Yuzhe Li

Yuzhe Li

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Yuzhe Li

Northeastern University

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

14Years (2013-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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29 July 2015 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYuzhe Li
Yuzhe Li
LSLing Shi
Ling Shi
PCPeng Cheng
Peng Cheng
JCJiming Chen
Jiming Chen
DQDaniel E. Quevedo
Daniel E. Quevedo
We consider security issues in remote state estimation of Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). A sensor node communicates with a remote estimator through a wireless channel which may be jammed by an external attacker. With energy constraints for both the sensor and the attacker, the interactive decision making process of when to send and when to attack is studied. We formulate a game-theoretic framework and prove that the optimal strategies for both sides constitute a Nash equilibrium of a zero-sum game. To tackle the computation complexity issues, we present a constraint-relaxed problem and provide corresponding solutions using Markov chain theory.

4 January 2017 in IEEE Transactions on Control of Network Systems
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYuzhe Li
Yuzhe Li
LSLing Shi
Ling Shi
TCTongwen Chen
Tongwen Chen
In this paper, a security problem in cyberphysical systems (CPS) is studied. A remote state estimation process using multiple sensors is considered. The measurement innovation packets from each sensor, which may be modified by a malicious attacker, are sent to a remote fusion center through wireless communication channels. To avoid being detected by typical bad data detectors at the remote estimator's side, the attacker would maintain the statistical properties of the measurements. Based on the information extracted from the trusted sensors and the correlations between the trusted sensors and the suspicious sensors, we propose three sequential data verification and fusion procedures for different detection information scenarios. The corresponding impacts of possible attacking patterns on the estimation performance under different detectors are analyzed explicitly. Simulations are provided to illustrate the developed results.

26 January 2018 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
YLYuzhe Li
Yuzhe Li
DSDawei Shi
Dawei Shi
TCTongwen Chen
Tongwen Chen
In this paper, a security problem in networked control systems (NCS) is studied. In a standard linear quadratic Gaussian (LQG) control scenario in NCS, a so-called false data injection attack could be launched by a malicious attacker to deteriorate the system performance without being detected. To defend against such attacks, a defender on the NCS side needs to allocate defense resources among the sensors to secure the data, and the defense investment determines the costs of compromising certain sensors. After observing the defender’ action, the attacker decides the target sensors to compromise. While both sides are subject to the resource constraints, the interactive decision-making between the defender and the attacker is investigated in a Stackelberg game (leader–follower game) framework. The optimal solutions for both sides under different types of budget constraints are analyzed. Simulation examples are provided to illustrate the main results.

19 February 2020 in IEEE Transactions on Cybernetics
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZhengen Zhao
Zhengen Zhao
YHYimin Huang
Yimin Huang
Ziyang ZhenZiyang Zhen
Ziyang Zhen
YLYuzhe Li
Yuzhe Li
In this article, a data-driven design scheme of undetectable false data-injection attacks against cyber-physical systems is proposed first, with the aid of the subspace identification technique. Then, the impacts of undetectable false data-injection attacks are evaluated by solving a constrained optimization problem, with the constraints of undetectability and energy limitation considered. Moreover, the detection of designed data-driven false data-injection attacks is investigated via the coding theory. Finally, the simulations on the model of a flight vehicle are illustrated to verify the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

27 September 2013 in IEEE Transactions on Signal Processing
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Journal Article
Closed access
YLYuzhe Li
Yuzhe Li
DQDaniel E. Quevedo
Daniel E. Quevedo
VLVincent Lau
Vincent Lau
LSLing Shi
Ling Shi
We consider periodic sensor transmission power allocation with an average energy constraint. The sensor sends its Kalman filter-based state estimate to the remote estimator through an unreliable link. Dropout probabilities depend on the power level used. To encompass applications where the estimator needs to attend to multiple tasks, we allow for irregular sampling, following a periodic pattern. Using properties of an underlying Markov chain model, we derive an explicit expression for the estimation error covariance. The results are then used to study optimal sensor power scheduling which minimizes the average error covariance.

19 December 2022 in IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
ZZZhengen Zhao
Zhengen Zhao
YXYunsong Xu
Yunsong Xu
YLYuzhe Li
Yuzhe Li
Ziyang ZhenZiyang Zhen
Ziyang Zhen
YYYing Yang
Ying Yang
YSYang Shi
Yang Shi
This paper studies the issues of data-driven attack detection and identification for cyber-physical systems under sparse sensor attacks. First, based on the available input and output data sets, a data-driven monitor is formulated with two objectives: attack detection and attack identification. Then, with the subspace approach, a data-driven attack detection policy is presented, wherein the attack detector is designed directly by the process data. A subspace projection-based attack identification scheme is proposed via designing a bank of projection filters to determine the locations of attacked sensors. Moreover, the sparse recovery technique is adopted to decrease the combinatorial complexity of the subspace projection based identification method. The attack identification is recast into a block-sparse recovery problem. Finally, the proposed methods are verified by the simulations on a flight vehicle system.