

Mr. Zilong Wang

IMDEA Software Institute

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 November 2021 in Computers
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
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AOAlfonso Ortega
Alfonso Ortega
Julian FierrezJulian Fierrez
Julian Fierrez
AMAythami Morales
Aythami Morales
ZWZilong Wang
Zilong Wang
MCMarina de la Cruz
Marina de la Cruz
TRTony Ribeiro
Tony Ribeiro
Machine learning methods are growing in relevance for biometrics and personal information processing in domains such as forensics, e-health, recruitment, and e-learning. In these domains, white-box (human-readable) explanations of systems built on machine learning methods become crucial. Inductive logic programming (ILP) is a subfield of symbolic AI aimed to automatically learn declarative theories about the processing of data. Learning from interpretation transition (LFIT) is an ILP technique that can learn a propositional logic theory equivalent to a given black-box system (under certain conditions). The present work takes a first step to a general methodology to incorporate accurate declarative explanations to classic machine learning by checking the viability of LFIT in a specific AI application scenario: fair recruitment based on an automatic tool generated with machine learning methods for ranking Curricula Vitae that incorporates soft biometric information (gender and ethnicity). We show the expressiveness of LFIT for this specific problem and propose a scheme that can be applicable to other domains. In order to check the ability to cope with other domains no matter the machine learning paradigm used, we have done a preliminary test of the expressiveness of LFIT, feeding it with a real dataset about adult incomes taken from the US census, in which we consider the income level as a function of the rest of attributes to verify if LFIT can provide logical theory to support and explain to what extent higher incomes are biased by gender and ethnicity.

8 September 2025 in arXiv
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Preprint
Open access
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ZWZilong Wang
Zilong Wang
GMGideon Mohr
Gideon Mohr
KGKlaus von Gleissenthall
Klaus von Gleissenthall
JRJan Reineke
Jan Reineke
MGMarco Guarnieri
Marco Guarnieri
Leakage contracts have been proposed as a new security abstraction at the instruction set architecture level. Leakage contracts aim to capture the information that processors may leak via microarchitectural side channels. Recently, the first tools have emerged to verify whether a processor satisfies a given contract. However, coming up with a contract that is both sound and precise for a given processor is challenging, time-consuming, and error-prone, as it requires in-depth knowledge of the timing side channels introduced by microarchitectural optimizations. In this paper, we address this challenge by proposing LeaSyn, the first tool for automatically synthesizing leakage contracts that are both sound and precise for processor designs at register-transfer level. Starting from a user-provided contract template that captures the space of possible contracts, LeaSyn automatically constructs a contract, alternating between contract synthesis, which ensures precision based on an empirical characterization of the processor's leaks, and contract verification, which ensures soundness. Using LeaSyn, we automatically synthesize contracts for six open-source RISC-V CPUs for a variety of contract templates. Our experiments indicate that LeaSyn's contracts are sound and more precise (i.e., represent the actual leaks in the target processor more faithfully) than contracts constructed by existing approaches.

27 September 2023 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
ZWZilong Wang
Zilong Wang
GMGideon Mohr
Gideon Mohr
KGKlaus von Gleissenthall
Klaus von Gleissenthall
JRJan Reineke
Jan Reineke
MGMarco Guarnieri
Marco Guarnieri
Leakage contracts have recently been proposed as a new security abstraction at the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level. Such contracts aim to faithfully capture the information processors may leak through side effects of their microarchitectural implementations. However, so far, we lack a verification methodology to check that a processor actually satisfies a given leakage contract. In this paper, we address this problem by developing LeaVe, the first tool for verifying register-transfer-level (RTL) processor designs against ISA-level leakage contracts. To this end, we introduce a decoupling theorem that separates security and functional correctness concerns when verifying contract satisfaction. LeaVe leverages this decoupling to make verification of contract satisfaction practical. To scale to realistic processor designs LeaVe further employs inductive reasoning on relational abstractions. Using LeaVe, we precisely characterize the side-channel security guarantees provided by three open-source RISC-V processors, thereby obtaining the first contract satisfaction proofs for RTL processor designs.