This paper introduces the INFLUTRUST framework that is designed to address challenges in trust-based influencer marketing campaigns on Online Social Networks (OSNs). The INFLUTRUST framework enables the influencers to autonomously select products across the OSN platforms for advertisement by employing a reinforcement learning algorithm. The Stochastic Learning Automata reinforcement algorithm considers the OSN platforms’ provided monetary rewards, the influencers’ advertising profit, and the influencers’ trust levels towards the OSN platforms to enable the influencers to autonomously select an OSN platform. The trust model for the influencers incorporates direct and indirect trust, which are derived from past interactions and social ties among the influencers and the OSN platforms, respectively. The OSN platforms allocate rewards through a multilateral bargaining model that supports competition among the influencers. Simulation-based results validate the INFLUTRUST framework’s effectiveness across diverse scenarios, with the scalability analysis demonstrating its robustness. Comparative evaluations highlight the INFLUTRUST framework’s superiority in considering trust levels and reward allocation fairness, benefiting both the influencers and the OSN platforms.
This paper tackles the challenges inherent in crowdsourcing dynamics by introducing the CROWDMATCH mechanism. Aimed at enabling crowdworkers to strategically select suitable crowdsourcers while contributing information to crowdsourcing tasks, CROWDMATCH considers incentives, information availability and cost, and the decisions of fellow crowdworkers to model the utility functions for both the crowdworkers and the crowdsourcers. Specifically, the paper presents an initial Approximate CROWDMATCH mechanism grounded in matching theory principles, eliminating externalities from crowdworkers’ decisions and enabling each entity to maximize its utility. Subsequently, the Accurate CROWDMATCH mechanism is introduced, which is initiated by the outcome of the Approximate CROWDMATCH mechanism, and coalition game-theoretic principles are employed to refine the matching process by accounting for externalities. The paper’s contributions include the introduction of the CROWDMATCH system model, the development of both Approximate and Accurate CROWDMATCH mechanisms, and a demonstration of their superior performance through comprehensive simulation results. The mechanisms’ scalability in large-scale crowdsourcing systems and operational advantages are highlighted, distinguishing them from existing methods and highlighting their efficacy in empowering crowdworkers in crowdsourcer selection.