7 March 2023 in Digital Threats: Research and Practice
Zigbee is widely adopted as a resource-efficient wireless protocol in the IoT network. IoT devices from manufacturers have recently been affected due to major vulnerabilities in Zigbee protocol implementations. Security testing of Zigbee protocol implementations is becoming increasingly important. However, applying existing vulnerability detection techniques such as fuzzing to the Zigbee protocol is not a simple task. Dealing with low-level hardware events still remains a big challenge. For the Zigbee protocol, which communicates over a radio channel, many existing protocol fuzzing tools lack a sufficient execution environment. To narrow the gap, we designed Z-Fuzzer , a device-agnostic fuzzing tool for detecting security flaws in Zigbee protocol implementations. To simulate Zigbee protocol execution, Z-Fuzzer leverages a commercial embedded device simulator with pre-defined peripherals and hardware interrupt setups to interact with the fuzzing engine. Z-Fuzzer generates more high-quality test cases with code-coverage heuristics. We compare Z-Fuzzer with advanced protocol fuzzing tools, BooFuzz and Peach fuzzer, on top of Z-Fuzzer’s simulation platform. Our findings suggest that Z-Fuzzer can achieve greater code coverage in Z-Stack, a widely used Zigbee protocol implementation. Compared to BooFuzz and Peach, Z-Fuzzer found more vulnerabilities with fewer test cases. Three of them have been assigned CVE IDs with high CVSS scores (7.5~8.2).
7 February 2025 in Distributed Ledger Technologies: Research and Practice
Symbolic execution of smart contracts suffers from sequence explosion. Some existing tools limit the sequence length, thus being unable to adequately evaluate some functions. In this article, we propose a symbolic execution approach without limiting the sequence length. In our approach, the symbolic execution process is a two-phase model that maximizes code coverage while reducing the number of sequences to be executed. The first phase executes all sequences up to a length limit to identify the not-fully covered functions, while the second attempts to cover these functions according to state evaluation and a function graph structure. We have developed a tool called SmartExecutor and conducted an experimental evaluation on the SGUARD dataset. The experimental results indicate that compared with state-of-the-art tools, SmartExecutor achieves higher code coverage with less time. It also detects more vulnerabilities than Mythril, a state-of-the-art symbolic execution tool.