Therese Anders

Therese Anders

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Therese Anders

School of International Relations, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA

Research Focus & Metrics

Academic Career Length

11Years (2016-Present)

(Calculated once Scilit publication data is synced: current year − year of first publication + 1)

Representative Publications

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17 February 2022 in Journal of Conflict Resolution
Verified
Journal Article
Closed access
CFChristopher J. Fariss
Christopher J. Fariss
TATherese Anders
Therese Anders
JMJonathan N. Markowitz
Jonathan N. Markowitz
MBMiriam Barnum
Miriam Barnum
Gross domestic product (GDP), GDP per capita, and population are central to the study of politics and economics broadly, and conflict processes in particular. Despite the prominence of these variables in empirical research, existing data lack historical coverage and are assumed to be measured without error. We develop a latent variable modeling framework that expands data coverage (1500 AD–2018 AD) and, by making use of multiple indicators for each variable, provides a principled framework to estimate uncertainty for values for all country-year variables relative to one another. Expanded temporal coverage of estimates provides new insights about the relationship between development and democracy, conflict, repression, and health. We also demonstrate how to incorporate uncertainty in observational models. Results show that the relationship between repression and development is weaker than models that do not incorporate uncertainty suggest. Future extensions of the latent variable model can address other forms of systematic measurement error with new data, new measurement theory, or both.

30 October 2020 in Journal of Peace Research
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Journal Article
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TATherese Anders
Therese Anders
Territorial control is a central variable for civil war research – yet, we lack sufficiently detailed data to capture subnational dynamics and offer cross-country coverage. This article advances a new measurement strategy for territorial control in asymmetric civil wars. Territorial control is conceptualized as an unobserved latent variable that can be estimated via observed variation in rebel tactics. The strategy builds on a theoretical model of rebel tactics, by which rebels use terrorism less when they control a given area – preferring conventional tactics, which require higher levels of territorial control. The latent variable, territorial control, is estimated via a Hidden Markov Model (HMM). As an observable indicator for rebel tactics, I leverage geo-coded event data and a function of the relative frequency of terrorist attacks and conventional war acts, weighted by time and distance. The model yields estimates of territorial control for asymmetric civil wars at a resolution of 0.25 decimal degree minimum diameter hexagonal grid cells. Validation of estimates for the Colombian and Nigerian civil wars suggests HMMs as a fruitful avenue to estimate spatiotemporal variation in territorial control.

24 April 2020 in International Studies Quarterly
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Journal Article
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TATherese Anders
Therese Anders
CFChristopher J Fariss
Christopher J Fariss
JMJonathan N Markowitz
Jonathan N Markowitz
Scholars systematically mismeasure power resources and military burdens by using gross domestic product (GDP) as a proxy for the income states can devote to arming. The core problem is that GDP confounds two conceptually distinct forms of income into one additive indicator. Subsistence income represents resources needed to provide the “bread” necessary to cover the basic subsistence needs of the population. Surplus income represents the remaining resources that could be allocated to “guns” or “butter.” Our new measure of surplus domestic product (SDP) corrects for this measurement error by decomposing subsistence income and surplus income from total GDP. Validation exercises demonstrate that SDP outperforms GDP at measuring the distribution of power resources. Though theoretically we expect states’ decisions to arm are influenced by the distribution of power; empirical models using GDP find mixed support for this expectation. Strikingly, using SDP reveals strong support for this proposition.

17 September 2018 in Political Psychology
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Journal Article
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BRBrian C. Rathbun
Brian C. Rathbun
KPKathleen E. Powers
Kathleen E. Powers
TATherese Anders
Therese Anders