5 November 2023 in Journal of Indonesian Legal Studies
27 January 2021 in German Law Journal
National sovereignty has been the key consideration for basing judicial cooperation in the European Union on mutual recognition. More than one decade after the creation of the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ), this contribution assesses whether mutual recognition-based EU legislation in civil and criminal law indeed respects national sovereignty. To this end, it studies the Framework decision on the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), the EU’s flagship instrument in the AFSJ. We distinguish two elements of national sovereignty: (a) the protection of the State and its basic structures (its statehood); (b) the State’s values, principles and fundamental rights (its statehood principles), and assess the EAW from a dynamic perspective: from its initial inception, in which mutual trust primarily implied little interferences with the laws and practices of issuing states, to the current state of affairs which is marked by what could be called a ‘mutual trust supported by harmonization’- approach. Especially in the judge-driven harmonization of the EAW and the dialogue between judicial authorities we witness important (and oftentimes overlooked) elements that impact national sovereignty. At the end, the findings of the article are put in the context of the current rule of law crisis in the EU.
4 December 2024 in Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
19 November 2024 in Res Publica
Legislative gridlocks, driven by social partisan sorting, pose a significant threat to contemporary democracies. In this paper, I argue that this problem can be addressed by replacing geographic electoral constituencies, which group voters by area of residence, with heterogeneous electoral constituencies, which are based on random assignment and thus reflect the diversity of the entire electorate. I show that geographic electoral constituencies are likely to crystallise cleavages that reinforce geographic divisions, whereas heterogeneous electoral constituencies are likely to dilute deep social divisions. I argue that heterogeneous constituencies have this effect not because they suppress intergroup difference, as is commonly held, but rather because they encourage political parties to express cross-cutting social identities. The politicisation of cross-cutting social cleavages prevents social partisan sorting and moderates political conflict. Heterogeneous electoral constituencies should therefore be considered as part of an expressive institutional response to the democratic threat of legislative gridlock.
6 September 2019 in Moral Philosophy and Politics
In representative democracies, referendum voting and parliamentary elections provide two fundamentally different methods for determining the majority opinion. We use three mathematical paradoxes – so-called majority voting paradoxes – to show that referendum voting can reverse the outcome of a parliamentary election, even if the same group of voters have expressed the same preferences on the issues considered in the referendums and the parliamentary election. This insight about the systemic contrarieties between referendum voting and parliamentary elections sheds a new light on the debate about the supplementary value of referendums in representative democracies. Using this insight, we will suggest legal conditions for the implementation of referendums in representative democracies that can pre-empt the conflict between the two methods for determining the majority opinion.