In order to understand the impact of individual communities on global sustainability, we need a community sustainability assessment system (CSAS). While many sustainability assessment systems exist, they prove inadequate to the task. This article presents the results of a systematic review of the literature on existing sustainability assessment systems; offers a definition of a sustainable community; provides a multi-scale, systems approach to thinking about community; and makes recommendations from the field of performance measurement for the construction of a CSAS.

The 1996 Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments required that water utilities send quality reports to customers. We test whether receiving such reports of health violations increases purchases of bottled water using newly released data and disaggregate changes in demand at the intensive and extensive margins. We find that a water-quality violation makes American households 25 percent more likely to purchase bottled water and, among purchasers, expenditures increase 4–7 percent, both larger responses than found in previous studies. Consumers spend approximately $300 million per year—about 4 percent of annual national spending on bottled water—to avoid health risks associated with violations.

We propose a framework in order to econometrically estimate case-based learning and apply it to empirical data from twelve 2 × 2 mixed strategy equilibria experiments. Case-based learning allows agents to explicitly incorporate information available to the experimental subjects in a simple, compact, and arguably natural way. We compare the estimates of case-based learning to other learning models (reinforcement learning and self-tuned experience weighted attraction learning) while using in-sample and out-of-sample measures. We find evidence that case-based learning explains these data better than the other models based on both in-sample and out-of-sample measures. Additionally, the case-based specification estimates how factors determine the salience of past experiences for the agents. We find that, in constant sum games, opposing players’ behavior is more important than recency and, in non-constant sum games, the reverse is true.