Béatrice Roussillon

Béatrice Roussillon

Auto-generated profile, based on publicly available information

Béatrice Roussillon

Univ. Grenoble Alpes, CNRS, INRAE, Grenoble INP, GAEL, F-38000 Grenoble, France

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

6Years (2021-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

View All Publications
8 May 2023 in Journal of Environmental Management
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
DLDaniel Llerena
Daniel Llerena
BRBeatrice Roussillon
Beatrice Roussillon
STSabrina Teyssier
Sabrina Teyssier
AFAdelaïde Fadhuile
Adelaïde Fadhuile
PBPenelope Buckley
Penelope Buckley
FWFrédéric Wurtz
Frédéric Wurtz

13 March 2025 in The Energy Journal
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
AFAdélaïde Fadhuile
Adélaïde Fadhuile
DLDaniel Llerena
Daniel Llerena
BRBéatrice Roussillon
Béatrice Roussillon
In this article, we design a non monetary demand response program to increase the share of intermittent renewable energy in the electricity production mix. We conduct a randomized field experiment over two years based on 165 households. We collect unique high-dimensional electricity data on thirty-minute household electricity consumption giving more than 6 millions observations. We introduce demand response with nonmonetary incentives coupled by a set of nudges addressing the cognitive biases that impede the optimization of electricity consumption and thus demand flexibility. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we estimate the effect of our non monetary demand response program on electricity consumption. Our results are encouraging, as demand was successfully decrease by 21 percent during the peak load event and increased by 17 percent during the peak energy production event. JEL Classification: D9, C93, Q41

16 October 2025 in Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction
Verified
Journal Article
Open access
NANardjes Amieur
Nardjes Amieur
SCSalim Chouaki
Salim Chouaki
OGOana Goga
Oana Goga
BRBeatrice Roussillon
Beatrice Roussillon
Social media giants like Meta, Google, and X leverage powerful algorithms to personalize user feeds, a practice now under intense public scrutiny. These algorithms can inadvertently skew the information users consume, potentially influencing political opinions and voting decisions. This raises critical questions: Do social media platforms foster misinformation and contribute to echo chambers? To address this ongoing debate, our study directly compares news exposure on Facebook (where algorithmic influence is strong) with news consumption off-platform (where user behavior plays a larger role). Specifically, we investigate: (1) Are users exposed to more/less misinformation on Facebook compared with their off-platform misinformation consumption? (2) Is news exposure on Facebook more/less diverse than off-platform news consumption? (3) To what extent do socio-demographic and psychological factors influence misinformation exposure on Facebook and consumption off Facebook? (4) Is there a relationship between socio-demographic and psychological factors and news diversity on and off Facebook? and (5) Is users' exposure to misinformation on Facebook correlated to off-platform news consumption? The longstanding biggest barrier to answering these questions has been the lack of access to data on what information users see and consume while browsing the Internet. In this paper, we use a measurement approach that asks a panel of users to donate data about the content they see online. For this, we designed a tool to collect traces of all news articles that individuals encounter on their desktop Facebook timeline and while they browse the Internet (off Facebook), along with signals about how users interact with them (e.g., clicks, time spent reading). Our tool observes content and interactions on and off Facebook on 4,149 news media domains sourced from Media Bias Fact Check and NewsGuard. Alongside the news post and article collection, we conduct surveys to gather socio-demographic and psychological data from our participants. Our study of 123,995 news-related posts on Facebook and 70,587 news articles visits off Facebook, collected from 642 users during 12 weeks, reveals the following central findings: (1) Only a small fraction 4% of users' news consumption off Facebook is driven by news exposure on Facebook, and only 5.7% of misinformation consumption off Facebook is driven by news exposure on Facebook. (2) There is a higher prevalence of misinformation in user-received content on Facebook compared to deliberately consumed content off-platform. On Facebook, 5.9% of our users' news exposure comes from sources known for spreading misinformation, while off-platform, only 2.6% of our users' news consumption is from misinformation sources. Conversely, Facebook presents more diverse content - 22% of users received content from only one political leaning on Facebook, compared to 36% of users who consumed content from only one political leaning off-platform. (3) Several socio-demographic and psychological factors showed a statistically significant correlation with misinformation exposure on Facebook but not misinformation consumption off Facebook. (4) The proportion of misinformation consumed off Facebook emerged as a statistically significant predictor of users' exposure to misinformation on Facebook, independent of news consumption on Facebook.

2 March 2024 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
SCSalim Chouaki
Salim Chouaki
IBIslem Bouzenia
Islem Bouzenia
OGOana Goga
Oana Goga
BRBeatrice Roussillon
Beatrice Roussillon
Facebook and other advertising platforms exploit users data for marketing purposes by allowing advertisers to select specific users and target them (the practice is being called micro-targeting). However, advertisers such as Cambridge Analytica have maliciously used these targeting features to manipulate users in the context of elections. The European Commission plans to restrict or ban some targeting functionalities in the new European Democracy Action Plan act to protect users from such harms. The difficulty is that we do not know the economic impact of these restrictions on regular advertisers. In this paper, to inform the debate, we take a first step by understanding who is advertising on Facebook and how they use the targeting functionalities. For this, we asked 890 U.S. users to install a monitoring tool on their browsers to collect the ads they receive on Facebook and information about how these ads were targeted. By matching advertisers on Facebook with their LinkedIn profiles, we could see that 71% of advertisers are small and medium-sized businesses with 200 employees or less, and they are responsible for 61% of ads and 57% of ad impressions. Regarding micro-targeting, we found that only 32% of small and medium-sized businesses and 30% of large-sized businesses micro-target at least one of their ads. These results should not be interpreted as micro-targeting not being useful as a marketing strategy, but rather that advertisers prefer to outsource the micro-targeting task to ad platforms. Indeed, Facebook is employing optimization algorithms that exploit user data to decide which users should see what ads; which means ad platforms are performing an algorithmic-driven micro-targeting. Hence, when setting restrictions, legislators should take into account both the traditional advertiser-driven micro-targeting as well as algorithmic-driven micro-targeting performed by ad platforms.

3 February 2025 in Research in Economics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
PBPenelope Buckley
Penelope Buckley
BRBéatrice Roussillon
Béatrice Roussillon
STSabrina Teyssier
Sabrina Teyssier

27 August 2025 in arXiv
Verified
Preprint
Open access
PDF file
DRDaniel Rehsmann
Daniel Rehsmann
BRBéatrice Roussillon
Béatrice Roussillon
PSPaul Schweinzer
Paul Schweinzer
We model competition on a credence goods market governed by an imperfect label, signaling high quality, as a rank-order tournament between firms. In this market interaction, asymmetric firms jointly and competitively control the aggregate precision of a label ranking the competitors' qualities by releasing individual information. While the labels and the aggregated information they are based on can be seen as a public good guiding the consumers' purchasing decisions, individual firms have incentives to strategically amplify or counteract the competitors' information emission, thereby manipulating the aggregate precision of product labeling, i.e., the underlying ranking's discriminatory power. Elements of the introduced theory are applicable to several (credence-good) industries that employ labels or rankings, including academic departments, ``green'' certification, movies, and investment opportunities.