Bernardo Portela

Bernardo Portela

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Bernardo Portela

INESC TEC, HASLab & DCC FCUP, Portugal

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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23 December 2017
Verified
Book Chapter
Closed access
PDF file
RBRaad Bahmani
Raad Bahmani
MBManuel Barbosa
Manuel Barbosa
FBFerdinand Brasser
Ferdinand Brasser
BPBernardo Portela
Bernardo Portela
ASAhmad-Reza Sadeghi
Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi
BWBogdan Warinschi
Bogdan Warinschi

1 March 2016
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
MBManuel Barbosa
Manuel Barbosa
BPBernardo Portela
Bernardo Portela
GSGuillaume Scerri
Guillaume Scerri
BWBogdan Warinschi
Bogdan Warinschi
Exciting new capabilities of modern trusted hardware technologies allow for the execution of arbitrary code within environments completely isolated from the rest of the system and provide cryptographic mechanisms for securely reporting on these executions to remote parties. Rigorously proving security of protocols that rely on this type of hardware faces two obstacles. The first is to develop models appropriate for the induced trust assumptions (e.g., what is the correct notion of a party when the peer one wishes to communicate with is a specific instance of an an outsourced program). The second is to develop scalable analysis methods, as the inherent stateful nature of the platforms precludes the application of existing modular analysis techniques that require high degrees of independence between the components. We give the first steps in this direction by studying three cryptographic tools which have been commonly associated with this new generation of trusted hardware solutions. Specifically, we provide formal security definitions, generic constructions and security analysis for attested computation, key-exchange for attestation and secure outsourced computation. Our approach is incremental: each of the concepts relies on the previous ones according to an approach that is quasi-modular. For example we show how to build a secure outsourced computation scheme from an arbitrary attestation protocol combined together with a key-exchange and an encryption scheme.

6 November 2019
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
PDF file
JAJosé Bacelar Almeida
José Bacelar Almeida
MBManuel Barbosa
Manuel Barbosa
GBGilles Barthe
Gilles Barthe
MCMatthew Campagna
Matthew Campagna
ECErnie Cohen
Ernie Cohen
STSerdar Tasiran
Serdar Tasiran
We present a machine-checked proof of security for the domain management protocol of Amazon Web Services' KMS (Key Management Service) a critical security service used throughout AWS and by AWS customers. Domain management is at the core of AWS KMS; it governs the top-level keys that anchor the security of encryption services at AWS. We show that the protocol securely implements an ideal distributed encryption mechanism under standard cryptographic assumptions. The proof is machine-checked in the EasyCrypt proof assistant and is the largest EasyCrypt development to date.

30 September 2024
Verified
Conference Paper
Open access
DBDiogo Barradas
Diogo Barradas
CNCarlos Novo
Carlos Novo
BPBernardo Portela
Bernardo Portela
SRSofia Romeiro
Sofia Romeiro
NSNuno Santos
Nuno Santos
As the Internet evolves from TLS 1.2 to TLS 1.3, it offers enhanced security against network eavesdropping for online communications. However, this advancement also enables malicious command and control (C2) traffic to more effectively evade malware detectors and intrusion detection systems. Among other capabilities, TLS 1.3 introduces encryption for most handshake messages and conceals the actual TLS record content type, complicating the task for state-of-the-art C2 traffic classifiers that were initially developed for TLS 1.2 traffic. Given the pressing need to accurately detect malicious C2 communications, this paper examines to what extent existing C2 classifiers for TLS 1.2 are less effective when applied to TLS 1.3 traffic, posing a central research question: is it possible to adapt TLS 1.2 detection methodologies for C2 traffic to work with TLS 1.3 flows? We answer this question affirmatively by introducing new methods for inferring certificate size and filtering handshake/protocol-related records in TLS 1.3 flows. These techniques enable the extraction of key features for enhancing traffic detection and can be utilized to pre-process data flows before applying C2 classifiers. We demonstrate that this approach facilitates the use of existing TLS 1.2 C2 classifiers with high efficacy, allowing for the passive classification of encrypted network traffic. In our tests, we inferred certificate sizes with an average error of 1.0%, and achieved detection rates of 100% when classifying traffic based on certificate size, and over 93% when classifying TLS 1.3 traffic behavior after training solely on TLS 1.2 traffic. To our knowledge, these are the first findings to showcase specialized TLS 1.3 C2 traffic classification.

1 September 2017
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
RMRicardo Macedo
Ricardo Macedo
JPJoao Paulo
Joao Paulo
RPRogerio Pontes
Rogerio Pontes
BPBernardo Portela
Bernardo Portela
TOTiago Oliveira
Tiago Oliveira
RORui Oliveira
Rui Oliveira
Cloud infrastructures provide database services as cost-efficient and scalable solutions for storing and processing large amounts of data. To maximize performance, these services require users to trust sensitive information to the cloud provider, which raises privacy and legal concerns. This represents a major obstacle to the adoption of the cloud computing paradigm. Recent work addressed this issue by extending databases to compute over encrypted data. However, these approaches usually support a single and strict combination of cryptographic techniques invariably making them application specific. To assess and broaden the applicability of cryptographic techniques in secure cloud storage and processing, these techniques need to be thoroughly evaluated in a modular and configurable database environment. This is even more noticeable for NoSQL data stores where data privacy is still mostly overlooked. In this paper, we present a generic NoSQL framework and a set of libraries supporting data processing cryptographic techniques that can be used with existing NoSQL engines and composed to meet the privacy and performance requirements of different applications. This is achieved through a modular and extensible design that enables data processing over multiple cryptographic techniques applied on the same database. For each technique, we provide an overview of its security model, along with an extensive set of experiments. The framework is evaluated with the YCSB benchmark, where we assess the practicality and performance tradeoffs for different combinations of cryptographic techniques. The results for a set of macro experiments show that the average overhead in NoSQL operations performance is below 15%, when comparing our system with a baseline database without privacy guarantees.

1 July 2018
Verified
Conference Paper
Closed access
JAJose Bacelar Almeida
Jose Bacelar Almeida
MBManuel Barbosa
Manuel Barbosa
GBGilles Barthe
Gilles Barthe
HPHugo Pacheco
Hugo Pacheco
VPVitor Pereira
Vitor Pereira
BPBernardo Portela
Bernardo Portela
We give a language-based security treatment of domain-specific languages and compilers for secure multi-party computation, a cryptographic paradigm that enables collaborative computation over encrypted data. Computations are specified in a core imperative language, as if they were intended to be executed by a trusted-third party, and formally verified against an information-flow policy modelling (an upper bound to) their leakage. This allows non-experts to assess the impact of performance-driven authorized disclosure of intermediate values. Specifications are then compiled to multi-party protocols. We formalize protocol security using (distributed) probabilistic information-flow and prove security-preserving compilation: protocols only leak what is allowed by the source policy. The proof exploits a natural but previously missing correspondence between simulation-based cryptographic proofs and (composable) probabilistic non-interference. Finally, we extend our framework to justify leakage cancelling, a domain-specific optimization that allows to first write an efficient specification that fails to meet the allowed leakage upper-bound, and then apply a probabilistic pre-processing that brings leakage to the acceptable range.