1 February 2012 in International Journal of Psychophysiology
1 March 2015 in European Journal of Neuroscience
Attention is a hypothetical mechanism in the service of perception that facilitates the processing of relevant information and inhibits the processing of irrelevant information. Prediction is a hypothetical mechanism in the service of perception that considers prior information when interpreting the sensorial input. Although both (attention and prediction) aid perception, they are rarely considered together. Auditory attention typically yields enhanced brain activity, whereas auditory prediction often results in attenuated brain responses. However, when strongly predicted sounds are omitted, brain responses to silence resemble those elicited by sounds. Studies jointly investigating attention and prediction revealed that these different mechanisms may interact, e.g. attention may magnify the processing differences between predicted and unpredicted sounds. Following the predictive coding theory, we suggest that prediction relates to predictions sent down from predictive models housed in higher levels of the processing hierarchy to lower levels and attention refers to gain modulation of the prediction error signal sent up to the higher level. As predictions encode contents and confidence in the sensory data, and as gain can be modulated by the intention of the listener and by the predictability of the input, various possibilities for interactions between attention and prediction can be unfolded. From this perspective, the traditional distinction between bottom‐up/exogenous and top‐down/endogenous driven attention can be revisited and the classic concepts of attentional gain and attentional trace can be integrated.
1 July 2008 in Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience
The sensitivity of involuntary attention to top-down modulation was tested using an auditory-visual distraction task and a working memory (WM) load manipulation in subjects performing a simple visual classification task while ignoring contingent auditory stimulation. The sounds were repetitive standard tones (80%) and environmental novel sounds (20%). Distraction caused by the novel sounds was compared across a 1-back WM condition and a no-memory control condition, both involving the comparison of two digits. Event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to the sounds were recorded, and the N1/MMN (mismatch negativity), novelty-P3, and RON components were identified in the novel minus standard difference waveforms. Distraction was reduced in the WM condition, both behaviorally and as indexed by an attenuation of the late phase of the novelty-P3. The transient/change detection mechanism indexed by MMN was not affected by the WM manipulation. Sustained, slow frontal and parietal waveforms related to WM processes were found on the standard ERPs. The present results indicate that distraction caused by irrelevant novel sounds is reduced when a WM component is involved in the task, and that this modulation by WM load takes place at a late stage of the orienting response, all in all confirming that involuntary attention is under the control of top-down mechanisms. Moreover, as these results contradict predictions of the load theory of selective attention and cognitive control, it is suggested that the WM load effects on distraction depend on the nature of the distractor-target relationships.
15 May 2013 in Journal of Neuroscience
The remarkable capabilities displayed by humans in making sense of an overwhelming amount of sensory information cannot be explained easily if perception is viewed as a passive process. Current theoretical and computational models assume that to achieve meaningful and coherent perception, the human brain must anticipate upcoming stimulation. But how are upcoming stimuli predicted in the brain? We unmasked the neural representation of a prediction by omitting the predicted sensory input. Electrophysiological brain signals showed that when a clear prediction can be formulated, the brain activates a template of its response to the predicted stimulus before it arrives to our senses.
1 January 2008 in Cognition
3 January 2013 in BMC Neuroscience
If we initiate a sound by our own motor behavior, the N1 component of the auditory event-related brain potential (ERP) that the sound elicits is attenuated compared to the N1 elicited by the same sound when it is initiated externally. It has been suggested that this N1 suppression results from an internal predictive mechanism that is in the service of discriminating the sensory consequences of one’s own actions from other sensory input. As the N1-suppression effect is becoming a popular approach to investigate predictive processing in cognitive and social neuroscience, it is important to exclude an alternative interpretation not related to prediction. According to the attentional account, the N1 suppression is due to a difference in the allocation of attention between self- and externally-initiated sounds. To test this hypothesis, we manipulated the allocation of attention to the sounds in different blocks: Attention was directed either to the sounds, to the own motor acts or to visual stimuli. If attention causes the N1-suppression effect, then manipulating attention should affect the effect for self-initiated sounds. We found N1 suppression in all conditions. The N1 per se was affected by attention, but there was no interaction between attention and self-initiation effects. This implies that self-initiation N1 effects are not caused by attention. The present results support the assumption that the N1-suppression effect for self-initiated sounds indicates the operation of an internal predictive mechanism. Furthermore, while attention had an influence on the N1a, N1b, and N1c components, the N1-suppression effect was confined to the N1b and N1c subcomponents suggesting that the major contribution to the auditory N1-suppression effect is circumscribed to late N1 components.