Claus Thustrup Kreiner

Claus Thustrup Kreiner

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Claus Thustrup Kreiner

Center for Economic Behavior and Inequality, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, 1353 Copenhagen, Denmark

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

28Years (1999-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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1 January 2011 in Econometrica
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HKHenrik Jacobsen Kleven
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
MKMartin B. Knudsen
Martin B. Knudsen
CKClaus Thustrup Kreiner
Claus Thustrup Kreiner
SPSøren Pedersen
Søren Pedersen
ESEmmanuel Saez
Emmanuel Saez
This paper analyzes a tax enforcement field experiment in Denmark. In the base year, a stratified and representative sample of over 40,000 individual income tax filers was selected for the experiment. Half of the tax filers were randomly selected to be thoroughly audited, while the rest were deliberately not audited. The following year, threat-of-audit letters were randomly assigned and sent to tax filers in both groups. We present three main empirical findings. First, using baseline audit data, we find that the tax evasion rate is close to zero for income subject to third-party reporting, but substantial for self-reported income. Since most income is subject to third-party reporting, the overall evasion rate is modest. Second, using quasi-experimental variation created by large kinks in the income tax schedule, we find that marginal tax rates have a positive impact on tax evasion for self-reported income, but that this effect is small in comparison to legal avoidance and behavioral responses. Third, using the randomization of enforcement, we find that prior audits and threat-of-audit letters have significant effects on self-reported income, but no effect on third-party reported income. All these empirical results can be explained by extending the standard model of (rational) tax evasion to allow for the key distinction between self-reported and third-party reported income

8 March 2016 in Economica
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HKHenrik Jacobsen Kleven
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
CKClaus Thustrup Kreiner
Claus Thustrup Kreiner
ESEmmanuel Saez
Emmanuel Saez

1 January 2007 in The Economic Journal
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HIHerwig Immervoll
Herwig Immervoll
HKHenrik Jacobsen Kleven
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
CKClaus Thustrup Kreiner
Claus Thustrup Kreiner
ESEmmanuel Saez
Emmanuel Saez

1 November 2006 in Journal of Public Economics
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HKHenrik Jacobsen Kleven
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
CKClaus Thustrup Kreiner
Claus Thustrup Kreiner

1 April 2020 in American Economic Review
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TEThomas Epper
Thomas Epper
EFErnst Fehr
Ernst Fehr
HFHelga Fehr-Duda
Helga Fehr-Duda
CKClaus Thustrup Kreiner
Claus Thustrup Kreiner
DLDavid Dreyer Lassen
David Dreyer Lassen
GRGregers Nytoft Rasmussen
Gregers Nytoft Rasmussen
This paper documents a large association between individuals’ time discounting in incentivized experiments and their positions in the real-life wealth distribution derived from Danish high-quality administrative data for a large sample of middle-aged individuals. The association is stable over time, exists through the wealth distribution and remains large after controlling for education, income profile, school grades, initial wealth, parental wealth, credit constraints, demographics, risk preferences, and additional behavioral parameters. Our results suggest that savings behavior is a driver of the observed association between patience and wealth inequality as predicted by standard savings theory. (JEL C91, D15, D31, E21)

1 January 2009 in Econometrica
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HKHenrik Jacobsen Kleven
Henrik Jacobsen Kleven
CKClaus Thustrup Kreiner
Claus Thustrup Kreiner
ESEmmanuel Saez
Emmanuel Saez
This paper analyzes the general nonlinear optimal income tax for couples, a multidimensional screening problem. Each couple consists of a primary earner who always participates in the labor market, b...