Wenjian He

Wenjian He

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Wenjian He

Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd., Shanghai, China

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

10Years (2017-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
18 June 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
WHWenjian He
Wenjian He
SDSanjeev Das
Sanjeev Das
WZWei Zhang
Wei Zhang
YLYang Liu
Yang Liu
Code-reuse attack is a growing threat to computing systems as it can circumvent existing security defenses. Fortunately, control flow integrity (CFI) is promising in defending such attack. However, former implementations generally suffer from two major drawbacks: 1) complex pre-processing to obtain control flow graph; 2) high overhead. In this paper, we propose a cross-layer approach that employs basic block information inside the binary code and read-only data to enforce fine-grained control-flow integrity. Our approach demonstrates high applicability and thorough attack detection coverage without static analysis or recompilation. Meanwhile, it can effectively protect even striped programs, while incurring negligible 0.13% performance overhead.

31 January 2020 in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
WHWenjian He
Wenjian He
SDSanjeev Das
Sanjeev Das
WZWei Zhang
Wei Zhang
YLYang Liu
Yang Liu
Code-reuse attack is a concrete threat to computing systems because it can evade conventional security defenses. Control flow integrity (CFI) is proposed to repel this threat. However, former implementations of CFI suffer from two major drawbacks: complex offline processing on programs and high overheads at runtime. Therefore, it is impractical for performance-constrained devices to adopt the technology, leaving them vulnerable to exploitation. In this article, we develop a cross-layer approach named basic-block-boundary-based control flow integrity (BBB-CFI) to minimize the overheads of both offline analysis and runtime checking. Our approach employs basic block information inside the binary code and read-only data to enforce CFI. We identify a key binary-level property called basic block boundary , and based on it we propose the code-inspired method where short code sequences can endorse a control flow transition. Our solution enables quick application launching because it does not require control flow graph construction at the offline stage. We only demand a lightweight analysis on read-only data and a small amount of code of the application. According to the experiments, our approach incurs a negligible 0.11% runtime performance overhead with a minor processor extension, whereas it achieves an order of magnitude speedup in pre-preprocessing compared to a baseline approach. Without control flow analysis or recompilation, BBB-CFI still effectively reduces 90% of the attack surface in terms of gadget numbers. Besides this, we show that the Turing-completeness in the libc is unsustainable. Our approach also demonstrates high applicability to many programs, and it is capable of protecting striped binaries.

1 October 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
WHWenjian He
Wenjian He
WZWei Zhang
Wei Zhang
SDSanjeev Das
Sanjeev Das
YLYang Liu
Yang Liu
Software Guard Extension (SGX) is a new security feature that has been released in recent Intel commodity processors. It is designed to provide a user program with a strongly shielded environment against other components in the system, including the OS, firmware and hardware peripherals. With SGX, developers can securely deploy critical applications on untrusted remote platforms without the concern of information leakage. However, researchers have found several attacks against SGX, suggesting blind reliance on SGX is inadvisable, and promoting the need for a comprehensive study on the security property of SGX. In this paper, we discover a new attack vector SGXlinger to disclose information inside the protected program. Our attack monitors the interrupt latency of the SGX-protected program, and it is the first time that the interrupt latency is leveraged as a side-channel. We develop a framework to repeatedly measure the interrupt latency of an enclave program, and the evaluation shows we can learn coarse-grained information inside the shielded environment. In an experimental setting, we measure that the information leakage rate of the proposed side-channel can reach up to 35 Kbps.

30 March 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
CLChang Liu
Chang Liu
SFShuaihu Feng
Shuaihu Feng
YLYuan Li
Yuan Li
DWDongsheng Wang
Dongsheng Wang
WHWenjian He
Wenjian He
TCTrevor E. Carlson
Trevor E. Carlson

30 March 2025
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
TZTingji Zhang
Tingji Zhang
BGBoris Grot
Boris Grot
WHWenjian He
Wenjian He
YLYashuai Lv
Yashuai Lv
PQPeng Qu
Peng Qu
YZYouhui Zhang
Youhui Zhang

1 January 2020
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
WHWenjian He
Wenjian He
WZWei Zhang
Wei Zhang
SSSharad Sinha
Sharad Sinha
SDSanjeev Das
Sanjeev Das
Hardware accelerators such as integrated graphics processing units (iGPUs) are increasingly prevalent in modern systems. They typically provide multiplexing support where several user applications can share the iGPU acceleration resources. However, security in this setting has not received sufficient consideration. In this work, we disclose a critical information leakage vulnerability due to defective GPU context management. In essence, residual register values and shared local memory in the iGPU are not cleared during a context switch. As a result, adversaries can recover the secret key of a cryptographic algorithm running on an iGPU from a single snapshot of the leaking channel. User privacy is also under threat due to browser activity eavesdropping through website-fingerprinting attack with high accuracy and resolution. Moreover, this vulnerability can constitute a covert channel with a bandwidth of up to 8 Gbps.