This paper presents a novel discrete-time (DT) chaotic map-based random-number generator (RNG), namely the Siponi map, which is a modification of the Logistic map. The Logistic map is usually applied to cryptosystems, mainly for the purposes of generating random numbers. In addition to being easy to implement, it has a better security level than other nonlinear functions. However, it can only process positive real-number inputs. Our proposed map is a deterministic function that can process positive and negative real values. We explored the map comprehensively and investigated its characteristics and parameters. We calculated the optimum parameter values using empirical and theoretical mathematical models to yield the maximum randomness of a sequence of bits. The limit variation of the maximum parameter value was determined based on a practical information measure. Empirical verification was performed for the Siponi map to generate bit sequences unrelated to the previous bit with high entropy values, and we found the extractor function threshold value to be 0.5, while the parameter control was −2 or 2. Using our proposed map, a simple RNG without post-processing passed DieHard statistical tests and all the tests on the NIST SP 800-22. Finally, we have implemented a Siponi map-based RNG on the FPGA board and demonstrated that the sources used are LUT = 4086, DSP = 62, and register = 2206.

This research designs a discrete time (DT) chaos based random number generator (RNG), which uses one-dimension chaos modification as deterministic function in the destillation process. One-dimensional chaos (1D) is a simple dynamic system, which is widely applied to generate random numbers. Our work modifies logistic map that will be applied as DT chaos-based RNG. The logistic map is a chaotic system that is usually applied in the cryptosystem. The modification performed yields a new deterministic equations, which is capable to process data of real numbers, and generate positive and negative numbers. Through empirical verification the extractor function is obtained with the threshold value=0.718 to convert the real number that is generated by a deterministic function into a sequence of bits which has high entropy value. Through NIST 800-22 randomness test it is revealed that the obtained bit sequences have the proportion values at intervals 0.9804-0.9994 and P-values are greater than 0.01 for the frequency test, the cumulative sums test, the rank test, and a linear complexity test. Implementation of the DT chaos-based RNG method with the our proposed function using ZedBoard Zynq 7000 presents the number of resources used are LUT=3.9%, FF=1.6% and DSP =12.7%.

In 2010, Leander proposed a new version of the block cipher PRESENT with smaller block size, namely SMALLPRESENT-[n]. This algorithm is designed to deepen understanding of how the running time of the algorithm and the vulnerability of attack during the round increase with the number of rounds and s-boxes not determined on the algorithm. The boomerang attack is a variation of the differential attack introduced by Wagner in 1999. This attack uses two differential characteristics that are mutually independent in short rounds with high probability. This paper intends to present a lucid explanation of the boomerang attack. We illustrate the practical application of the boomerang attacks on two rounds of the SMALLPRESENT-[4], that includes the steps to find differential characteristic until key recovery, and explain the concept of attack for novice cryptanalysis. Based on experiments conducted, we found a boomerang differential characteristic on two rounds of SMALLPRESENT-[4] with a probability 2^-10 and 4-bit subkey in the first round of the algorithm.

Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) require authentication systems that balance privacy, scalability, and post-quantum security. While lattice-based V-LDAA offers quantum resistance, it faces challenges in signature size, traceability, and integration. We propose post-quantum traceable direct anonymous attestation (PQ-TDAA), combining National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)-standard Dilithium2 and Falcon-512 signatures with adapted Beullens-style blind signatures and Fiat–Shamir simplified Schnorr proofs, reducing proof size by 69.2% (8 kB vs. V-LDAA’s 26 kB) and supporting European Telecommunications Standards Institute Technical Specification (ETSI TS) 102 941-compliant traceability through Road Side Unit (RSU)-assisted verification. Evaluated using SageMath, Python 3.11, and NS-3, PQ-TDAA-Falcon-512 achieves 8.1 ms and 49.7 ms end-to-end delays at 10 and 20 vehicles, respectively, with 64.7 Mbps goodput on congested 802.11p channels, showing promise for densities of ≤50 vehicles and advantages over Dilithium2. Real-world validation on ARM Cortex-A76 (Raspberry Pi 5, emulating automotive OBUs) yields sub-0.5 ms V2V cycles within 100 ms beacon intervals, supporting practical embedded deployment. Future work will extend PQ-TDAA to emerging 5G and NR-V2X settings, integrate more realistic mobility and channel models through coupled NS-3 and SUMO co-simulation, and investigate side-channel resistance for enhanced scalability and robustness in real deployments.

As systems migrate toward post-quantum readiness, symmetric keys are kept longer and protect larger data volumes, a regime in which keystream security beyond the birthday bound matters. The dominant block–cipher counter mode, AES-CTR (Advanced Encryption Standard, counter mode), caps keystream security at the birthday bound regardless of key length, and, to our knowledge, no lightweight stream cipher pairs provable beyond-birthday-bound security with a permutation standardised by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). We propose SoP-CTR, a stream cipher built from the NIST-standardised Ascon-$p_{12}$ permutation via the Sum of Permutations (SoP) paradigm. The z-split SoP framework achieves single-key beyond-birthday-bound (BBB) security by XORing a split constant into the counter word, eliminating independent key derivation. We prove an explicit two-term pseudorandom-function (PRF) advantage bound $\mathrm{Adv}\le q^{3/2}/2^{320}+2pq/2^{256}$, valid for pairwise-distinct counters in $[0,2^{63})$. The online term is negligible throughout this $2^{63}$-block range, and the offline term bounds adversarial key-search and is the binding constraint for post-quantum offline budgets. The SoP construction provably eliminates the birthday distinguisher that breaks a hypothetical single-call CTR-Ascon at $q\approx 2^{160}$. We also give the first quantum analysis of this domain-separated single-key variant in the Q1 model, where construction queries are classical and the public permutation may be evaluated quantumly, obtaining an attack at $2^{85.3}$ and an unconditional lower bound of $2^{64.3}$, so the post-quantum figure is the best known attack cost of $2^{85.3}$ rather than the generic $2^{128}$ Grover level. On a physical STM32F407 ARM Cortex-M4 (168 MHz), hardware cycle-counter measurements yield 61.44 cycles per byte (cpb) for the unrolled variant, about 4.6% faster than Ascon-128 keystream extraction (64.39 cpb), and 63.78 cpb for the memory-optimised rolled variant (3832 bytes Flash), while providing a strictly stronger BBB guarantee. An x86-64 AVX2 two-block variant achieves 2.57 cpb at 1 KiB.